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Abstract 
 
This thesis provides a critical interrogation of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and global distributive justice. The central argument of the thesis is that 
global corporations display profound effects on people‘s life chances, which 
should render such corporations subject to principles of global distributive 
justice. Such principles, it is argued, ought to reflect the complex realities of the 
political-economic circumstances within which corporations operate. Thus the 
thesis provides an account of global distributive justice that speaks to both 
political philosophical attempts to ground discussion of global justice in the 
extant realities of globalisation, as well to critical accounts of the corporation 
within the global economy that as yet lack a normative foundation on which 
proposals for reform can be based. The thesis argues that both statist and 
cosmopolitan conceptions of justice have neglected the important role 
corporations play in many unjust circumstances. In an attempt to reconcile the 
gap that often exists in political philosophy between theory and practice, the 
thesis discusses two sets of normative standards that it argues ought to apply to 
corporate activity. The first set, the ideal-aspirational set, draws on Rawlsian 
ideas to do with property-owning democracy, and argues that a fully just 
corporation on this reading would set restrictions on corporate size, profit and 
executive remuneration, as well as requiring a change from concentrated 
ownership in the hands of a few, to widespread ownership. The second set of 
ideas, those of concessive theory - to which priority is given - concedes to the 
facts of global corporations and global capitalism, and addresses both substance 
and procedure in relation to global distributive justice. In relation to substance, a 
do no harm principle is suggested as the basic normative minimum standard by 
which corporate activity should be assessed. In relation to procedure, the 
application of an all affected interests principle would give those who experience 
the profound effects of corporations a right to a say in decisions taken that affect 
their lives. Cutting across these principles are five conditions that would work 
towards their implementation throughout global corporate activity. These 
conditions are: pre-consultative learning, transparency and disclosure of 
information, a consultative forum, evaluation, and the opportunity for redress. 
The thesis concludes with an assessment of the UN Global Compact and an 
analysis of the extent to which the Compact meets the ideas of thesis, as well as 
making recommendations for reform of the Compact on the basis of these ideas.  
 
  
 
1 
1: Introduction 
 
This thesis critically interrogates Corporate Social Responsibility (hereinafter 
CSR) policies from the perspective of global distributive justice.  The activities 
and behaviour of global corporations are of utmost importance to politics, to 
political philosophy and, more specifically, to the idea of distributive justice. 
Global corporations shape and determine the sorts of lives that people across the 
world are able to live, and in many instances, it can be argued, they do this in a 
problematic or harmful manner. The financial crisis and recession of 2009 is one 
example of this. It is not difficult to think of other instances – global corporations 
are central to questions of human rights, labour rights, and the environment. CSR 
policies are the most common way in which global corporations currently 
respond to such allegations, separating out their wider societal responsibilities 
from their commercial role. This thesis provides a critical examination of CSR, 
using the key argument that global corporations display a profound effect on 
people‘s life chances, such that their activities should be subject to principles of 
global distributive justice.      
 
The idea that corporations have a profound effect on people‘s life chances is 
stated and developed throughout the thesis. However, at the outset it is useful to 
outline in figures the extent and nature of this ―profound effect‖. In 2009, the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports the 
following: ―there are 82,000 TNCs [transnational corporations] worldwide, with 
810,000 foreign affiliates … exports by foreign affiliates of TNCs are estimated 
to account for about a third of total world exports of goods and services, and the 
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number of people employed by them worldwide totalled about 77 million in 
2008‖ (UNCTAD, 2009: 8). The size of such companies is also noted by 
UNCTAD: between 2006 and 2008 the world‘s largest 100 companies 
―accounted for, on average, 9%, 16% and 11% respectively, of estimated foreign 
assets, sales and employment of all TNCs.‖ (Ibid: 10). It is important to note the 
inescapable political nature of corporations this size; as Anderson and Cavanagh 
note, by 2000, of the largest 100 economies in the world, 51 were corporations 
and 49 were states (2000: 3).  
 
Hence this profound effect can be quantitatively expressed; qualitative 
expressions abound. Amidst widespread and persistent allegations of corporate 
abuse and denial of human and labour rights, as well as corporate harm to the 
environment, the financial crisis and recession of 2008/2009 has triggered the 
idea in the popular mindset that corporations are responsible for inequality and 
unfairness, manifested in unemployment, loss of income through pensions and 
savings and public sector bailouts of private sector organisations. Furthermore 
there is a common perception that this impact is made possible because of the 
inordinate amount of power that global corporations wield over international 
organisations, governments, societies, and individuals.   It is to such effects that 
the political philosophical element of the thesis speaks. Corporate activity of this 
nature is not just a temporary problem requiring a policy-based response. This 
phenomenon raises significant problems for political philosophy that require a 
thorough and systematic investigation of how it might be possible to mitigate 
these profound effects.  
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Distributive justice is concerned with societal arrangements for assigning basic 
rights and duties to citizens, and for determining the fair distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of societal cooperation. There is by no means consensus on 
the idea of distributive justice. The thesis adds to this area of political 
philiosophy by contending that global corporations should be of concern to 
questions of justice. Indeed, global corporations present an urgent dilemma for 
political philosophy, in that it is difficult to see how a fair distribution of benefits 
and burdens of societal cooperation can be developed without reference to global 
corporations, such is their impact upon society and the people therein. However, 
in large part, dominant theories of distributive justice do not explicitly include 
global corporations within their purview.  
 
Thus the thesis seeks to address this gap by responding to the central research 
question that asks, what demands could and should a conception of global 
distributive justice make of global corporations and their CSR policies? The 
thesis argues that it is the effects that corporations have on people‘s lives that 
prompts this as a necessary question to ask. In order to to do this the thesis 
explores the ways in which such claims of justice can be made.  Despite many 
recent attempts to ground the question of justice in political-economic changes 
related to institutions of global governance and globalised markets, the normative 
implications of the activities of global corporations remain markedly unexamined 
by political philosophy. In parallel, international political economy (IPE)-based 
accounts of global corporations and CSR, while imparting systematic critiques of 
corporations, have not explored the possibility of developing a normative 
proposal by which corporate activity could be assessed and reformed. Political 
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philosophy, in its concern with articulating an ―ideal‖ conception of justice, thus 
remains largely divorced from extant realities that change the way in which the 
question of justice ought to be approached and responded to. Similarly, IPE 
accounts of corporations, while often calling for reform of corporate activity, 
have not engaged systemactically with emergent philosophical ideas of global 
distributive justice.  
 
Key to developing such a proposal is that the question of justice and corporations 
cannot be resolved by reference to states or global public instutions of 
governance alone. The political and economic environment in which 
corporations operate necessitates a more complex response. This complexity is 
manifested in the way in which corporate activity impinges upon conceptions of 
distributive justice that neatly divide into categories of the national and the 
international, as well as the public and the private. This transgression of 
boundaries provokes two key concerns for the thesis. On the one hand, the thesis 
is concerned with the globality of global corporations, and argues that state-
based theories of distributive justice cannot adequately address the activities of 
global corporations. On the other hand, the thesis argues that cosmopolitan 
conceptions of global distributive justice that are addressed to global public 
institutions of governance are incomplete as a result of the lack of attention that 
is paid to global corporations.  
 
In their ―real-world‖ transgressions of these analytical and normative categories, 
global corporations problematise most conventional accounts of distributive 
justice, which set out to address and rectify the central political problem of how 
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societies should be organised so that it is possible for those living within those 
societies to live a just life. In the midst of this complexity, the thesis aims to set 
out a normative proposal that achieves a balance between what is desirable, and 
what is feasible. This is borne of the contention that the primary use of political 
philosophy ought to be its application to ―real world‖ circumstances, thus joining 
theory with practice. The thesis contends that making the link beween justice and 
global corporations is both desirable and necessary, but most importantly, is 
possible, by speaking across disciplinary boundaries in a systematic way.  
 
The contention that global corporations have a real and significant effect on the 
type and quality of life many people experience infers that such corporations 
have a scope of reponsibility that extends beyond their commercial remit. CSR 
policies constitute the dominant corporate response to this extension of 
responsiblities. By making commitments regarding some of the ways in which 
their activities affect people‘s lives (such as in relation to human rights, labour 
rights, or environmental standards), corporations attempt to manage such effects 
through a process of self-regulation. Yet CSR is by no means uncontested or 
uncontestable. Given the fact of its existence, and the nature of the issues 
addressed, however, CSR warrants attention from political philosophy.  
 
Hence, the central argument of the thesis is as follows. The profound effects that 
global corporations have on people‘s lives renders them subject to principles of 
global distributive justice. In order to join (political philosophical) theory with 
(corporate) practice, the thesis extends and develops this contention by 
addressing the process of CSR, using it as a focal target for deveoping a 
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conception of global distributive justice. Understood within a cosmopolitan-
liberal frame, the thesis offers a critique and proposal for reform of global 
corporate acitivty through the process of CSR as one such conception. The thesis 
does this by developing a series of proposals, which are applied to a working 
example of CSR, the UN Global Compact. Briefly, these proposals articulate two 
ideas. The first, in ideal-aspirational terms, is that a just corporation would be 
smaller, working from a widespread (rather than concentrated) ownership base, 
with a fairer redistribution of profits, all proceeding from a base of equality 
within society. The second proposal concedes to certain facts and, given the 
stated aim of the thesis to link theory and practice, is afforded more attention by 
the thesis. This proposal suggests that a conception of global distributive justice 
ought to concede to the facts of global capitalism and the existence of global 
corporations, as well as the manner in which the question of corporate 
responsibility has emerged historically. On this basis, the thesis contends that 
global corporations should be subject to a do no harm principle, as well as an all-
affected interests principle, which are implemented and overseen by reference to 
five conditions that apply to the process of CSR. These conditions are: pre-
consultative learning, transparency and disclosure of information, a consultative 
forum, evaluation and the opportunity for redress.  
 
The introduction proceeds as follows. The next section establishes the subject 
area of the thesis and outlines its two central contributions to knowledge. The 
latter part of the second section sets out the central research question, as well as 
five sub-questions through which the central question is explored and responded 
to. The third section of the introduction details the theoretical framework through 
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which the research questions are answered. The fourth section of the introduction 
outlines the central argument of the thesis, and provides a qualitative explication 
of the central claims of the thesis by detailing the various ways in which it is 
alleged that corporations shape people‘s lives. The final section outlines the 
chapter structure of the thesis.  
 
1.1 Subject Area  
 
The thesis is concerned with two subject areas within the broader field of 
international politics: global political theory and IPE/global governance-based 
accounts of global corporations. This section of the introduction outlines in broad 
terms the parameters of these subject areas and articulates the motivations behind 
the attempt to draw both areas together. It is a central conviction of this thesis 
that both fields of work are enhanced by dialogue across disciplines, and it is this 
conviction that represents the foundation for the original contribution to 
knowledge that the thesis makes. This section first summarises the contributions 
of the thesis, then details these contributions further, and finally outlines the 
research questions that the thesis seeks to answer.  
 
On the one hand, the thesis speaks to the emergent branch of political philosophy 
that is concerned with justice beyond the domestic state. Many different 
approaches characterise this field of thought – from those that emphasise the 
centrality of the state or the nation within questions of global justice, such as 
Miller (2007), Nagel (2005), and Rawls (2001b), to those that adopt a 
cosmopolitan view, in which the individual is deemed to be the central unit of 
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moral concern, such as Beitz (1999), Caney (2005b), Pogge (2002; 2008), 
Nussbaum (2003), O‘Neill (2000), and Tan (2004).  The thesis argues the first 
approach overplays the capacity of the domestic state to regulate global 
corporations, bound as it is by a concept of territoriality; chapter four outlines 
both normative and empirical reasons as to why this is problematic. The second 
approach, it is argued, is generally incomplete in that the activities of global 
corporations are not explicitly addressed; chapter five develops a critique of such 
conceptions on this basis.  
 
On the other hand, the thesis contributes to the literature within IPE and global 
governance that is concerned with the role that global corporations and CSR play 
in contemporary world politics. Private corporations have of course always been 
a concern of IPE (see for example, Gill and Law 1989; Gill, 2003; Strange, 
2003). However, the past decade has seen a growth in the number of IPE 
specialists who are concerned with the existence of various strands of private 
authority within global governance, that are involved in the making and 
development of rules and standards at the global level; global corporations and 
CSR are part of these strands of authority (for an overview of recent literature in 
the area, see Ougaard, 2008). Within this broad field as well, there have been 
numerous urges to rethink normative questions of justice, democracy and 
equality in the context of the challenges posed by contemporary processes of 
globalization (see for example Higgott, 2001; Higgott and Devetak, 1999; 
McGrew, 1997; Murphy, 2000). The chief concern of this literature is that 
contemporary processes of globalisation dilute and to an extent break down both 
the real and imagined boundaries that have been set around such normative 
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questions and thus the manner in which we address such questions requires 
interrogation. The thesis is located at the intersection of these sets of literature, 
both of which prompt the question of justice and corporations albeit in different 
ways. The thesis addresses this by explicitly engaging ideas within analytical 
political theory that address the applicability of principles of distributive justice 
to institutions that have a profound effect on people‘s life chances.  
 
1.1.1 Contributions to Knowledge 
The thesis proceeds from the contention that questions of justice cannot be 
answered solely by reference to binary categories of national and international, 
or public and private. This position derives from a view of global governance 
that emphasises the complexity and poly-centric nature of the origin of rules, 
processes, and social relations that shape and affect people‘s lives:  
 
[…] it is plain that globalization has significantly affected the mode of 
governance. In tandem with this reconfiguration of social space, the statist 
mould of the old has given way to a polycentric framework of regulation. 
States continue to figure very significantly in this post-statist condition, but 
they are embedded in multi-scalar and diffuse networks of regulation. 
Polycentric governance occurs though diverse and often interconnected 
public and private arrangements on varying scales from local to global. 
This situation has lacked the clear centre of command and control of the 
sort the Westphalian sovereign state once provided (Scholte, 2005: 221-
222).  
 
Such respatialisation of social relations calls for a reconfiguration of the 
boundaries within which much social scientific thought is situated. Political 
philosophical thought about distributive justice, in the manner in which much 
work proceeds from the assumption of the nation state as the central mode of 
governance affecting and shaping people‘s lives, ought not be immune to this. In 
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this regard, and with reference to the first contribution to knowledge the thesis 
makes,
1
 the work of Rawls is indicative of the ontological assumptions that shape 
many characterisations of distributive justice. He states:  
 
I shall be satisfied if it is possible to formulate a reasonable conception of 
justice for the basic structure of society conceived for the time being as a 
closed system isolated from other societies. The significance of this special 
case is obvious and needs no explanation. It is natural to conjecture that 
once we have a sound theory for this case, the remaining problems of 
justice will prove more tractable in the light of it. With suitable 
modifications such a theory should provide the key for some of these other 
discussions. (1999: 7).  
 
In laying out this limitation, Rawls established the nation-state, and more 
specifically the liberal-democratic state, as the locus of activity and decision-
making that is of concern to work on distributive justice. Shaped by a series of 
institutions, which he characterised as the basic structure of society, Rawls 
proceeds from the idea that the liberal-democratic state is responsible for the type 
and quality of life that citizens experience, and the idea that it is to this set of 
institutions that principles of justice must apply. The basic structure is the overall 
framework within which Rawlsian thought applies, and while its central 
characteristic in Rawl‘s work is that it is a state, the basic structure is significant 
in that it has effects on people‘s lives that are ―profound and present from the 
start‖ (Ibid my emphasis). In this, the idea of the basic structure articulates the 
belief that there is an inescapable institutional character to a society that is 
crucial in determining people‘s life chances. Individuals have a limited capacity 
to resist the effect of this structure, and the job of the principles of justice is to 
shape it so that the profound effects it has are just and fair.  
                                                        
1 It is important to note that these contributions to knowledge are not listed in order of priority; 
both are deemed to be of equal value within the thesis.  
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This limitation to the nation state of principles of justice is more fully critiqued 
by the thesis in chapter four, which outlines normative and empirical reasons for 
why this limitation is so problematic. Broadly, it is argued that states do not 
constitute the only form of political organisation through which questions of 
justice arise and can be responded to. An IPE-based account of globalisation tells 
against the desirability of this limitation in the way in which it highlights the 
ongoing, intensified development and articulation of norms, rules and standards 
at the global level that shape people‘s lives to a significant extent. CSR is one 
example of how this happens.  
 
Following on from this, the thesis also makes a contribution to cosmopolitan 
conceptions of global distributive justice, in the manner in which it draws 
attention to the important role global corporations have to play in the type and 
quality of life that people experience. Cosmopolitan thought has its lineage in the 
work of Kant ({1795} in Reiss and Nisbet 1991) and has always articulated the 
importance of the universal in questions of ethics and justice. However, in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, analytical political philosophy predominantly 
treated questions of justice as coterminous with the part the state has to play in 
determining the type and quality of life people experience, hence the vast amount 
of attention and thought that has gone into Rawlsian-influenced conceptions of 
distributive justice.  However, towards the end of the twentieth century, 
cosmopolitan thought began to regain ground within the field, as a response to 
contemporary processes of globalisation and concomitant doubts about both the 
empirical suitability, as well as the normative desirability, of the continued use of 
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the state as the central locus of concern within questions of justice. In this regard, 
cosmopolitans have approached various questions, from the broader normative 
ones of justice and democracy (for example Caney, 2005b; Held, 1995; McGrew, 
2002; Pogge, 2002 and 2008; Tan, 2004;) to more specifically applied questions 
of global finance (Brassett, 2009), institutions of global governance (Best, 2006), 
or global civil society (Kaldor, 2001; Scholte, 2001) to name but a few.  
 
While both approaches mentioned above deal with social, political and economic 
relations beyond the domestic state, the question of the normative demands that 
can be made of global corporations has not been systematically dealt with. As 
such the thesis makes a contribution to this literature by drawing together both 
cosmopolitan as well as some state-based ideas about distributive justice, with 
literature from IPE and global governance that addresses global corporations, 
private authority and CSR. Chapter five develops a more extensive critique of 
existing cosmopolitan conceptions of distributive justice in this vein of thought.  
 
The second contribution to knowledge that the thesis makes is to link the 
normative questions of justice into the IPE and global governance literature. As 
mentioned above, there have been moves in this direction in recent years, to 
bring to attention the necessity of developing an ethical response to globalisation. 
In this regard, what tends to be emphasised is the changing nature of the domain 
within which questions of justice ought to be addressed, with the sphere of 
concern for justice being recharacterised variously as the ―global public domain‖ 
(Ruggie, 2004), the ―global polity‖ (Ougaard and Higgott, 2002), or the ―global 
basic structure‖ (Buchanan, 2000). The thesis takes these calls for a normative 
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assessment of contemporary globalisation as an invitation to connect research 
that emphasises the key role that forms of private authority, such as global 
corporations, play within contemporary world politics, with political theory.  
 
The involvement of global corporations, and other forms of private authority, 
within structures of global governance is neither unitary nor linear. Some have 
written about global corporations and the manner in which they are able to 
influence global governance arrangements and the different ways in which they 
exercise this power (for example, Fuchs 2007; May, 2006). Others have assessed 
global corporations in terms of the way in which they cooperate amongst 
themselves in order to pursue economic and political goals (for example Graz 
and Noelke, 2008), as well as with autonomous political organisations (for 
example, Cutler, Haufler and Porter, 1999), or alternatively, with other private 
actors (Pattberg, 2007). Some literature has emphasised the way in which 
corporations are contributors to regulation in what are traditionally thought to be 
―public sector‖ areas (Haufler, 2001). Other work has emphasised the role that 
private sector actors play in particular subject areas, for instance, the 
environment (for example, Falkner 2008; Newell, 2000; Newell and Levy, 2004 
and 2006;), development (Bull and McNeill, 2007) or information technology 
(Haufler, 2001). 
 
Within and amongst this literature is the phenomenon of CSR. Further 
characterisation of CSR is developed in chapters two and three. For the purposes 
of this section, however, it is necessary to indicate the reasoning behind the 
selection of CSR as a focus for the normative question of global distributive 
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justice. CSR policies are generally the manner in which global corporations deal 
with what they deem to be their responsibilities to society beyond their remit as 
commercial entities. One way in which they do this is in participation in the 
above-mentioned structures of global governance, in partnership with various 
other private actors, or states, or international organizations. Of course, some 
CSR policies are developed by corporations on their own, but for the large part 
they make at least some reference to an external organization, or to externally 
determined standards. In general, CSR policies address matters such as human 
rights, labour rights, environmental standards and social standards. Thus the 
thesis contends that it is within such policies that the normative demands that 
justice could make of global corporations ought to be developed.  
 
The way in which the thesis contributes to the above mentioned literature on 
private authority within global governance is by attempting to open up this area 
of work to normative critique through a systematic engagement with the 
philosophical idea of distributive justice. The central argument, developed and 
expanded upon in the fourth section of the introduction and throughout the thesis, 
is that global corporations are responsible for exerting profound effects on 
people‘s life chances, such that they ought to be subject to principles of global 
distributive justice. In order to do this, the thesis opens up the process of CSR to 
normative scrutiny and ultimately makes suggestions for how it could be 
reformed with a conception of justice at its core. The various problems that many 
authors have argued are associated with CSR have included issues such as 
accountability (Newell, 2005), the non-negotiability of values within standard 
CSR approaches (Blowfield, 2005a), the use of the concept of citizenship in 
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relation to corporations (Crane, Matten and Moon, 2008), as well as the 
privatisation of CSR norms involved in the process (Cutler, 2006). The political-
philosophical inspired response of the thesis to such concerns about CSR is that 
the activities and behaviour of global corporations and their CSR render them 
subject to a conception of global distributive justice that incorporates such 
activities. Thus the thesis identifies a gap in the literature in relation to global 
justice and the activities of global corporations, as well as a gap in the literature 
on private corporations and CSR in relation to the normative demands that ought 
to be made of global corporations. In bringing these two sets of literature 
together, the thesis develops two sets of proposals that place the issue of 
distributive justice at the core of corporate activity and applies these ideas to the 
UN Global Compact, as a working example of CSR.  
 
1.1.2 Research Questions 
The central argument of the thesis is pitched at the above mentioned gaps in the 
literature to do with global distributive justice and IPE-global governance based 
accounts of global corporations. By making the case that global corporations 
display profound effects on people‘s life chances, the thesis proposes the 
development of a conception of global distributive justice that can mitigate these 
effects by addressing the process of CSR. Thus the thesis poses a central research 
question that is of necessity inter-disciplinary and that seeks to avoid the 
limitations of existing literature, as outlined above.  
 
Hence the thesis addresses and responds to the following central research 
question: 
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 In the context of contemporary intensified processes of globalisation, what 
demands can and should a conception of global distributive justice make 
of global corporations and their CSR policies? 
 
The thesis proceeds on the basis that an adequate response to this question is not 
to be found in a state-based approach to justice, nor is one to be found by 
addressing only global public institutions of governance. The matter of justice 
and corporations elicits a more complex response that reflects the poly-centric 
framework of governance within which corporations operate. Addressing this 
empirical reality is a key concern for the thesis. However, so too is the demand 
for a normative proposal that sets out what justice in relation to corporations 
requires. Therefore, the thesis addresses a series of sub-questions that reflect the 
complexity within which corporations operate, the need to rethink conventional 
accounts of justice prompted by this, as well as the need for a normatively 
demanding set of requirements. Hence, the sub-questions addressed are:  
 
 In what ways are the history and emergence of CSR important from the 
perspective of global distributive justice? 
 How, if at all, can the application of principles of global distributive justice 
to global corporations be justified? 
 In ideal circumstances, as well as in aspirational terms, what demands 
should a conception of global distributive justice make of global 
corporations and CSR? 
 In non-ideal circumstances, conceding to the currently prevailing facts of 
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global capitalism and global corporations, what demands should a 
conception of global distributive justice make of global corporations and 
CSR? 
 How do these concessive ideas relate to a working example of CSR, the 
UN Global Compact? 
 
By addressing these research questions, the thesis seeks to extend and develop 
the idea that corporations ought to be subject to principles of justice in a hitherto 
unexplored way – that is by connecting two diverse sets of literature. These 
research questions pay attention to the actors and structures of global governance 
that shape people‘s lives, while also paying attention to the normative ideals of 
justice.  
 
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
The purpose of the theoretical framework is to establish the lens through which 
the research questions are understood and answers are approached. In laying out 
the philosophical underpinnings of the thesis, the theoretical framework makes 
clear the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the work. The thesis is 
broadly cosmopolitan-liberal in its outlook. This section of the introduction 
attempts to flesh out the implications of this outlook for the manner in which the 
argument of the thesis has been made.  
 
1.2.1 Cosmopolitan Suffering 
Cosmopolitanism is not new – this set of ideas has existed since ancient Greece 
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(Vertovec & Cohen, 2002: 5). In more recent times, cosmopolitanism has 
experienced a resurgence in academic interest, prompted in large part because of 
the growing acceptance of the impact that contemporary globalizing processes 
have on the study of international politics. In chapter five, the manner in which 
contemporary cosmopolitans have discussed specifically questions of global 
justice is discussed in greater detail. In this section of the introduction, however, 
cosmopolitanism is introduced as a partial theoretical frame for the argument 
being made in the thesis.  
 
As a starting premise, the cosmopolitan perspective of the thesis is manifest in 
the fundamental assertion that the territorially bound nation state is not the sole 
locus of human and political organization in which people‘s lives are determined, 
played out and shaped. Cosmopolitanism, from this point of view, allows for the 
adoption of a methodological and theoretical frame from which to approach 
questions of justice. As a starting point, cosmopolitanism focuses our concern on 
the universal questions of justice and ethics as just that – universal, with a central 
idea being that such questions pertain to all of humanity at any one time. This is 
not to argue that cosmopolitanism would prompt universal (or common) answers 
to such questions, but to assert that an appropriate starting-point for our scope of 
concern in thought about such questions is that there is an inescapable 
universality therein.  
 
As such, the thesis asserts that questions of justice are not always and only 
particular to one state, nation or country, thus the parameters of thought about 
justice ought not always be designed to align with parochial or territorial 
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boundaries. It is important to be clear here about the conception of 
cosmopolitanism being adopted here. An extreme version of this view would 
argue that there are no questions of justice that arise only in particular states. It is 
not necessary here to adopt such a view. Instead the thesis proceeds from the 
more modest cosmopolitan position that justice, in certain cases, can be a 
question for the state, but the state is not the only form of institution within 
which questions of justice arise. Global corporations are one manifestation of 
this claim. Thus the framework of cosmopolitanism opens up the question of 
justice beyond the territorial boundaries of the state, eliciting a response to 
certain questions of justice that are not particular to one state.  
 
This leads to the question of what we are responding to when these questions of 
justice allegedly arise. If justice is not always about responding to, say, the rights 
of citizens within a particular state, then what is it about? In a sense, if we 
conceive of justice as being a solely state bound idea, then the answer can be 
simplified to an extent. Of course, political philosophy has produced many 
different answers to questions of this nature – Rawls argued that justice is about 
the distribution of primary goods (1999); Dworkin argues that justice is about the 
distribution of resources (2002); Sen and Nussbaum argue that justice is about 
the distribution of capabilities (Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000); Nozick argued that 
justice is about the distribution of property rights (1974). Thus, debates about 
distributive justice have largely centred on whether such distribution should be, 
say, egalitarian, utilitarian, or libertarian. The simplification, mentioned above, is 
that such debates (with exceptions) have been conducted on the assumption that 
justice is a question that can be satisfactorily responded to within the real and 
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abstract boundaries of the nation-state. More particularly, justice in most of the 
above paradigms has been discussed in relation to a liberal democratic state; the 
exception here is the capabilities approach, developed by Sen and Nussbaum, 
which has informed Nussbaum‘s conception of global justice (2003), as well as 
influencing notions of development. As well as this, others such as Caney 
(2005b) and Beitz (1999) have articulated globalised versions of egalitarianism 
(this is discussed further in chapter five) and Pogge (2002 and 2008) has 
deliberately made his conception of global justice appealing to libertarians,  
 
Overall, however, the thesis argues that in relation to justice and corporations, 
the cosmopolitan concern with the mitigation of suffering offers scope for 
responding to the question of what justice requires us to be concerned with. For 
many cosmopolitans, this concern is what unites cosmopolitanism as a paradigm 
(see for example Brassett and Bulley, 2007; Linklater, 2007). Such authors 
emphasise the relationship between this account of cosmopolitanism with post-
structuralism and discourse ethics; in this latter regard of course the pursuit of a 
definitive conception of distributive justice in relation to corporations is an 
anathema. However, the thesis contends that this does not rule out the 
applicability of justice as the mitigation of suffering to the question at hand. The 
point about suffering is that it is universal and inescapable, and it is hard to 
disagree with the contention that at a basic level, the mitigation of suffering and 
the protection of inevitable human vulnerability ought to be the most urgent 
demand of justice. Of course, suffering is not defined and experienced in the 
same way across cultures – but forms of suffering are an unavoidable part of the 
human experience. In relation to corporations, this is appealing, because 
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conceptions of justice that have been developed within the framework of a 
(liberal-democratic) state are not easily translatable in circumstances of injustice 
that are not solely defined by the territorial boundaries of the state and the public 
sphere, as is the case with global corporations.  
 
An obvious objection to this view is that if justice is merely about the mitigation 
of suffering, then surely an adequate response is one of humanitarianism. Indeed, 
Nagel infers such an idea in his discussion of global justice (2005). This position 
would argue that if all that is required by global justice is the mitigation of 
suffering, then humanitarian responses, as and when necessary, sufficiently deal 
with such instances of injustice. Thus if global justice requirements are restricted 
to a minimalist idea about mitigating suffering, then a minimalist response will 
follow. The thesis does not agree with this position. Humanitarian responses to 
justice constitute discretionary and sporadic actions that do not address the 
ongoing systematic harm that is deemed to be unjust. Pogge (2008) makes a 
similar argument when he alleges that the global order is responsible for causing 
harm to those who live in severe poverty, which he argues triggers a negative 
duty not to participate in such an order. Chapter six appeals to this idea, in its 
argument that global corporations, at a very basic minimum are required not to 
cause harm. As part of a discussion of the theoretical framework, however, the 
thesis contends that the cosmopolitan-based notion of justice as the mitigation of 
suffering simplifies, but also makes urgent, the question of justice in relation to 
corporations.  
 
1.2.2 The Liberal Basic Structure 
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The allegation of systematic harm in relation to global corporations links to the 
liberal aspect of the theoretical framework. The idea that there exists an 
institutional set-up that inescapably impacts upon people‘s lives alludes to the 
Rawlsian (and thus liberal) idea of the basic structure. As mentioned above, the 
thesis contests the restriction to the state that Rawls set on the basic structure, but 
the thesis agrees with the Rawlsian-liberal idea that people‘s lives are 
unavoidably shaped by an institutional set-up and that it is to this set-up that 
justice applies. Rawls contends that the basic structure shapes the sort of lives 
people experience, as well as shaping their expectations and hopes about their 
lives (2005: 269). In this sense, the thesis takes the question of justice to be 
fundamentally political, in the sense of there being a scheme of politically 
determined institutions through which lives are to an important extent shaped – 
and through which there is the potential for mitigation of the above mentioned 
universal suffering.  
 
The inclusion of global corporations within the basic structure would have been 
ruled out by Rawls; for him ―Justice as fairness is a political, not a general, 
conception of justice: it applies first to the basic structure and sees these other 
questions of local justice and also questions of global justice (what I call the law 
of peoples) as calling for separate consideration on their merits‖ (2001a: 11). Of 
course, Rawls‘s conception of justice would call for the regulation of corporate 
activity, but in two importantly different ways – his conception would only 
regulate such activity within a state, and he would see corporations not as part of 
the basic structure, but as private organisations that are not subject to principles 
of distributive justice. However, the thesis contends that if the basic structure is 
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defined as a set of institutions that has effects on people‘s lives that are 
―profound and present from the start‖ – and contemporary global political life is 
constituted by a complex network of a variety of actors who are involved in the 
determination of sets of global rules and standards that directly impact people‘s 
lives – it would seem unjust to omit those networks of actors and sets of rules 
because of the lack of a clear institutional structure (like the nation-state) to 
which they belong. 
 
This is the essential point at which the theoretical framework adopted by the 
thesis is at once cosmopolitan and liberal – the priority is the (in)justice of 
numerous different circumstances, and this trumps any priority given to forms of 
political organisation that restrict the scope of concern of justice to, say, citizens, 
or co-nationals. This framework informs the ultimate suggestions of the thesis. 
From the cosmopolitan conception of justice as the mitigation of suffering comes 
the proposal that corporations ought to be subject to a do no harm principle. 
From the liberal idea of the basic structure that unavoidably shapes people‘s lives 
comes the recommendation of the adoption of an all-affected interests principle, 
which affords people an opportunity to participate in CSR processes and 
corporate activity that affects them. As such, the theoretical framework adopted 
here proceeds from the contention that suffering is an urgent concern of justice, 
that must exist and emanate from somewhere; at the same time, attempts to 
alleviate suffering, or realize justice, must also apply to something or 
somewhere. 
 
The link the thesis makes between the universality of cosmopolitan concerns and 
  
 
24 
the limitation of the scope of concern to some form of basic structure points 
towards another important framing of the thesis – that of the boundary it seeks to 
dilute that exists between theory and practice. Much recent work on global 
distributive justice is largely theoretical and non-applied in focus (for example, 
Beitz, 1999; Caney, 2005b; Fraser, 2008; in part, Pogge, 2008). The thesis 
acknowledges this work as of signatory importance. However, the focus of this 
thesis is on how such theory intersects with practice, and it is at this intersection 
where the original contribution of the work is developed. In the view of this 
thesis, much of this theoretical work has imposed limitations on the question of 
global justice because of a reliance on the idea that justice must necessarily be 
thought about in relation to a definitive separation of the national and the 
international, as well as an equally definitive separation of public and private 
sectors. What this thesis contends is that the ultimate usefulness of theory lies in 
its ability help us understand and explain the ―real world‖, as well as make 
normative suggestions for the ―real world‖. This thesis identifies global 
corporations as warranting attention from the perspective of justice and in doing 
so, applies theory to practice in a way that does not rely on the aforementioned 
definitive separations.  
 
In summary then, the thesis approaches the central research question, as well as 
the sub-questions, using a cosmopolitan-liberal theoretical framework. The thesis 
takes as its starting point the cosmopolitan assumption of the universality of 
human suffering as the chief concern for questions of justice; thus justice is 
necessarily approached from a global perspective. Intertwined with this 
framework of thought is a liberal approach to the manner in which this suffering 
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is channeled and mitigated – through a basic structure of political institutions that 
display profound effects on people‘s life chances.  
 
1.3 Research Activities  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, an important part of the approach this 
thesis has taken is the consistent effort to connect theory with practise. At the 
root of this approach is the belief that a primary value of theory is the manner in 
which it aids us to understand ―real-world‖ phenomena, but also the manner in 
which it allows us to think beyond the limits of current circumstances in order to 
make normative recommendations for such real-world phenomena.  
 
The central contributions of the thesis were established through extensive use 
and scrutiny of the broad array of literature that exists pertaining to distributive 
justice, on the one hand, and global corporations and CSR, on the other. To this 
end, the thesis has undertaken a large amount of textual analysis related to global 
corporations and CSR. This has involved the use of documents, reports and 
websites that provide information and analysis of CSR; the specific focus in the 
final chapter of the thesis, on the UN Global Compact, necessitated the use and 
consultation of many UN documents and website. As detailed elsewhere in the 
introduction, the thesis views the emergence of CSR as a neo-Polanyian type 
response to the globalisation of neoliberal economic policies. As such, it was 
necessary to make use of much literature within the field of international political 
economy in order to develop a coherent theoretical explanation of the emergence 
of CSR. Chapters two, three and partially chapters six and seven are the product 
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of this analysis.  
 
Parallel to the extensive use of this type of literature is the use of political theory 
literature on distributive justice, both of the global and domestic in orientation.  
The starting point for this analysis of literature was the necessity of establishing 
the primary ways in which the question of global justice has been rejected, on the 
one hand, and accepted, on the other. Chapters four and five are the product of 
this analysis. Chapters six and seven elaborate this analysis further, but 
importantly these chapters establish the intersections between the two types of 
literature analysed in the thesis. As detailed in chapter six, the Polanyian and 
Gramscian insights developed in chapter three inform the recommendations of 
concessive theory. 
 
The intersection between these literatures is a key link to the wider contributions 
of the thesis, and establishing and developing this intersection was a central 
challenge of the resarch process. What the analysis argues is that while the 
emergence of CSR and the form it has taken is unavoidably shaped by processes 
of global capitalism (as per the Polanyian and Gramscian insights), it is the task 
of a conception of distributive justice (in a concessive sense) to set out principles 
that reflect not just this reality, but also to reflect that justice makes demands that 
are of a high normative standard. Thus this element of the research process 
necessitated the achievement of a balance between the constraints of what is 
known (about global corporations and about CSR), and the possibilities of what 
ought to be. Infused in this attempt to achieve a balance were the perceived 
constraints imposed by the very disciplinary boundaries that the thesis sought to 
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overcome. As such, while much political philosophy articulates the need for 
some form of ―global justice‖ the thought that global corporations require a 
differentiated account would be deemed unnecessary by many, the assumption 
being that a state-based, or a global public-based response would be adequate. 
Likewise, accounts of CSR that concentrate on it as a technical question of 
efficiency (as opposed to a contestable question of justice) mitigate against the 
application of stringent normative proposals for its reform.  
 
By addressing both broad sets of literature, the thesis worked to overcome these 
disciplinary constraints by proceeding from the conviction that a response to the 
question of justice and corporations was both necessary and possible. The sheer 
breadth of the literature involved posed a challenge and to certain extent the 
research process had to be restricted in a number of particular ways – in the 
particular conceptions of justice that are critiqued and addressed, and in the 
empirical application of the argument. This challenge is reflected on more fully 
in the thesis conclusion, where the possibility for future research afforded by 
such restrictions is addressed. However, what this research process afforded the 
thesis was the opportunity to show that speaking across disciplinary boundaries 
is desirable and possible, whatever the inherent restrictions of the process.  
 
1.4 Central Thesis  
 
1.4.1 Central Argument 
The central argument of the thesis is that, due to the manner in which global 
corporations display a profound effect on people‘s life chances, they ought to be 
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subject to principles of global distributive justice. This contention is expanded 
and developed by arguing that a way of responding to these profound effects is 
through a critique and revision of global corporate activity within the process of 
CSR. Elaborated through the research questions outlined above, the thesis offers 
two proposals that could mitigate these profound effects. In ideal circumstances, 
it is argued that justice would require the reform of global corporate activity 
following some of the ideals espoused by Rawls‘s idea of a property-owning 
democracy (delinked from the state-centric ontology of its incarnation). Were 
global corporations to exist within a property-owning democracy, it is argued 
that they would be required to be a lot smaller, with a fairer redistribution of 
profits, against a background of base equality. The thesis argues that such 
requirements would have implications for corporate taxation, capital mobility, 
and executive remuneration. 
 
In non-ideal circumstances however, to which the thesis pays greater attention, 
the facts of global capitalism and global corporations must be conceded, as it is 
these concrete realities with which a conception of global distributive justice 
must contend. The thesis proposes the application of a do no harm principle, as 
well as an all affected interests principle, as a suitable response to circumstances 
that provoke questions of justice. The do no harm principle forms a basic 
minimum normative standard, the purpose of which is to set a substantive limit 
on corporate activity. The all affected interests principle relates to procedure, and 
its purpose is to afford a degree of legitimacy to the process of CSR, proceeding 
from the basic idea that in circumstances where an institution has a profound 
effect on people‘s life chances, those people have a right to a say in the decisions 
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such an institution takes. The purpose of this section is to elaborate on the 
circumstances that have provoked the research questions. Whereas the above 
sections detailed the gaps within the literature that the thesis seeks to fill, this 
section brings depth and meaning to the contention that global corporations 
warrant attention from the point of view of justice. As such, this section offers a 
broad overview of these ―profound effects‖ that form the basis of the thesis 
argument.  
 
1.4.2 Profound Effects 
The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries saw the emergence of a 
widespread popular perception that large global corporations are responsible for 
most, if not all, of the negativities associated with globalisation. Some such 
critiques have pointed to a connection between expanded corporate power and 
the deterioration of democratic institutions, at both the national (see for example, 
Monbiot, 2000; Nace, 2003) and regional levels (see for example Balanya et al, 
2000). Others have documented citizen responses to such developments, such as 
the ―anti-globalisation‖ protests of the late 1990s, in a ―call-to-arms‖ fashion (for 
example Danaher and Mark, 2003). Some authors have targeted specific issue 
areas that corporations are said to have had a detrimental impact upon. For 
instance, Schlosser (2002) attacked the global food industry; Klein (2000), 
attacked the branding policies of global corporations, arguing that they were 
responsible for a loss of cultural diversity across the globe. Korten (2001) argues 
that corporations are responsible for causing much of the world‘s poverty and 
inequality. Perhaps most damningly, the film and book produced by Bakan (2003 
and 2005, respectively), argued that the activities and nature of corporations are 
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akin to the behaviour of a human psychopath. Consolidated by ―anti-
globalisation‖ protests across the world in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
idea that corporate power is something that is of concern to the general public is 
not an unusual one. In more recent times, such ideas have been given greater 
weight by the association of large financial corporations with the financial crises 
of 2008/2009.  
 
The argument that corporations have an undue effect on people‘s lives has 
existed in relation to developing countries and global poverty for some time (for 
instance see the examples given below about tax avoidance). However, more 
recently, a popular sentiment has emerged that global corporations have had a 
direct impact upon people‘s lives in the industrialised developed countries of 
Europe and North America, in terms of income and wealth from shares, pensions 
and savings, as well as in terms of job security and inevitable redundancy in 
difficult economic circumstances. Recent financial crises have emphasised the 
idea in many Western societies that corporations wield a great deal of power over 
people‘s lives; this power is increasingly coming under popular scrutiny. 
Importantly, events of 2008 and 2009 have seemed to emphasise in the popular 
imagination that global corporate power is a question that requires a normative 
response. 
 
These general claims by the above mentioned authors require further 
specification, if the central thesis of ―profound effects‖ is to be acceptable in 
order to then make the required argument from political philosophy. Thus the 
remainder of this section will provide detail in this regard.   
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A common category of allegations made against corporations is that of the abuse 
of human rights. Perhaps one of the most high profile cases of recent years in this 
regard is that of Ken Saro Wiwa and Shell in Nigeria. Saro Wiwa, and the 
―Ogoni 9‖ led protests against the installation of a Shell pipeline in the Ogoni 
region of Nigeria in the early 90s; Saro Wiwa and the rest of the group were 
hanged by the military government, and since then Shell has been dogged by 
allegations that the corporation was complicit in their deaths by having provided 
funding and resources to the government to kill them. In June 2009, the case 
brought to a New York federal court alleging human rights violations on the part 
of Shell was settled out of court, with the corporation agreeing to pay $15.5m in 
compensation to the Ogoni people (Pilkington: 2009). Other common allegations 
in this regard that have been made surrounding the use of child labour in the 
manufacture of say, clothes bound for Western stores (Oneworld.net, 2008), 
torture and sexual abuse by private military companies (Amnesty International, 
nd), and the denial of freedom of association to corporate employees in both the 
US and beyond (Human Rights Watch, 2007; ILRF, nd).  
 
There are numerous further allegations of corporate human rights abuses, from 
those that have been pursued in U.S courts – the Centre for Constitutional Rights 
cites at least six examples of cases they have taken to court (CCR, 2009) – to the 
compiling of lists of some of the ―most wanted‖ corporate criminals (Global 
Exchange, 2009). Increasingly, such cases are being pursued legally, lending the 
allegations strength and seriousness – with the role played by large NGOs such 
as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who are recognised formally 
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by some international organizations, affording such campaigns both popular and 
political legitimacy. 
 
Related to allegations of human rights abuses are allegations of corporate 
(mis)use of natural resources. The main culprits in this category are oil, mining, 
logging and mineral exploitation corporations, with conflict breaking out over 
hydroelectric dams, biofuel plantations as well as coal, copper, gold and bauxite 
mines (Vidal, 2009). Central arguments of these sorts of allegations are that 
global corporations are involved in activities that will lead to the eventual 
extinction of indigenous peoples, as well environmental degradation and loss of 
biodiversity. As well as this there are many allegations that mineral and 
extraction corporations are implicit in many conflicts that lead to human rights 
abuses (see for example War on Want 2007, or Human Rights Watch, 2009). In 
many of these cases it is alleged that the state is also complicit in these abuses, 
supporting the activities of the corporation, rather than those of its citizens 
(Vidal, 2009). 
 
There are also frequent allegations made that corporations are responsible for 
covering up scandals in which they have been responsible for injustice. Recent 
examples in this regard include the Trafigura scandal in the UK, in which the 
corporation tried to cover up its responsibilty for the illegal dumping of waste 
and the consequent ill-health of those who came into contact with it in the Ivory 
Coast, as well tried to hamper reporting of this by the press (see The Guardian, 
2009b). Cover-up was proven in the Enron scandal of the early 2000s, with 
allegations of auditors destroying evidence and shredding documents (see, 
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among many, Eichenwald, 2002; Fox, 2003).  
 
An element of these sorts of allegations is that corporations are able to behave in 
this way because they are able to take advantage of globalising circumstances in 
ways that governments are not. As such, for example, corporations can exert 
their rights to extract resources and use land for profit, which in turn trumps the 
rights of indigenous peoples. Furthermore, corporations can use the practice of 
global outsourcing to derogate responsibility for the protection of employee‘s 
labour rights. It is also alleged that many corporations are able to make the best 
of globalisation by paying employees in developing countries far less than they 
would be paid in developed countries – see, for example, recent allegations that 
Tesco is complicit in workers‘ poverty by paying its South African employees 
less than a living wage (War on Want, 2009a). Related to this are also the 
advantages corporations can gain from particular technical strategies such as 
exploiting tax loopholes, transfer pricing and tax havens for their commercial 
gain. In this regard, War on Want describes transfer pricing as having enabled 
companies to charge themselves over £4,000 for a ballpoint pen and under £1 for 
an entire prefabricated building in order to dodge the tax they owe (War on 
Want, 2009b). Explicit links are often made between tax avoidance, and poverty 
and development goals, with the Tax Justice Network arguing that if 
corporations were taxed properly, the achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals would be a lot easier (2009). Beyond the matter of global 
poverty, one UK newspaper‘s recent series of investigations into the tax 
avoidance strategies of over 100 UK firms highlights the wider societal 
implications of corporate tax avoidance, arguing that corporations rely on the 
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state for their basic functioning and as such it is incumbent upon them to obey 
tax laws (The Guardian, 2009a). 
 
Another common perception of corporations is the inequality generated by their 
profit levels and the consequent unfairness of this. The perception in this regard 
is that corporations are involved in unfair arrangements regarding profit and pay, 
and that these arrangements are an indication of levels of inequality associated 
with injustice. Evidence suggests that a large gap has emerged between top wage 
earners and average wage earners; one study indicates that, in the US at least, in 
the period 2002-2006 the top 1 percent of wage earners gained ¾ of all income 
growth, something that is attributed to an ―explosion in top wages and salaries‖ 
(Saez, 2008: 2-3). Particularly in recent times, there is a perception that large 
global corporations are responsible for this inequality, and increasingly it is 
being objected to not just by the general public, but also by shareholders. An 
example of this is the refusal on the part of shareholders to approve the Shell 
directors‘ remuneration report in 2009 (Webb: 2009). Of course corporations 
cannot be entirely blamed for all inequality in wages. However the recent general 
concern that has emerged about executive remuneration indicates that 
corporations do play a significant role in wage inequality. Compounding these 
types of facts are the widespread links that have been made between the culture 
of generous executive remuneration and bonuses, and the global financial crisis 
of 2008/9 – for instance, the US President appointed ―pay tsar‖, who cited 
executive pay as a contributing factor to the crisis (BBC, June 10 2009).  
 
The common response of corporations to such allegations is either the 
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development of a CSR policy, or reference to and potential reform of such a 
policy. Indeed it has recently been argued by some ethical campaigners that it is 
the corporations that do not have a prominent CSR policy that we ought to be 
most concerned with, with corporations such as Gap and Nike having responded 
to and reformed as a result of much-vaunted allegations of malpractice 
(Rosselson, 2009). This thesis argues that the above described stories and reports 
are instances of the profound effects that corporations have on people‘s life 
chances, and that this is sufficient to consequently argue that corporations should 
be subject to principles of global distributive justice. The range of instances is 
quite broad, from the allegations of outright harm, to more complex instances of 
perceived unfairness and inequality. These allegations could potentially elicit a 
number of different responses. Some might say it is the role of the state to 
regulate corporations more stringently; others would say that corporations are 
best left to regulate themselves and to be relied upon to make ethical and just 
decisions. The thesis argues that current circumstances demand a different sort of 
response and that such a response can partially be found with the political 
philosophical ideal of distributive justice.  
 
1.5 Chapter Structure 
 
Chapter two begins by detailing what defines global corporations, and then goes 
on to present an historical overview of the emergence of CSR policies, as well as 
setting out the nature and characteristics of these policies. The historical 
periodisation is chosen to represent the wider political and economic context 
within which the role of the corporation sits. The first period is pre-1945, and 
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was one that was in the main characterized by instances of corporate 
philanthropy. The second historical period is 1945 – late 1980s, years that were 
somewhat shaped by attempts at establishing some form of international 
regulation of global corporations. The chapter describes some of the failed 
attempts at doing this, as well as detailing the emergence of multilateral codes 
for corporations that still exist. The third historical period is the late 1980s to the 
present, which has been characterised mainly by the lean towards the self-
regulation of corporations, through various codes of conduct. The chapter then 
moves on to set out a characterization of CSR. The chapter describes CSR in 
terms of its agents, the content of the policies, as well as the procedures used to 
practise CSR. 
 
Chapter three develops a theoretical explanation for the emergence of CSR. This 
chapter further consolidates one of the two subject areas of the thesis, that of 
international political economy. The chapter sets out the main ideas of embedded 
liberalism and the Polanyian double movement and contends that insights from 
Polanyi‘s work can explain why CSR emerged, or more generally, why the 
question of the social responsibility of global corporations emerged when it did. 
The contention here is that CSR is a response to Polanyian-type resistance to 
neoliberalism, manifested in the growth of a global civil society movement and 
the financial crises of the late 1990s. The chapter also details a neo-Gramscian 
perspective on the emergence of CSR, which interprets global corporations and 
their CSR policies as an aspect of a capitalist regime of accumulation. The 
chapter contends that such ideas are useful in explaining why CSR takes the form 
it does by highlighting the manner in which CSR processes are shaped and 
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determined in large part by the hegemonic bloc of global capitalism. These ideas 
are important in influencing the recommendations of the thesis in relation to the 
reform of CSR.  
 
Chapter four sets up the argument within political theory literature by detailing 
some of the main state-based theories of justice that exist within the literature. 
The chapter critically examines three justifications given for the restriction of 
distributive justice to the nation state. These three justifications are citizenship, 
which critiques primarily Rawls‘s work (1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2005); national 
self-determination, which relates primarily to the work of Miller (1995, 2007); 
and sovereignty, which relates to the work of Nagel (2005). The chapter presents 
both normative and empirical reasons why such conceptions of distributive 
justice are insufficient to contend with the challenge posed by contemporary 
processes of globalisation, of which global corporations are part.  
 
Chapter five develops the political theory element of the argument further by 
outlining and critiquing cosmopolitan conceptions of global distributive justice. 
This chapter seeks to highlight a gap that exists within cosmopolitan political 
theory regarding the important role that global corporations play. Thus chapter 
five first sets out a loose characterisation of what cosmopolitanism is, dividing it 
into four (often overlapping) categories of methodological, moral, political and 
legal cosmopolitanism. The chapter then moves to discuss some of the 
justifications for, and principles of global distributive justice that have been 
articulated by cosmopolitan writers. The general claim here is that such 
conceptions are incomplete in the manner in which they largely focus on the 
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applicability of principles of justice to global public institutions of governance. 
The chapter then moves to make a key argument – that in order for justice to 
apply, it is enough that an institution displays profound effects on people‘s life 
chances. The thesis draws on a debate between Rawls and Cohen (Cohen, 1997, 
2002, 2008) to do with the make up of the basic structure and the requirements of 
justice, as well as Williams‘s (1998) contribution to that debate in relation to 
publicity and justice. On the basis of this debate, it is argued that global 
corporations and their CSR policies fit this conception.  
 
Chapter six sets out the principles of global distributive justice that this thesis 
argues are suitable for application to global corporations. The chapter is divided 
into two central ideas, first that there is an ideal-aspirational aspect to the 
argument, and second, that part of the argument needs to concede to certain facts, 
thus a concessive part of the argument. In the ideal-aspirational terms, ideas 
about the Rawlsian property-owning democracy are explored in relation to 
corporations, with the conjecture being made that the Rawlsian ideal in this 
instance would set limitations on the size of corporations, as well as changes to 
the ownership of corporations so that there is widespread rather than 
concentrated ownership. As well as this, it is argued that such requirements 
would necessitate wider and fairer redistribution of corporate profits, all 
proceeding from a base level of equality within a property-owning democracy. 
The chapter also extrapolates from Cohen‘s ideas about justice, which argue that 
justice would require not only just rules, but also just individual choices within 
those rules, such that an ethos of justice prevails. The chapter then focuses on 
what is called concessive theory, which attempts to suggest what justice in 
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relation to corporations would require once certain facts have been conceded. In 
this vein of thought, it is argued that an appropriate principle to apply to 
corporations (once the fact of global capitalism and the existence of global 
corporations as they are is conceded to) is the Do No Harm Principle, as well as 
an All–Affected Interests Principle (AAIP). The rationale behind this is to offer a 
basic normative minimum standard for corporate activity, as well as a normative 
principle that would afford people who are affected by that activity to have a say 
in it. The chapter discusses both these principles, but the central focus is on the 
AAIP. The chapter sets out five conditions through which these principles could 
be met within the process of CSR. These conditions are: pre-consultative 
learning, transparency and disclosure of information, a consultative forum, 
evaluation mechanisms, and the opportunity for redress. The chapter briefly 
addresses concerns and objections to the views articulated, which in the main are 
to do with the balance between concession and aspiration.  
 
Chapter seven is about applying the theoretical arguments of the thesis to a 
working example of CSR, the UN Global Compact. The Compact is a UN 
initiative, which primarily encompasses a code of conduct to which global 
corporations, as well as small to medium enterprises, can voluntarily sign up to. 
There are ten principles within the code that relate to human rights, labour rights, 
environmental standards and anti-corruption measures. The chapter begins with a 
brief overview of the work of the Compact, as well as summary of the main 
arguments in favour and against the Compact since it began in 2000. The chapter 
then moves to apply the ideal-aspirational ideas articulated in chapter six to the 
work of the Compact, and asserts that inasmuch as these ideas would place 
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restrictions on the size of corporations, on the level of profit and remuneration 
generated, as well as the requirement that corporations would exist within a 
system that ensures background justice, the Compact does not come close to 
meeting such ideals. The chapter then moves to a more focused analysis of the 
Compact, drawing from the concessive theory articulated in chapter six. The 
chapter assesses the extent to which the Compact meets the five conditions of the 
principles, and provides recommendations as to how the Compact might be 
reformed in order to meet such conditions. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of whether it is better, from the point of view of justice, to view the 
Compact as a necessary stepping stone in the right direction, or whether the 
Compact is in fact a concession too far and that justice requires holding out for 
more ideal arrangements.  
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced the central arguments and contributions of the thesis. 
The introduction outlined the main subject areas to which the thesis makes a 
contribution – those of global political theory, and IPE/global governance-based 
literature on global corporations and private authority. Through a critique of 
state-based and cosmopolitan based conceptions of distributive justice, the thesis 
addresses global corporations and the process of CSR as a potential agent for 
global justice. To this end, the thesis addresses the central research question that 
asks what demands could and should a conception of global distributive justice 
make of global corporations and their CSR policies.  
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In order to respond to this question, the thesis employs a cosmopolitan-liberal 
theoretical framework, which proceeds from the idea that the potential for the 
mitigation of suffering is found within the institutional structure that inevitably 
shapes people‘s lives. The chapter then elaborated the key argument, which is 
that global corporations have a profound effect on people‘s life chances, and 
went on to detail a number of well-known instances in which this idea is 
demonstrated. The research activities of the thesis were briefly discussed, 
highlighting the central research tasks undertaken, as well the challenges and 
difficulties posed by the research process. The chapter ended with a summary of 
thesis chapters.  
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2: Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Overview 
  
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter gives a brief history of the evolution CSR of policies, and offers a 
description of the nature and character of CSR. First the chapter details what the 
global corporation is. Subsequently, the history of CSR is discussed, and is 
divided into three sections, which detail: traditional forms of corporate 
philanthropy (pre-1945); attempts at multilateral regulation (1945-late 1980s); 
and contemporary CSR in the form of codes of conduct (late 1980s-present). The 
broader historical context of this periodisation is the transition from nineteenth 
century laissez-faire capitalism, through the post-war construction of multilateral 
institutions of international governance, to contemporary structures of global 
governance. Such structures incorporate both public and private actors, blurring 
the division between public and private authority, and consolidating global 
corporations‘ position as powerful global political actors. Thus this history 
chapter sets up the political and economic context within which CSR has 
emerged, setting up the case for applying principles of global distributive justice 
to global corporations.  
  
Codes of conduct are used here to loosely characterise CSR. In general, any 
policy that can be described as CSR is usually expressed in some form of code of 
conduct. These codes are broken down into the agents who construct and 
implement them, their contents, and the procedures and organisational forms 
used to follow these codes. The purpose of this characterisation is to indicate the 
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multiplicity of actors involved in codes of conduct, the trans-border nature of 
their content, and the novelty of their procedures and organisational forms. This 
characterisation reflects the wider historical context elaborated in the first half of 
the chapter.  
 
This is written in the context of a massive growth in the interest in and attention 
being paid to CSR, as well the many instances of widely known and publicised 
corporate irresponsibility, as detailed in the introduction. Far from an obscure, 
―alternative‖ way to conduct business, CSR is for the most part central to the 
public image of a global corporation. To give an idea of the scale of CSR, in 
2008 nearly 80 per cent of the world‘s 250 largest companies issued some kind 
of social and/or environmental report in 2008 (KPMG, 2008: 13). As of October 
2009, there are over 6000 participants in the UN Global Compact. CSR is a focus 
for national governments and global and regional regulatory organisations. For 
example, the UK government published a major report on CSR in 2004 (DfID, 
2004), and CSR is now part of policy developed in 6 UK government 
departments. The EU has a major web portal devoted to CSR, which contains 
multiple policy documents about the topic (EU, nd). In 2008, the World Business 
Council on Sustainable Development had over 200 international leading 
companies as members, spread over 36 countries, with a total annual turnover of 
US $6 trillion (WBSCD, 2008). Increasingly, many corporations describe their 
CSR policies as being integrated into the core of their business, rather than a 
separate branch of the business. For instance, Shell‘s 2008 Sustainability Review 
discusses the manner in which its Code of Conduct and Business Principles 
informs their products, operations, staff and external relationships (Shell, 2008: 
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3). KPMG reports that 4 per cent of the world‘s largest companies now included 
their CSR results within their main business and financial reporting (Ibid).  
 
CSR is also a matter for scholarly attention, not just in terms of research, but also 
in terms of the education of future business leaders. Academic centres such as 
the Centre for Responsible Business, University of California Berkeley; The 
International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility at the University of 
Nottingham; The Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative at the Kennedy 
School of Government at Harvard now exist to both promote research and 
understanding of CSR, but also to integrate CSR into business education. The 
Global Compact sees education of business professionals as key to the future of 
CSR, and in 2009, lists 45 academic participants. The Compact has also 
produced a series of Principles for Responsible Management Education (UNGC, 
2007).  
 
Thus CSR is a central element of twenty first century business practice and 
academic work both in fields of business, as well as within the fields of global 
politics and international political economy. Furthermore, it is the contention of 
the thesis that CSR and global corporations are of great concern to global 
political theory as well. However, before that core argument is made, it is 
necessary to provide some more detailed background on the nature of the 
contemporary global corporations, the history of CSR, as well on the nature of 
the codes of conduct that constitute most CSR policies. The next section of the 
chapter gives some short details on what a global corporation is.  
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2.2 What is a Global Corporation? 
 
The purpose of this short section is to detail what exactly a global corporation is. 
There are two elements to the description. The first element is that of the 
relationship between the state and the corporation: corporations must get their 
licence to operate from a state somewhere. It is the history of the corporate-state 
relationship that is key to understanding the position that global corporations are 
currently in, the establishment of legal personality and limited liability being 
important aspects of this. The second instance is the globality of the corporation, 
in which corporations span territorial boundaries in a way that is problematic for 
a conception of distributive justice. What this section aims to elaborate on is the 
features of global capitalism that underpin the core contention of the thesis about 
the profound effects of corporations on people‘s life chances; chapter one 
outlined a variety of instances of such effects. This section details the system 
through which such effects are made possible, thus contending that they are in 
fact a consequence of the systemic (as opposed to incidental) harm caused by 
global capitalism.  
 
‗Corporation‘ here refers to the dominant form of capitalist ownership of the 
modern era, in which large scale investment is made possible and the liability of 
shareholders is limited (Calhoun, 2002a). Key features of a corporation are that it 
can sue or be sued, pay taxes, and be treated as entity distinct from those who 
own it or are employed within it; the corporation also allows for succession of 
ownership, such that its business can continue even if ownership changes. The 
global corporation, or multinational corporation, is an enterprise that can finance, 
  
 
46 
manage and control productive assets in more than one country (Muchlinski, 
2008). Such operations can be linked by ownership, so that regional and 
subsidiary bodies are owned by a parent company incorporated in the home 
country. They can also be connected by a series of contractual relationships, thus 
creating a networked transnational production chain (Ibid). The remainder of this 
section elaborates on these features further.  
 
2.2.1 Corporate Legal Personality 
Legal personality was first given to guilds in the fourteenth century, but by the 
sixteenth century, this began to be extended to business enterprises, such as the 
East India Company and the Hudson Bay Company. Initially, governments used 
corporations as a way to manage colonial trade, thus acting in the interest of the 
state they originated from. The purpose of these organisations was not explicitly 
profit making from the outset; in the first book published on the law of 
corporations, and in the charters of new corporations, a central idea of the 
corporation was the ―better management and ordering of trade in which the 
corporation was engaged‖ (May, 2006: 6). Over time, the involvement of 
corporations in the construction of the infrastructure for developing economies, 
such as the US and the UK, enabled corporations to establish themselves as quite 
powerful entities. The establishment of legal identity for corporations has 
important implications, including the ability of corporations to avoid inheritance 
tax, and claim certain civil and legal rights (Bendell, 2004a: 8). Bendell also 
mentions limited liability in this regard. Limited liability is intricately linked to 
the establishment of corporate legal personality, and refers to the arrangement 
whereby the liability of shareholders is limited to the amount they have agreed to 
  
 
47 
pay for their shares (Dignam, 2008). Thus, limited liability can enhance the 
operation of corporation, by encouraging investment (by limiting the risk 
undertaken by sharehoders) and consequently by encouraging entrepreneurial 
risk-taking on the part of management. Limited liability is key to understanding 
the trajectory of the corporation from an organisation with a public role in 
economic development to a profit-making entity.  
 
Particular technological and managerial techniques were key to corporate 
expansion in this period and May argues that the example of the US corporation 
is indicative here (2006: 8). Economies of scale and scope were part of such 
corporate expansion. In relation to the former, Fordist and Taylorist techniques 
of organisational logic and division of labour, influenced by the concept of 
scientific management enabled firms to identify the most efficient production 
method. In terms of the latter, economies of scope, firms can also grow by 
expanding the range of goods and services it produces, and by achieving cost 
savings through expansion by vertical integration (Roach, 2005: 28-30). Some 
successful examples of such innovations are notable: Truitt mentions Ford Motor 
Company, IBM as examples of technological innovators, and AT&T and United 
States Steel as examples of companies that expanded their scope through mergers 
and acquisitions (2006: 36-37).  
 
This expansion had political implications. May cites Galbraith, who argued that 
large corporations‘ ability to position themselves at the heart of the governance 
of society, so that the largest corporations have the potential to ―embed 
themselves within the governance mechanisms of modern society, but without 
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any linked political accountability‖ (Ibid: 9). The most significant aspect of the 
US corporate model is, according to May, the separation of ownership and 
management, which enabled corporate professional managers to exercise the 
rights of corporate personality on behalf of its owners; this has led to instances of 
corruption, scandal and illegal activities. Thus the depersonalisation of 
ownership in a sense disrupted the original public purpose that corporations had 
been set up to achieve: 
 
[…] as shareholders had surrendered active control of, and responsibility 
for, their property, leaving it in the hands of the managers they employed, 
perhaps they had also released the wider community from any obligation 
to protect them to the full extent implied by the strict application of the 
doctrine of property rights. The balance between the legitimate economic 
interests of owners and the wider social or community interest remains 
the key issue for the political economy of corporations (Ibid: 10). 
 
 
2.2.2 Globalisation of the Corporate Model 
The disruption of the state-based public purpose of the corporation is 
consolidated further by the globalisation of the corporate model. Most authors 
agree that it is the expansion of the corporation across the globe with only partial 
or minor constraints as a result of national boundaries that is of utmost 
significance in analysing the contemporary role of the corporation. The main 
way in which a corporation expands is through foreign direct investment (FDI). 
FDI can take many forms: buying all or part of an existing foreign company, 
establishing a factory or distribution centre in a foreign country, setting up a start 
up company or a research and development centre in a foreign country, often 
taking advantage of favourable tax or labour laws (Truitt, 2006: 164-165).  Large 
corporations were further enabled to consolidate their business strengths by 
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forming ―trusts‖ through mergers and acquisitions; in effect, trusts are super 
corporations that allowed competitors to protect themselves through the 
formation of monopolistic agreements (Ibid: 16).  
 
Many sucessful global corporations consolidate their business through 
outsourcing. Nike is an exemplary example of this sort of practice, having 
developed a business model that was premised on not wanting to own anything 
(Ibid: 65). A corporation that outsources globally spreads its risk to an array of 
subcontractors, suppliers, distributors and providers of ancillary services 
(Amoore, 2006: 51). Another commercial practice that aids the consolidation of a 
corporation‘s power across the globe is that of transfer pricing, which enables 
corporations to sell goods internally within an organisation, usually across 
national boundaries in order to take advantage of favourable tax laws. 
 
Amoore also discusses more subliminal ways in which the global corporation 
renders itself a powerful political influence and actor. She cites examples such as 
the commissioning of management consultants McKinsey & Co to advise on 
restructuring in the Indian state of Andrha Pradesh, which resulted in their 
recommendation that 20 million peasant farmers be removed from their land; 
following on from this the state‘s power sector was privatised under a program 
supported by the UK Department for International Development, the World 
Bank, Pricewaterhouse Coopers and Accenture (Ibid; 52). This blurring of the 
role of public and private authority is highly indicative of the behaviour of 
contemporary global corporations. CSR is a further indication of this blurring, 
which will be discussed more fully throughout this chapter.  Such blurring, in 
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tandem with corporate activity on a cross-boundary basis, is what presents a 
difficulty for conceptions of distributive justice.  
 
In this story of the corporation, two things have changed fundamentally. By 
attaining legal personality, corporations have acquired legal rights akin to an 
individual, and have developed limited liability, in which a separation of 
ownership and management has occurred. Thus the original public purpose of the 
corporation has been disrupted. Consolidating this is the corporation‘s role in 
contemporary processes of globalisation, as both a driver of it, as well as a 
beneficiary. As discussed above, particular commercial practices have enabled 
this, as well as the way in which corporate activity has been part of a blurring of 
public and private authority. Thus the profound effects of global corporations 
discussed in chapter one are enabled by the system of global capitalism in which 
corporate activity no longer serves a public purpose and is not coterminous with 
state borders. As the next chapter will discuss in greater detail, CSR can be 
explained as another feature of this systemic harm, which is what renders it 
problematic as a response to such profound effects.  
 
2.3 Historical Emergence of CSR 
 
The following three subsections detail the loosely divided historical periods into 
which the emergence of CSR can be categorised. The first subsection deals with 
the time period pre-1945, which is largely characterised by corporate 
philanthropic initiatives. The second subsection deals with the time period 1945 
– late 1980s, which was shaped by mostly failed attempts at achieving 
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multilateral regulation of global corporations. The final subsection deals with the 
late 1980s to the present time, and is defined by generalised moves towards the 
self-regulation of global corporations with regard to their social responsibilities.  
 
2.3.1 Period 1: Corporate Philanthropy pre-1945 
Prior to the widespread practice of CSR, many corporations acknowledged their 
societal responsibilities in an importantly different way, though practices of 
corporate philanthropy (CP). For purposes of clarity, this section deals with the 
historical period pre-1945. Of course, it is not true to say that CP has now 
disappeared entirely. However, CP constituted the popular way in which 
companies interacted with wider society, and differs from current CSR practices. 
Socio-economic circumstances during this time were such that there emerged 
glaring inequalities between rich and poor. Many businesses developed a 
tradition of corporate philanthropy which was quite different from present-day 
CSR policies. Parkinson differentiates between CP and CSR as the former being 
when a corporation attempts to address social ills that are not necessarily of its 
making, the latter being the corporation conducting its activities in a more 
responsible manner (Parkinson, 2006: 4 note 10). 
 
The motivations behind CP initiatives vary. Some are to do with the practice of 
benevolent charity; others, on the other hand, were motivated by the idea that 
wealthy industrialists had an obligation to provide for their own workers, rather 
than those who were worse off in wider society. In the boom of nineteenth 
century capitalism, it came to be regarded by some as the duty of the wealthy to 
donate part of their wealth for the benefit of the lesser off in society. Inherent in 
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this idea is the inevitability that the wealth generated by capitalism would be 
unequally distributed.  Andrew Carnegie, one of the great philanthropists of this 
time, who made his fortune primarily in the steel industry, describes this 
inevitability: ―We accept and welcome, therefore, as conditions to which we 
must accommodate ourselves, great inequality of environment; the concentration 
of business, industrial and commercial, in the hands of a few; and the law of 
competitions between these, as being not only beneficial, but essential to the 
future progress of the race‖ (Carnegie, 1889: 3). Such inequality can be mitigated 
by the careful donation of wealth to communities in the form of universities, 
libraries, parks, and halls. Carnegie cautions against the sporadic donation of 
wealth to those who are unable or unwilling to help themselves. To assist the 
―poor‖ unduly is to simply pauperize them (Owen, 1965: 4). Instead, it is the 
duty of the rich man (sic) to 
 
consider all surplus revenues which come to him simply as trust funds, 
which he is called upon to administer, and strictly bound as a matter of 
duty to administer in the manner which, in his judgement, is best 
calculated to produce the most beneficial results for the community – the 
man of wealth thus becoming the mere trustee and agent for his poorer 
brethren, bringing to their service his superior wisdom, experience, and 
ability to administer, doing for them better than they would or could do 
for themselves (Carnegie, 1889: 8). 
 
In this then, CP is seen to be a responsibility of the wealthy to correct the poor, 
and enable them to better themselves. Notions of philanthropy such as these are 
infused with religious undertones, in particular a Protestant social ethic, and far 
from being ad hoc and sporadic, are construed by Carnegie as the true destiny of 
those with wealth: ―Such, in my opinion is the true gospel concerning wealth, 
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obedience to which is destined some day to solve the problem of the rich and the 
poor, and to bring ‗[p]eace on earth, among men good will‘‖ (Ibid: 11).  
 
Other corporate philanthropic schemes had religious origins as well, also 
emphasising the particular duties that employers had to their employees, beyond 
a basic relationship of labour and capital. Entrepreneurs such as George Cadbury 
provided public housing, education and exercise facilities for his workers and 
their families, motivated by his Quaker-inspired belief that his duty to employees 
extended to their physical and spiritual health and well being (Witzel, 2003: 43). 
In a similar vein of thought, Titus Salt relocated his factory away from its 
polluted location in Bradford, to Saltaire, where he built a model community, 
providing houses with running water for employees (Idowu, 2008: 12). Joseph 
Rowntree was another pioneer in this regard, setting up not only housing 
schemes for employees, but also pension and profit sharing schemes (Ibid).  
 
CP differs from contemporary CSR, in that it was most often based on a notion 
of the duties, responsibilities and benevolence owed by employers, either to 
wider society, or to employees. Such behaviour fits more easily with the original 
notion that there was a duty of public good in the establishment of corporations. 
The attitude of benevolent paternalism underpinning CP initiatives may seem 
unacceptable in contemporary circumstances, but the historical context in which 
such initiatives took place was importantly different. In relation to Cadbury, Salt 
and Rowntree mentioned above, they implemented and carried out their schemes 
in Victorian England, where there was widespread poor health and housing and 
education provision levels were low. As such, these philanthropists provided 
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welfare-state type care, before the welfare state existed. However, similarly to 
current CSR practices, CP schemes were also motivated by the idea there was 
possible financial gain in looking after people, particularly their own workforces, 
in this way, i.e. that this sort of investment produced a more productive and 
motivated workforce.  
 
2.3.2  Period 2: 1945- late 1980s 
The widespread internationalisation of corporations in the post World War 2 
period was paralleled by the establishment of a postwar international economic 
order - in the form of the World Bank (1944), the International Monetary Fund 
(1944), and the International Trade Organisation/GATT (1947), the 
enshrinement of universal principles of human rights in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), as well as the establishment of the United 
Nations (1945).  In this context, it is interesting to note that despite this 
unprecedented level of attempted international cooperation, no universal 
framework for the regulation of global corporations emerged. Had the US 
ratified the Havana Charter, which established the International Trade 
Organization, this perhaps would have been different as it included provisions 
for the protection of investment and the control of restrictive business practices; 
the subsequent system that emerged however (General Agreement of Trade and 
Tariffs, the GATT) operated on a much more ad hoc basis (Jenkins/UNRISD, 
2001: 1-2).  
 
By the 1970s, there emerged a growing concern about the power of transnational 
corporations, particularly in the context of the New International Economic 
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Order at the UN, which put forward a set of proposals regarding trade, aid and 
debt for developing countries. The central tenet of a new North-South dialogue 
regarding the prospects of developing countries was the entitlement of such 
countries to regulate and control the activities of multinational corporations 
operating within their territory. This development meant that corporate activity 
was recognised as being integral to the socio-economic wellbeing of a country. 
There emerged during this time a variety of attempts to regulate such 
corporations on a multi-lateral basis. In 1974, the UN established the United 
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), the aims of which were 
to understand the political, social, economic and legal effects of TNCs, to secure 
international agreements that promote positive contributions towards national 
development goals, and to strengthen host countries‘ negotiating capacity 
(UNCTAD 2002). This led in 1977 to the creation of a voluntary Draft Code of 
Conduct on Transnational Corporations. This code set out the following: that 
TNCs should respect host countries‘ development goals, observe their domestic 
laws, respect fundamental human rights, adhere to socio-cultural objectives and 
values, abstain from corrupt practices, and observe consumer and environmental 
protection objectives (FoE, 1998: 1). By the early 1990s however, efforts to 
agree on this code stalled, due to pressure from Northern governments and 
corporate lobbying (Bendell, 2004a:12) and/or more explicitly, pressure from the 
US government (Ibid: 2). The Centre was eventually subsumed within the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development in 1993, after a brief period in the UN 
Department for Economic and Social Development.  
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Another significant, but ultimately weak, attempt at regulating transnational 
corporations came in the form of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises in 1976, which was revised in 1979, 1982, 1984, and 1991, with the 
most significant revisions being made in 2000 (see OECD, 2000). These 
guidelines cover standards in relation to the disclosure of information, workers‘ 
rights, industrial relations, environmental protection, combating bribery, 
consumer interests, science and technology, ensuring competition and taxation, 
respect for human rights, and elimination of child labour and forced labour. 
However, as with many other multilateral instruments of this nature, the 
Guidelines are voluntary, non-specific, and poorly implemented (FoE, 1998: 4), 
thus having little impact on the behaviour of transnational corporations. 
Essentially, they were designed to deflect criticism of the activities of such 
corporations (Jenkins/UNRISD, 2001: 4), rather than a meaningful attempt at 
developing a system of checks and balance on corporate behaviour. Like many 
multilateral attempts at regulation, these guidelines lack an enforcement 
mechanism (May, 2006: 4).  
 
Other international multilateral agreements included The International Labour 
Organization’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy (see ILO, 2006) and UNCTAD‘s Set of 
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of 
Restrictive Business Practices (see UNCTAD, 1980). The ILO‘s Declaration was 
first adopted in 1977, but was revised in 1991, 2000 and 2006. The purpose of 
the Declaration is to ―encourage the positive contribution which Multinational 
Enterprises can make to economic and social progress, and to mimimise and 
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resolve the difficulties to which their various operations may give rise‖ (see ILO, 
2006). It requires companies to give due respect to the sovereign rights of states, 
obey national laws and regulations, respect the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and act in harmony with the development priorities and social aims of 
host countries (FoE, 1998: 4), but again is voluntary and fairly limited in its 
requirements.  
 
UNCTAD‘s Set of Multilaterally Agreed Principles and Rules for the Control of 
Restrictive Business Practices [―the Set of Principles‖], adopted in 1980 (see 
UNCTAD, 1980), is worth noting as it is a good indicator of the changing 
attitude towards TNCs from the 1980s onwards. Whilst the 1970s had seen 
moves towards the multilateral regulation of TNCs, this period involved the 
consolidation at an international institutional level of the perceived value of 
TNCs and foreign direct investment in the creation of wealth and prosperity, 
especially in developing countries. This occurred in the context of the dominant 
political-economic values of Thatcherism and Reaganism. This Set of Principles 
was created because of the ―need to ensure that restrictive business practices do 
not impede or negate the realization of benefits that should arise from the 
liberalization of tariff and non-tariff barriers affecting international trade, 
particularly those affecting the trade and development of developing countries‖ 
(quoted in FoE, 1998: 5). This type of agreement is indicative of the wider 
attitude of this time that the attraction of, rather than the governmental regulation 
of, TNCs was key to successful socio-economic development. As such, the 
climate became one of enablement of corporate goals, rather than any type of 
governmental regulation or restriction of corporations. By embedding the 
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generation of profits by corporations with the trophies of economic growth and 
prosperity (and thus successful ―development‖), and intertwining the role of the 
corporation with the role of the state (in the sense that the state was seen as 
secondary to the corporation in the generation of economic growth), the position 
of corporations as powerful key players in the global economy was established.  
 
2.3.3 Period 3: late 1980s-Present 
In this sense then, the genesis of company-led corporate social responsibility 
policies needs to be seen in the wider context of the political and economic 
international order of the l980s and 1990s. As the political climate moved 
towards increased deregulation and liberalisation of the global economy, the 
capacity of the state began to be ―rolled-back‖ and the position of the corporation 
as a global actor was consolidated. However, the neo-liberal consensus of the 
1980s was diluted somewhat by the 1990s (Jenkins/UNRISD, 2005: 527), and 
attention came to be focussed on the behaviour of corporations in terms of their 
labour practices, and social and environmental impact.  
 
Rather than prompting a wave of attempts at the global public regulation of 
corporations however, instead corporations began to engage in self-regulation. 
This is indicative of the widespread change in the position of the state within 
structures of global governance, and, as CSR has been put on the agenda of 
international organizations such as the World Bank and the UN, demonstrates the 
extent to which the line between global public and private authority is blurred in 
contemporary circumstances.  
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More specifically, the move towards corporate self-regulation and CSR policies 
has been driven by a number of factors. First, with an increase in the levels of 
FDI and the structures of a transnational corporation adapting to cope with such 
expansion, global business operates by means of global supply chains, in which a 
company can control production without exercising ownership (Jenkins, 2001: 
7). Because of this mode of operation, a causal relationship is set up between 
vast webs of suppliers, so that it is hard to avoid the inevitable claim of 
responsibility on the part of a head company for the conduct of a contractor or 
supplier. 
 
Second, Jenkins also cites the importance of intangible assets to a corporation‘s 
value, particularly in the trend towards branding and its associations with 
corporate image (Ibid). Although trademarks and brands have a history of use 
that extends back to guilds in the fourteenth century (May, 2006: 5), the late 
twentieth century was a period in which corporate branding became a key 
marketing strategy for global corporations. Increasingly, one of the main 
strengths of a global corporation is in the reputation (rather than just the quality) 
of its brand. This phenomenon works alongside global supply chains and 
outsourcing, as mentioned above, so that branding ―allows the networks of 
production and services behind a brand to become so loose and diffuse that 
connections are rarely made between immigrant workers, gangmasters, human 
trafficking, and the salad on our plates‖ (Amoore, 2006: 61). However, the 
converse of this has also become true. While corporations have outsourced their 
operations to the point that they bear little direct (legal) responsibility for the 
standards in their subsidiaries, the value of their brand has increased because the 
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brand has been used as the main asset in the marketing and sale of the product. 
The ability to connect unethical practices in a distant factory with, for example, 
clothes that are bought in a well-known branded clothes shop, can be severally 
damaging to corporate reputations. This ―market-based vehicle‖ provides 
corporate accountability movements with a way in which a corporation‘s 
behaviour in one country can be linked with its reputation in another (Vogel, 
2006: 9). In the context of the rise in corporate accountability movements (see 
below), the negative impact of this strategy is something that such corporations 
seek to avoid at all costs.  
 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, CSR policies have been driven by a 
massive growth in civil society and social movements, many of which have had 
corporate responsibility and accountability as a target for exposure/confrontation, 
and more recently, collaboration (Utting/UNRISD, 2005b: 10). Bendell states 
that, for example, by 1999, the nonprofit sector in 22 countries employed 19 
million people full-time, turning over $1.1 trillion annually, over 100,000 part-
time employees and 1.2 million full-time volunteers were working for 
international non-governmental organisations in France, Germany, Japan, The 
Netherlands, Spain and the UK (cited in Bendell, 2004a: 12). This growth in the 
popularity and strength of civil society activists and NGOs working on global 
issues was aided by the vast developments in communications technology, 
enabling such groups to disseminate information with unprecedented speed, 
regardless of geographical distance.  
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Although crude, a distinction needs to be made between two different types of 
civil society activity in the context of CSR. On the one hand, there is what 
Bendell describes as ―confrontational engagement‖, or forcing change tactics on 
the part of such groups that dominated the early 1990s (Ibid: 13). Such tactics 
involve the highlighting of bad practices on the part of corporations, the 
organisation of boycotts and protests, and an attempt to raise general awareness 
about the participation of well-known brands in unethical or unacceptable 
business practices. One well-known campaign has been that against the use of 
―sweatshops‖ by Nike throughout the 1990s (for a chronology of events, see 
CCCE, 2009). A similar campaign was that of Baby Milk Action, which 
campaigned specifically against Nestle and their promotion of formula feeding of 
infants in the developing world (see Baby Milk Action, nd). These campaigns 
were both aided by, and an integral part of, the counter-globalization movement 
of the late 1990s, and events such as the World Social Forum, and the European 
Social Forum have given increased legitimacy and publicity to the civil society 
movement to highlight the power and responsibility of corporations.  
 
On the other hand (partly as a result of the success of such movements, and 
partly as a result of the international political-economic climate of the time), civil 
society groups have also come to be involved at the level of both domestic and 
international governance in the development of CSR policies. In the main, this 
involves what are now known as public-private partnerships between business, 
civil society actors, and governmental institutions, or the creation of codes of 
conduct under the auspices of multi-stakeholder initiatives. Examples of such 
initiatives are the Global Reporting Initiative, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
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Tuberculosis, and Malaria, The Forest Stewardship Council. At the level of the 
UN, civil society group (as well as business sector) participation in World 
Conferences and Summits has increased throughout the 1990s, for example in 
events such as the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, the 1995 World Summit on Social 
Development in Copenhagen, and the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg in 2002 (Forman and Segaar, 2006: 17).   
 
In sum then, CSR policies have been developed as a result of (in the context of) 3 
different phenomena: 1. the political-economic international climate of the 1980s 
and 1990s which emphasised a reduced role for the state in regulating business. 
This should be seen in the context of the priority given at the international 
institutional level to neoliberal economic policy. 2 the changing mode of 
operation of business, in which different suppliers and firms become involved in 
a chain of responsibility which ends with the all-important brand reputation; and 
3. the growth in civil society activity highlighting this chain of responsibility, 
which has resulted both in pressure on corporations to reform, and partnership 
with government and business in order to develop and implement such reforms. 
Taken together, these three phenomena highlight the idea that CSR is both a 
reaction to and a manifestation of contemporary processes of globalisation. 
 
2.4 Codes of Conduct: Agents, Content and Procedures of Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 
One of the biggest difficulties in analysing CSR policies is that CSR means a 
variety of things to a variety of people. There is no one way of ―doing‖ CSR, and 
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it can involve the development of many different policies and new modus 
operandi, from partnership with government, NGOs, or other companies, to the 
development of new codes of conduct that represent the particular values the 
companies see as being part of their social responsibility. In general, however, 
CSR policies are expressed in the form of codes of conduct, although the content 
of and participants in these codes are by no means uniform. The rest of this 
section of the chapter outlines the different types of agents involved in codes of 
conduct, the matters such codes seek to address, and the procedures such codes 
follow.  
 
2.4.1 Agents of CSR 
 
CSR policies involve the participation of a variety of stakeholders in the 
development or construction of a code of conduct that expresses a company‘s 
commitments regarding the impact of its activities in the wider community. The 
idea that a variety of actors (generally held to be those who are either impacted 
by, or have an impact upon, the action in question) ought to be involved in this 
process has been theorised by stakeholder theory. The central idea behind 
stakeholder theory is that traditional theories of management put too much 
emphasis on the importance of shareholders in the business, and that there are a 
variety of other stakeholders associated with the operation of the firm to whom 
due recognition must be given. Freeman proposes that there ought to be an equal 
relationship between the firm and all stakeholders; generally, these stakeholders 
are (in no particular order), owners, management, local community, customers, 
suppliers, and employees (Freeman, 2002: 42). As such, the firm‘s primary 
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responsibility is not to shareholders but to all actors who have an effect on, or are 
affected by the activity of the firm. The idea is that the firm ought to be managed 
with due regard to the equality of all stakeholders and that as well as being 
concerned with the ―bottom-line‖ (profitability), a firm should also pay due 
regard to the ―triple bottom line‖ (social and environmental impacts of its 
activities).  
 
Initially, codes of conduct were primarily developed unilaterally by companies or 
business associations, rather than with the participation of multiple stakeholders 
(Utting, 2002: 69). In the early 1980s, most codes that were adopted unilaterally 
by companies were to do with questionable payments, prompted largely because 
of the US Securities and Exchange Commission‘s investigation into such 
payments (Jenkins/UNRISD, 2001: 5). This approach was apparently a 
convenient one for business, in the sense that by developing their own regulatory 
codes, corporations avoided external interference and controlled the direction of 
regulation. It was, however, open to criticism: allegations of greenwash, an ad 
hoc approach, and the gap that often existed between what appeared on paper, 
and what was done in practice (Ibid). 
 
In the context of this type of criticism then, the trend shifted towards the 
participation of a variety of actors in multi-stakeholder initiatives in the 
construction of corporate codes of conduct. Primarily, actors include:  NGOs, 
trade unions, business and industry associations, corporations, global public 
governance agencies and national governments. Such initiatives form links that 
transgress the territorial boundaries of the states in which they are based, thus 
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reflecting the nature of the corporate environment that they are trying to regulate. 
The structure of these initiatives and the range of actors that participate is not 
fixed or uniform. 
 
 For instance, Business for Social Responsibility (BSR) is a non-profit business 
association based in the US, but lists as its global alliances as The UN Global 
Compact, The Ethos Institute (Brazil), Business in the Community (UK), 
amongst others. Its major funders are traditional philanthropic associations such 
as The Ford Foundation, and government agencies, such as the US Department 
of State. The Ethical Trading Initiative has a membership that incorporates 
corporations, international trade union confederations, and global NGOs, as well 
as the UK‘s Department for International Development (DFID). At the level of 
supranational governance agencies, the EU‘s Multi-Stakeholder Forum on 
Corporate Social Responsibility (see EU, 2004) incorporates regional business 
associations, global NGOs, regional trade union federations, and global public 
governance agencies. Similarly, the UN Global Compact operates under the 
auspices of a global public governance agency, but is centred around the 
participation of a wide range of actors from both public, private and non-
governmental sectors.  
 
This multi-stakeholder approach has obvious implications for the content and 
organisational form of the codes of conduct, which will be dealt with in further 
detail below. In terms of the actors involved, the array of participants in multi-
stakeholder initiatives are a good indication of the way in which codes of 
conduct, and CSR, are constructed as both a public and private responsibility. In 
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this form of regulation, what Utting calls ―articulated regulation‖ (2005: 8) or 
what has elsewhere been called ―regulated self-regulation‖ (cited in Ougaard, 
2006: 247;), authority (albeit what might be called ―soft‖ authority) stems from 
both public and private sector on a non-territorial (global) basis. The success of a 
multi-stakeholder initiative is dependent on the all actors‘ participation, be it 
governmental participation to add a degree of legitimacy, NGO participation for 
the articulation of special interest groups needs/interests, or corporate 
participation to lend an element of feasibility to the process. In this sense, the 
authority derived from multi-stakeholder codes of conduct is only as good as the 
sum of its parts. 
 
The multiplicity of actors involved in the creation of corporate codes of conduct 
is not without problems. Although it purports to be a more democratic way of 
constructing CSR, it raises some important questions which relate to the overall 
success of CSR. On paper, the participation of all relevant stakeholders ought 
overall to be a good thing. However, power dynamics come in to play in this 
instance, so that the very issue of inclusion in or exclusion from the dialogue 
becomes problematic in terms of the resulting code of conduct. For instance, 
Newell has pointed out that very often the poorest sections of the community are 
excluded from the processes of constructing codes of conduct, often because they 
are not seen as legitimate stakeholders, or because their interests are presumed to 
be represented by those bodies already involved in the process (2005: 543). By 
using the stakeholder process as the justification for the content of a code of 
conduct, we learn nothing about ―the observable and non-observable uses of 
power in stakeholder relationships, or the rights and responsibilities of 
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stakeholders‖ (Blowfield, 2005b: 180). Additionally, there can be problems in 
relation to the legitimacy of actors in terms of the communities they speak for. 
NGOs, in this regard, are problematic because, as Newell points out, NGOs have 
their own political agendas to play out in CSR processes, which may not 
necessarily align with those of a community they purport to represent (Newell, 
2005: 552). Similarly, Utting has pointed out that many trade unions have 
difficulties with NGO participation in such processes, because of the ambiguity 
of their status as legitimate representatives, as well as the manner in which 
NGOs participate in processes that operate outside of democratic public policy 
processes (Utting, 2005: 9). The general point here is that multi-stakeholder 
participation within a CSR process does not get around the fact that it is still an 
inherently political process, within which the political dynamics of power are 
played out. As is discussed later on in the thesis, justice is contingent on such 
power dynamics being rectified. The ideas set out in chapter six attempt to 
address problems in this regard.  
 
Despite this, the convergence of different actors in the formation of codes of 
conduct is important from the point of view that it illuminates a lot about the 
context in which CSR is constructed. Implicit in the variety of actors is the idea 
that corporate responsibility is not just a matter of private (self) regulation, or 
public (state) regulation. This reflects the generalised move in the last twenty 
years of the twentieth century away from the ―hard‖ regulation of public 
governance agencies, in particular the state; and, more recently, the curbing of 
the private authority of corporations, albeit in ways that do not fit easily into a 
model of public regulation.  
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2.4.2 Content of Codes 
CSR seeks to address many different phenomena that fall outside the realm of 
traditional business activities. They can be directed at issues of labour standards, 
environmental sustainability, human rights, health care provision, education, and 
housing. The content of a code is entirely dependent on the particular code in 
question, and there is no standard for what is included and what is excluded. 
Additionally, what is included also depends on the particular constellation of 
stakeholders involved in the construction of the code (see above), and the final 
outcome of a code is a reflection of the power dynamics at play between such 
stakeholders. This section focuses on labour standards, environmental standards 
and human rights as the three key areas which codes of conduct address. 
Although there are many codes that address a wide diversity of issues (often ones 
that are of direct relevance to the particular industry) the three chosen here form 
the basis of the majority of codes, and have a background in multilateral attempts 
at regulation of corporations.  
 
Labour standards are a key area of attention for corporate social responsibility 
because of the changes contemporary globalization brings about for work 
practices and job security. Outsourcing and technological change have 
implications for workers in terms of both how they do their jobs, how they 
negotiate relations with their employer, as well as the fairness of the payment 
they receive for their labour. In a recent UN study of more than 300 companies, 
labour rights were found to be the most recognised of rights by companies 
surveyed (Wright and Lehr, 2006: ii). Whereas the issue of labour standards and 
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worker rights was once primarily a matter of negotiation between employer, state 
and trade unions, contemporary CSR means that these issues are often dealt with 
in multi-stakeholder codes, as well as the traditional mechanisms of social 
partnership. On a most basic level, labour standards means the right to freedom 
of association and collective bargaining, elimination of forced or compulsory 
labour, elimination of the worst forms of child labour, and the elimination of 
discrimination with respect to employment. This list is based on ILO 
conventions. The above mentioned standards are included in multi-stakeholder 
bodies such as the UN Global Compact (principles 3, 4, 5 and 6; see UN Global 
Compact: no date b), the Ethical Trading Initiative (points 1, 2, 4 and 7 of The 
Base Code; see Ethical Trading Initiative: 2001)), the Clean Clothes Campaign 
(principle 2; see Clean Clothes Campaign, 2006), and the Fair Labor Association 
(see Fair Labour Association, 1998).  
 
As mentioned above however, which standards appear and how far-reaching they 
are seems to vary according to the initiative in question. For instance, within the 
Clean Clothes Campaign and the Fair Labor Association, there is much 
discussion of the right of employees to a living wage, which is based on ILO 
conventions 28 (1928) and 131 (1970), and the methods that ought to be used to 
determine what a living wage is, yet there is no mention of a living wage at all in 
the Global Compact. Such selectivity of principles is borne out in practice by an 
ILO review of codes of conduct, in which principles related to occupational 
health and safety appeared in 75 per cent of codes reviewed, whereas those 
related to freedom of association and collective bargaining appeared in only 15 
per cent (cited in Diller, 1999: 112). This selectivity is indicative of the paradox 
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in how codes of conduct operate in relation to employers. In effect, codes of 
conduct are a self-limitation on the power of the firm with respect to its 
employees, yet it can be argued that such self-limitation mainly occurs when it is 
advantageous for the employer to do so (Murray, 1998: 5).  
 
The role corporations can play in both the degradation of the environment, and 
the effort to stem such degradation is central to CSR. Climate change is 
impossible to address adequately on a state by state basis; it is by its very nature 
trans-border. To the extent that they are unconstrained by territorial boundaries, 
global corporations can transcend the difficulties experienced by states in this 
area. At the same time, global corporations are highly culpable for the extent of 
environmental degradation, with their activities having quite serious 
environmental consequences along the value chain (Newell and Levy, 2006: 
159). Codes of conduct, then, are the way in which corporations deal with such 
issues. As opposed to the area of labour standards, the issue of environmental 
standards is a relatively new one, and so it seems to have been possible for 
corporations to a certain extent to control the discourse of CSR in this regard. 
Whereas labour standards have a long history of the trade union movement, and 
are traditionally a site of struggle between workers and firms, environmental 
standards as an issue of corporate responsibility have come to the fore more 
recently, in an era of intensified globalization in which corporate power is a 
significant strand of global governance. 
 
This is a good indicator of the role that the state can and cannot play in questions 
of CSR. In relation to labour disputes, many workers are protected by their right 
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to strike. There is no such similar threat in the case of climate change. The right 
to strike is in most instances protected in domestic legislation, and trade unions 
are key actors in many domestic policy negotiation processes in many countries. 
The issue of corporate responsibility in respect of climate change is importantly 
different – as mentioned above, states cannot deal with climate change alone, and 
so cooperation from the corporate sector is vital. As well as this, it is possibly 
easier for corporations to ignore the demands of climate change, given that a 
large of part of those who could be severely affected are future individuals. 
Climate change, and environmental standards are, then a good indicator of the 
nature of contemporary CSR policies.  
 
Like other issues that are addressed by corporate codes of conduct, 
environmental standards can mean different things, according to the manner in 
which it is being dealt with. General principles of environmental protection, as 
laid out in the Global Compact, are that businesses should support a 
precautionary approach to environmental challenges; undertake initiatives to 
promote greater environmental responsibility; and encourage the development 
and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies. Like labour standards, 
these principles are based on global public instruments of governance, in this 
case the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.  Industry-based 
codes, such as the international chemical industry‘s code ―Responsible Care‖, are 
more specific to the type of environmental hazard posed by the particular 
industry. Its guiding principles, whilst mentioning more generalised practices of 
CSR, such as stakeholder engagement, also incorporate pledges that are directly 
relevant to the chemical industry, such as resource conservation and waste 
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reduction (Responsible Care: 2009). Environmental standards are also dealt with 
in multi-stakeholder initiatives that involve more input from civil society, and as 
such could be seen to be more far-reaching, and less at risk of the accusation of 
―greenwash‖.  The Forest Stewardship Council, which was set up to promote 
sustainable forestry management for instance, cites, amongst other principles, the 
rights of indigenous peoples, and the conservation of biodiversity and fragile 
ecosystems (Forestry Stewardship Council: 1996). 
 
Human rights are increasingly recognised as a matter for concern for 
corporations. Like environmental standards, the link between business and its 
responsibility for human rights is a relatively new one; for instance Amnesty 
International only began their work on CSR and human rights in 1996. There is a 
vast array of global public governance instruments in relation to human rights, 
but at a basic level (with reference to the UN Declaration on Human Rights), 
human rights are held to encompass: the fundamental equality of all persons, the 
right not to be discriminated against on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status; the right to life and security; the rights to personal, social, economic 
and cultural freedoms (UN, 1948). There are two main instruments at the UN 
level that make explicit the link between business and human rights: the UN 
Global Compact, and the Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights. In 
the case of the Compact, the principles are not set down in law and it is 
specifically a non-regulatory, voluntary initiative (Kell and Levin, 2003: 152). In 
the case of UN Draft Norms, they were interpreted to be similar to UN ―soft 
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law‖, such as UN declarations, guidelines and standards, and are considered to 
have more strength in terms of enforcement and governance structures (Mantilla, 
2008: 286). Thus, there is a growing recognition of the link between business and 
human rights, given that international law increasingly recognises the legal rights 
and responsibilities of non-state actors. On this basis, Cutler points out that 
normative claims can now be made about corporate conduct with respect to 
human rights (Cutler, 2006: 208).  
 
The UN norms in this regard, while seen by some as controversial and the cause 
of bitter debate (Kinley and Chambers, 2006), are also seen as an important 
stepping stone in the direction of clarifying global corporations legal 
responsibilities in relation to human rights (Mantilla, 2008: 289). While they 
were not officially considered or voted against by the UN Human Rights 
Commission, instead being ―set aside‖, the debate that ensued is significant. 
Other legal instruments have been used to pursue allegations of corporate abuse 
of human rights. For instance, the US Alien Torts Claims Act has recently been 
used to prosecute US companies for human rights abuses in foreign countries. A 
notable example in this respect was the prosecution of Shell in 2009 in New 
York on behalf of the Ogonii people of Nigeria, as mentioned in the introduction.    
 
Thus there has recently been some progress towards clarifying global 
corporations‘ legal responsibilities with regard to universal rights, and in some 
instances the issue of human rights abuses has been pursued within the realm of 
public domestic regulation. Civil society activists have been responsible for 
exerting significant pressure in relation to the role corporations have to play in 
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the protection of human rights. Cases such as the execution of the Ogoni 9 in 
Nigeria, and the behaviour of private security firms in Colombia led Shell and 
BP to take on board human rights concerns (Amnesty International, 2003b: 2). 
However, these processes are contested and resisted at various different 
junctures.  Kinley and Chambers point out that attempts to establish a form of 
global public regulation of corporations with respect to human rights in 
international law (for example, the UN Draft Norms mentioned above) have been 
roundly condemned by business leaders in favour of their own methods of self-
regulation (2006: 449). Mantilla details the different reactions of states to the UN 
Draft Norms. On the one hand he found that the home states of global 
corporations tended to be against the norms, while host states (generally those of 
developing countries) tended to advocate their adoption as legal norms (Mantilla, 
2008: 287-288).  
 
Thus the content of codes of conduct is by no means concrete, and the overview 
given here should not be seen as definitive. What is important to note, however, 
is that the issues addressed by codes of conduct of necessity involve the 
participation of many different actors, including states, corporations, NGOs and 
international organisations. For instance, climate change cannot be addressed on 
a state-by state basis; similarly, labour relations cannot be addressed without 
reference to states (within whose mechanism most employee rights are 
guaranteed) or without reference to trade unions. Thus the content of codes 
highlights that the political questions addressed by CSR cannot be answered by 
reference to any one form of organisation be it public or private, national or 
international. 
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2.4.3 Procedures  
Like the agents who are responsible for codes of conduct, and the content of 
codes of conduct, the procedures used to implement codes of conduct and the 
organizational form they take are not fixed. In terms of these procedures, there is 
an interesting blurring of the public and the private that occurs, which largely 
stems from the multiplicity of actors involved in the procedures. This section 
details the main procedures and organisational forms of codes of conduct.  
 
Increasingly, corporations are using their annual reporting as a way of being seen 
to be implementing their own CSR policies. This is known as ―triple bottom 
line‖ reporting, which obliges corporations to report not just on profitability, but 
on social and environmental performance as well. This can be done by including 
social and environmental elements in their annual reports, or by allowing other 
companies to scrutinise their performance and then produce a report on them (see 
for example the McKinsey & Co report on the performance of companies who 
are part of the UN Global Compact; McKinsey & Co, 2004).  
 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is one of the most popular frameworks for 
reporting on social and environmental performance. To date, there are about 
20,000 stakeholders from over 80 countries involved in the GRI. It operates as 
the collaborating centre of the United Nations Environmental Programme, and 
thus, the guidelines are offered as a free public good. In 2008, over 1000 
companies had produced a report based on GRI guidelines (GRI, 2009b). The 
GRI is seen to be something of a partnership organisation to the Global Compact. 
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The Compact provides the framework of values that a corporation signs up to, 
while the GRI offers the practical guide on how to do this (see GRI, 2009a). One 
of the requirements of the Compact is that a corporation provides a 
Communication on Progress, and the GRI framework is promoted as the 
―logical‖ way in which to do this (Kell, 2006: 45). There are also a variety of 
private consultancy agencies that offer similar guidelines, for example The 
Corporate Citizenship Company, but which lack the global public element of 
initiatives such as the GRI. 
 
Like the GRI, standardisation bodies offer a means by which corporations can 
acquire internationally recognised endorsement of their operations in terms of 
social and environmental performance. ISO 9000 is becoming increasingly 
involved in the environmental and social concerns of the CSR agenda and sees 
this as one of its growth areas (see ISO, 2006). Social Accountability Standard 
(SA8000) on the other hand was set up specifically in 1998 for providing a way 
of standardising a corporation‘s operations in terms of social and environmental 
impact (see Social Accountability Standard, 2001). Another example is 
AccountAbility, a multi-stakeholder, membership-based organisation, involved 
in the promotion of responsible business practices, and the broader accountability 
of civil society and public organizations (see  AccountAbility, 1999).  
 
The guidelines these bodies offer are not strict codes of conduct, but offer 
uniform criteria by which different corporations‘ interpretation of the general 
principles can be judged. The drive for standardisation of principles is somewhat 
paradoxical in the context of the desire corporations seem to have had to 
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maintain control over CSR and to use self-regulation as a way of pre-empting 
public regulation. However, there are reasons for this move towards 
standardisation. In a world of competing codes of conduct, standardisation of 
principles offers both efficiency gains and competitive advantage (Ougaard, 
2006: 245). Ougaard also points out that corporations are increasingly seeking 
out standards that have an official stamp of legitimacy from political authorities, 
thus indicating a move away from privatised self-regulation (as mentioned 
above) towards what Knill and Lehmkuhl call ―regulated self-regulation‖ (cited 
in Ougaard, 2006: 247).  
 
Utting points out that the standardisation and reporting procedures outlined 
above can be limiting in the sense that they involve the collection and checking 
of a vast number of different principles, and the complexity of these procedures 
can hamper their feasibility and scaling up (Utting, 2002a: 63 and 2005b: 9). 
Complaints-based procedures can offer another way in which the behaviour of a 
corporation can be exposed and monitored. This can be done in a variety of 
different ways, such as consumer boycotts, shareholder activism, and 
transnational litigation, and can take on a variety of different institutional forms, 
such as through judicial and parliamentary procedures, global collective 
agreements between TNCs and trade unions, and NGO-watchdog bodies (Utting, 
2002a: 63-4).  
 
The Fair Labor Association (FLA)‘s Annual Report 2006 (see FLA, 2006: 22-
24) details a case-study in which a type of complaints based procedure was 
implemented following the dismissal of three workers for attempting to organise 
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a trade union branch in a Nike-affiliated factory in Thailand. The procedure 
centres on the multi-stakeholder body acting as a facilitator for dialogue between 
the dismissed workers, the factory management, Nike management, and Thai 
government officials, following a complaint being lodged with the FLA. In this 
particular case, the workers were reinstated, and the trade union branch was 
permitted, as well as the implementation of changes of some work practices.  
Similar to the point above about ―regulated self-regulation‖, Utting calls these 
types of procedures ―post-voluntarist‖ that are an indication of a move away 
from entirely voluntary and private approaches to CSR (Utting, 2005a: 384).  
 
Procedurally, one of the most interesting things about codes of conduct and the 
multi-stakeholders that construct and implement them is the organizational form 
they take. Despite the fact that many of the participants are bureaucratic 
hierarchical institutions, involvement with such a multiplicity of actors 
necessitates an alternative organisational form. One of the most common features 
of many multi-stakeholder initiatives is their organisation into learning networks. 
It seems that the dissemination of knowledge between stakeholders is the 
preferred way in which participants learn about CSR. The Global Compact is an 
inter-organisational network (ION), in which various autonomous organisations 
(in this case, global corporations) come together in a shared conceptual system to 
achieve goals that they could not achieve alone; the knowledge generated by the 
pursuit of these goals is disseminated amongst other members of the network, 
thus providing a continuously evolving bank of information all of which should 
contribute to the wider aim of the promotion and adoption of the ten principles 
(Kell and Levin, 2003:155; Ruggie, 2002). There is no authoritative hierarchical 
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bureaucratic structure, with the Global Compact office acting as a facilitator of 
communication and partnership projects between participants (Kell and Levin, 
Ibid). In this way then, participants in the Compact not only have to report on 
their performance, but this performance is made available and shared amongst all 
members. Further details on the organisational nature of the Compact are given 
in chapter seven.  
 
Furthermore, it seems that this dissemination of knowledge along such networks 
is making codes of conduct and CSR a form of governance that is more explicitly 
public, in the sense that a lot of the information regarding CSR is accessible to 
the wider public. A primary example in this regard is the organisation the 
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, an organisation set up in 2005 at 
the request of John Ruggie, in his capacity as the UN special representative on 
business and human rights. The purpose of this initiative is to make available, via 
a website, a vast array of documents in relation to business and human rights 
(See Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 2009). Another example is 
CSRwire, a source of CSR and sustainability news, whose members are NGOs, 
companies, organisations and associations interested in the spread of knowledge 
and information about CSR (See CSRwire, 2009). Additionally, it is a 
requirement of the Global Compact that all participants make available what is 
known as their Communication on Progress; participants who do not do so after 
two years are labelled as ―inactive‖. The GRI, as detailed above, make all the 
reports submitted to them available for public use via their website.  
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This phenomenon is interesting from the point of view of governance, as it 
means that although many of the actors involved in this type of governance are 
essentially private, their participation is being made quite explicitly public. The 
existence of these sources of information means that the discourse of CSR 
becomes part of a public sphere of knowledge; the awareness this creates in 
terms of private global governance structures is important. This type of 
transparency and accessibility of information and decision-making procedures 
goes some way towards establishing a degree of accountability, or at least 
provoking further scrutiny that may lead to a form of accountability. In this 
sense, the ―opening up‖ of CSR to the public sphere creates some form of 
legitimacy for it. Similarly, by changing the way in which business is taught, 
CSR to a degree becomes normalised in the eyes of those who shape the business 
world. The publicity of rules and standards related to CSR is important for the 
argument that is made in chapter five, regarding distributive justice and 
corporations. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has given a brief description of the nature of global corporations, as 
well as a brief history of the development of CSR policies in the context of the 
changing structures of global governance in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Although originally created with some semblance of a public goal, 
corporations have become a symbol of the profit-making goal of twentieth 
century capitalism. This has occurred through the development of various 
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management and commercial techniques that firstly afforded corporations 
limited liability and secondly allowed their expansion across territorial borders.  
 
There are two central ways in which the historical story presented in the chapter 
is important. In the first instance, the history of the corporation and the 
emergence of CSR are important for an argument about distributive justice 
because the wider issue of the role that the contemporary state can play in 
affecting people‘s lives is an intrinsic part of it. As mentioned early on in the 
chapter, corporations in their first historical iteration were granted licences to 
operate from particular states that were conditional on their fulfilling a public 
purpose – hence the development of railways, for instance. More recently, in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, multiple attempts were made by multilateral 
organisations (whose authority derives from states) to regulate corporate 
activities and to legally codify corporations‘ social responsibilities. In 
contemporary circumstances the role of the state in relation to the corporation is 
ambiguous and ill defined; on the one hand, many states endorse and fund CSR 
practices, and act as partners to corporations in such initiatives, while on the 
other, states are constrained by their territorial boundaries to regulate global 
corporations that are not similarly constrained. As the references to Amoore 
mentioned above indicate, this represents a blurring of global public and private 
authority. This is problematic for distributive justice because most theories of 
distributive justice rely on binary opposites such as domestic/international, or 
public/private, to determine the way in which the question of distributive justice 
is approached. Thus, the historical background of CSR is indicative of the wider 
context in which questions of (global) distributive justice emerge in 
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contemporary circumstances, as well as being indicative of how responses to 
such questions should be developed.  
 
The second way in which this story is important is in terms of the historical 
constraints that this history exerts on the practice and process of CSR. As the 
first part of the chapter discussed, the activities of global corporations are 
enabled by a system of global capitalism, which has established legal personality 
and globalised the corporate model across territorial boundaries. Historically, 
attempts to regulate corporations by multilateral institutions in terms of their 
social responsibilities have for the most part failed. This historical fact is 
important in the consideration of what justice requires in relation to corporations, 
as it points to a key problem with CSR as a response to allegations of corporate 
wrongdoing. The next chapter critiques CSR as another feature of this system 
and thus inadequate as a response to the contention of systemic harm. Chapter 
six attempts to find a way around this, by focusing on making a differentiation 
between what is desirable and what is feasible in relation to justice and 
corporations, and divides the ideas proposed into aspirational and concessive 
theory. The latter set of ideas concede to the facts of global capitalism, global 
corporations and to the reality of how CSR is practiced. In this regard, the 
historical context of the emergence of CSR informs the extent to which a 
proposal about justice and the corporation should concede to facts. The next 
chapter extends this attempt at understanding CSR by developing a Polanyian 
and Gramsci influenced theoretical explanation for why CSR emerged and why it 
takes the form it does. This explanation also informs the concessive theory of the 
thesis.  
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3: Explaining CSR: Polanyian and Gramscian Insights 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical explanation for the 
emergence of CSR, as well as an explanation for the form and content that the 
process of CSR conventionally takes. These explanations will ultimately lead to 
insights as to what needs to be conceded in the conclusions of the thesis as 
regards a concessive theory of global distributive justice. In the previous chapter, 
the historical context of CSR was described in terms of three historical periods, 
in which the discourse and norms about the responsibilities of business to society 
shifted from that of corporate philanthropy, to attempts at multilateral regulation 
and on to what is now termed CSR, which is a process of self-regulation albeit 
incorporating a multiplicity of political actors. 
 
However, what is of interest for the questions the thesis has posed about justice 
and the global corporation is a deeper explanation for why CSR has emerged in 
the time it has, and why it has taken the form it has. In attempting to gain some 
understanding of these questions, the chapter sets up the discussion in later 
chapters about what justice in relation to corporations means. Given the aim of 
the thesis to create a synthesis between a political-economic understanding of 
CSR and a normative view of justice and the corporation, it is helpful to provide 
a thorough explanation for why CSR is the way it is. As such, the chapter draws 
on insights from Polanyi and Gramsci to do this.  
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The first section of the chapter briefly discusses further the value of this 
explanatory chapter. The second section discusses some key Polanyian ideas – 
embedded liberalism, and the double movement – and details how Polanyi‘s 
arguments that an inevitable resistance emerges within societies that have been 
dominated by free market principles. The next section discusses the globalisation 
of these ideas, detailing how global civil society activists as well as the financial 
crises of the late 1990s constituted a form of resistance to unfettered global 
capitalism. As well as this, the section discusses CSR specifically, viewing CSR 
as a reaction on the part of global corporations to these forms of resistance. The 
key point for these sections that derive from Polanyian ideas is that the 
emergence of the phenomenon of CSR is usefully explained as a reaction to neo-
Polanyian resistance of global capitalism, in which corporate activity is 
highlighted as something that needs to be restrained in order for capitalism itself 
to be sustainable.  
 
The final section of the chapter turns to the form and content of the CSR process 
and uses Gramscian ideas to explain why CSR takes the shape it does. As such, 
why particular issues are on the agenda and others are not, and why the process 
of CSR excludes some groups and not others. In this, the Gramscian idea of the 
hegemonic bloc of global capitalism is used to understand the process, and it is 
argued that the control that processes of global capitalism exert on it render it an 
inherently limited process. The conclusion summarises the chapter and indicates 
how the ideas articulated within it are important for forgoing discussions about 
justice and the corporation.  
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3.2 The Value of Explanation 
 
The core value of this chapter is in the manner in which it contextualises CSR as 
a political-economic phenomenon that has implications for the way in which we 
think about justice. The thesis argues that the political and economic choices 
encapsulated by CSR necessitate attention from the normative point of view of 
distributive justice. In order to think through what the synthesis of these areas 
(CSR and distributive justice) might imply, it is important to gain a historically 
contextualised understanding of the way in which CSR emerged, which was 
done in chapter two, as well as a similarly contextualised theoretical explanation 
for the emergence of CSR. 
 
As well as the value of explanation in its own right, this explanation is also 
important in the context of the later ideas articulated in the thesis about CSR and 
global distributive justice. As is discussed in chapter six, the thesis argues that a 
concessive view of justice is valuable in relation to corporations – that is, a view 
that concedes to certain facts and realities about the political-economic context 
within which corporations operate. In order to do this, the ideas discussed in 
chapter six, under the heading of ―concessive theory‖ make reference to 
conventional processes of CSR yet also seek to develop the proposals that go 
beyond current practices that are, as is discussed in this chapter, shaped by a 
hegemonic control of global capitalism. Thus the role of this chapter is to 
uncover reasons for CSR and its form in order that it can be established what is 
necessary to concede within concessive theory.  
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3.3 Embedded Liberalism and the Polanyian Double Movement 
 
It is argued by many that CSR is a manifestation of the globalisation of 
embedded liberalism, or a global social market paradigm. In terms of the fact of 
the existence of CSR, the thesis draws from Polanyian-influenced ideas about 
embedded liberalism and the double movement, as well as drawing from 
Ruggie‘s ideas about the globalisation of embedded liberalism. It is argued in 
this chapter that CSR is indicative of the widespread recognition on the part of 
global corporations, as well as other stakeholders, that the pursuit of corporate 
activity without due regard to the social consequences of such activity is 
unsustainable in the long term. As such, the emergence of CSR is usefully 
understood as a reaction to a neo-Polanyian double movement that served to re-
embed the economic activities of global corporations into society. This section 
provides a description and discussion of embedded liberalism and the Polanyian 
double movement.  
 
3.3.1 Embedded Liberalism  
The embedded liberalism compromise is the idea that economic liberalisation 
ought to be embedded in a social community (see Ruggie 1982). In the post-war 
period of the twentieth century, state based government was key to this process 
of stabilisation in the provision of social safety nets and adjustment assistance, 
while pushing international liberalisation (Ruggie, 2003). In this context, the 
embedded liberalism compromise denotes the international financial regime 
embodied in the Bretton Woods institutions, and describes how this regime 
  
 
87 
enabled state governments to adapt domestically to the economic pressures and 
changes that came with the liberalization of their economies.  
 
In this school of thought, there is an implicit assumption that (global) capitalism 
has widespread benefits for society, but that in conjunction with these benefits 
there are also harmful consequences which have to be tamed; thus there is a role 
for the state in providing measures of social protection. Justice, on this view, is 
dependent on a ―settled and stable social bond‖ outside of which justice is 
thought unlikely to be possible (Devetak and Higgott, 1999: 487). Thus the 
sovereign state has the authority to ensure just distributive arrangements that are 
acceptable to citizens, who are linked by the common bond of community and 
territory.  
 
According to Ruggie, this compromise was made possible because the post-war 
international economic/financial regime was founded upon international 
authority that was a fusion of power and legitimate social purpose (1982: 385). 
As long as there is broad underlying consensus about that social purpose, then 
international regimes are adaptable through this embedded liberal compromise: 
 
If and as the concentration of economic power erodes, and the ‗strength‘ 
of international regimes is sapped thereby, we may be sure that the 
instruments of regimes also will have to change. However, as long as 
purpose is held constant, there is no reason to suppose that the normative 
framework of regimes must change as well. In other words, referring 
back to our analytical components of international regimes, rules and 
procedures (instruments) would change but principles and norms 
(normative frameworks) would not (Ruggie, 1982: 384). 
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The institutions that enable and carry out the embedded liberal compromise are 
less important in and of themselves. As long as such institutions are underpinned 
by a broadly held social purpose, then the normative framework of the regime 
will be secure. Self-reflexivity is important in this respect. Regimes that are self-
reflexive are conscious of the importance of norms and ideas within the 
institutions of the regime (Best, 2003: 368):  
 
What was remarkable about this particular system was not simply its 
commitment to a different kind of social purpose, but also its self-
conscious recognition of the centrality of a normative framework and its 
willingness to allow its central tensions to be negotiated on an ongoing 
basis (Best, 2003: 369). 
 
The embedded liberal compromise that Ruggie developed in the early 1980s was 
essentially state-centric in character, and makes a clear differentiation between 
the domain of the national and that of the international. What this means is that 
while embedded liberalism was multilateral, that multilateralism was predicated 
on domestic interventionism, i.e. states were given the financial tools necessary 
―to pursue their own ‗favorite experiments‘ within the wider global economy, 
through the provision of IMF credit, some exchange rate flexibility and the right 
to control capital flows‖ (Best, 2003: 365)2. So, embedded liberalism empowered 
states to respond to international events to ensure domestic stability, but the 
normative basis of the international financial regime which underpinned this was 
derived from a shared sense of social purpose that was institutionalised 
multilaterally.  
 
3.3.2 The Double Movement 
                                                        
2
 The phrase ‗favorite experiments‘ is acknowledged by Best to be borrowed from Keynes.  
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In his explanation of the embedded liberal compromise, Ruggie uses Karl 
Polanyi‘s argument regarding the inevitability of a compromise that must emerge 
from a period of free market capitalism (Ruggie, 1982: 385-388). This is 
exemplified by the idea of the ―double movement‖. Polanyi wrote about the 
―double movement‖ in the context of the social consequences of nineteenth 
century industrialisation and the collapse of the laissez-faire system, as well as 
the crises of the inter-war period (see Polanyi, 2001). His central point was that 
economic liberalization is always coupled with resistance to such liberalization, 
such that the economy must always be (or become – as a result of the double 
movement) embedded within society. He argued that the attempt to create a fully 
disembedded free market society (i.e. an economy with minimal governmental 
intervention) is impossible, since economic relations are intrinsically bound up in 
wider society (i.e. embedded): 
 
Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implies a stark 
utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without 
annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have 
physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a 
wilderness (Polanyi, 2001: 3).  
 
In the context of nineteenth century industrialising societies, the self-regulating 
market was the ―common matrix‖ that shaped the other fundamental institutions 
of the international system (the balance of power, the gold standard and the 
liberal state). It was the self-regulating market that led to the collapse of this 
system: 
 
…the origins of the cataclysm lay in the utopian endeavour of economic 
liberalism to set up a self-regulation market…All types of society are 
limited by economic factors. Nineteenth-century civilization alone was 
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economic in a different and distinctive sense, for it chose to base itself on 
a motive only rarely acknowledged as valid in the history of human 
societies, and certainly never before raised to the level of a justification of 
action and behaviour in everyday life, namely, gain. The self-regulating 
market system was uniquely derived from this principle (Ibid: 31). 
 
Polanyi posited that there are three forms of integration in an economy that act to 
coordinate and structure economic activity – reciprocity, redistribution and 
exchange (Ibid: 45-58). Reciprocity indicates a social system that is organised 
around trust, in which there are symmetrical power relations between a society‘s 
members. A social system based on redistribution is one in which a central 
authority is required to make decisions regarding the distribution of resources, 
and consequently, general consent to this authority is required (Ibid; Watson, 
2006: 438). Polanyi draws on ethnographic and anthropological studies to 
highlight the idea that ―man‘s economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social 
relationships‖ (Polanyi, 2001: 48).  
 
It was the dominance of the third form of integration, exchange, that Polanyi 
deemed problematic. He considered the dominance within a society of principles 
of gain or individual acquisitiveness (exchange relations) as inherently 
unsustainable in the long-term as it runs counter to humanity‘s natural inclination 
towards reciprocity and redistribution, as well as exchange. By elevating these 
principles to those of a foundational human characteristic, society comes to be 
run as an adjunct to the market and social relations become embedded in the 
economic system, rather than the other way around (Ibid: 60).  
 
Essentially this means that economic decisions, at both individual and 
institutional levels, are made according to a principle of gain, rather than one that 
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prioritises reciprocity and redistribution. This is unsustainable because it                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
construes human beings and the natural environment as commodities, when in 
fact they (land, labour, and money) are fictitious commodities (Block, 2001: 
xxv). This, it was argued by Polanyi, is the great error of modern economics – 
that land, labour and money are treated within economic theory as commodities 
like other products that can be bought or sold, when in fact ―labour is simply the 
activity of human beings, land is subdivided nature, and the supply of money and 
credit in modern societies is necessarily shaped by government policies‖ (Ibid).  
 
The demands that a free market economy makes on the individual are 
unsustainable in the long term, and the economic uncertainty generated by a self-
regulated market, as well as the concomitant required flexibility of the individual 
in terms of his/her economic circumstances, are impossible burdens to bear 
(Block: xxxiv). As such, fictitious commodities will behave differently on the 
market than real ones and will bring into play the natural human inclination 
towards reciprocity and redistribution. This produces human tensions that the 
market alone cannot rectify and because of this unsustainability, there is an 
unavoidable role for the state to play in decision-making regarding how to 
regulate the market. The state then serves the broader social purpose of 
embedding the economy within society, in order both to tame the consequences 
of capitalism, and also to sustain capitalism.  
 
This is what is known as the double movement, in which the moves towards a 
free-market economy are countered by resistance to that form of economic 
organisation. This resistance comes from all sections of society – and crucially is 
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bound to be supported by capitalist interests in society, given the need of 
capitalism for predictability and stability through forms of protection. The state 
introduces forms of social protection in order to protect its citizens, and societies 
move collectively to protect themselves, for example in trade unions (Munck, 
2007: 34). Without this resistance, the consequences of a free market economy 
are stark.  
 
Polanyi uses the example of the international gold standard and the resulting 
international chaos following its collapse to demonstrate this. The double 
movement does not seek to overthrow free-market capitalism, or provoke radical 
opposition to it. Instead, the double movement is a compromise that resolves the 
inherent tensions that come about as a result of the intermingling of the domestic 
and the international financial systems. Thus the economic relations that come 
about as a result of the liberalisation of an economy ought to be (and have to be) 
embedded within wider society. Once economic relations are embedded in 
society in this way, (and not the other way around), a society can function 
sustainably, and, according to the ideas of embedded liberalism, the social 
contract is intact. Thus the presumption of the principles of the free market that 
human beings naturally gravitate only towards individual gain and 
acquisitiveness is disputed by the Polanyian idea that capitalism requires other 
principles in order to function – those of redistribution and reciprocity.  
 
There is an interesting link in this idea to what Cohen argues about justice and 
societal ethos (Cohen, 1997 and 2008). Although this will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter five, it is important to note here that the argument that a 
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sustainable capitalist society depends on the propensity of human beings to 
behave fairly and to support a system that enables justice is similar to ideas put 
forward most prominently by Cohen, that argue that justice is about more than 
fair rules, it is also about fair individual choices within those rules. Thus the idea 
that societies resist the progression of free market capitalism is linked to 
distributive justice ideas about the necessity of an ethos of justice amongst 
members of a society. Such an ethos is made possible precisely because, on the 
Polanyian understanding, historically many societies have been organised around 
reciprocal or redistributive principles, rather than solely around exchange 
relations.  
 
To summarise: the embedded liberal compromise denotes the international 
economic regime that enabled states to liberalise their economies whilst 
cushioning themselves from the external shocks of that liberalisation 
domestically; this was agreed in a multilateral framework (Bretton Woods), and 
was underpinned by a shared understanding of social norms. This is based on 
Polanyi‘s work on the ―double movement‖ in which a society inevitably moves 
to resist the destruction of a free market by protecting itself.  
 
3.4 The Globalisation of Embedded Liberalism 
 
In the context of contemporary processes of globalisation, the primary difficulty 
with embedded liberalism as laid out above is that it is based on a 
national/international dichotomy. Globalisation disrupts the embedded liberal 
compromise by transcending the state-centric notions on which it is based. While 
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the embedded liberal compromise works from the premise that the domestic 
state, in conjunction with international financial institutions, can resolve the 
problems associated with the liberalisation of an economy, contemporary 
processes of globalisation problematise this assumption of state-centrism. This 
section first details the globalisation of embedded liberalism, and the neo-
Polanyian double movement this prompted, highlighting the impact that 
contemporary globalisation has had on the international institutional structures of 
governance, and the forms of resistance to this change that have emerged. The 
section discusses CSR as a reaction to this double movement.  
 
3.4.1 Globalisation of Embedded Liberalism 
On the view exalted by the idea of embedded liberalism, globalisation means that 
the sphere of the political is extended beyond (above, below and between) the 
state; territory is not the sole means of political organisation (associated with 
Westphalian sovereignty) and the state is surrounded by a variety of different 
(political) actors that exist on multiple levels of governance, other than that of 
the state. While the state is still responsible in many respects for the development 
of, for example, social protection, its ability to respond to certain global political, 
economic and social events and processes is altered by the presence of non-state, 
supra-state, or sub-state actors. Global corporations, in this context, are seen as 
being one of a number of different actors operating at the global political and 
economic level that are involved in the creation and implementation of rules, 
standards and norms that work to affect people‘s live in a serious way.  
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Essentially, globalisation involves the emergence of certain economic, social and 
political processes that exert pressure on the state in two different directions. On 
the one hand, there is the move towards the liberalisation of the domestic 
economy. Broadly the actors involved in this pressure have (historically) been 
international financial institutions, global corporations and states that have 
pursued such economic policies both domestically and internationally. In the 
context of this pressure, the provision of social protection has become a question 
for ―the market‖. The market, and the internationally mobile capital that flows 
through it, as constructed by the powerful actors listed above, is unrestricted by 
the territorial boundaries that the state must operate under, and is free from the 
obligations that come with the political community of the state. This rolling back 
of the state was exemplified internationally by policies such as IMF structural 
adjustment programmes, and domestically through governments following 
Thatcherite and Reaganite principles. This is based on the idea that the self-
regulating market will inevitably produce just outcomes, and that the role of the 
state ought to be minimal. 
 
On the other hand, globalisation also involves a push from civil society actors 
that act to tame the freedoms of the market, as exemplified by the actors listed 
above, to introduce a form of regulation of their behaviour. This push occurs in 
many different ways and in many different arenas: the various mass protests at 
meetings of international organisations (in Seattle in 1999, Washington 2000 and 
2002, Genoa in 2002, London, 2009 for example), the creation of alternative 
policy forums such as the World Social Forum or the European Social Forum, 
and the development of partnerships between nongovernmental organisations 
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and corporations. These forms of resistance to globalising processes are 
indicative of a growing belief that the unfettered mobility and power of capital is 
something that needs to be addressed through the emergence of a strengthened 
global civil society. Such resistance is about the development and creation of 
alternative policy frameworks to resolve questions of poverty, socio-economic 
development and justice.  
 
Problematic here is the lumping together of a broad church of different 
organisations, groups and movements, all of whom have different specific 
agendas and different modes of operation. Additionally, as Munck points out, 
only a North Atlanticist/Eurocentric perspective would assert that anti-
globalisation protest began in Seattle in 1999 (Munck, 2007: 57-8). However, 
with this caveat in mind, the point is that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there 
emerged a mobilisation of a significant body of non-state actors who were 
motivated by the sentiment that neoliberal globalisation was unjust, and ought to 
be changed. Central to this, for this analysis, is that these actors are not state-
bound, yet many aim to develop a form of protection of individuals and 
communities that might be thought to be the duty of the state. In this sense, a 
consequence of the drive towards neoliberalism during this period was that there 
emerged a resistance that aims to undermine some of the fundamental principles 
of neoliberalism 
 
In the context of global corporations, contemporary processes of globalisation 
mean that they are increasingly being regulated in ways other than state-based 
regulation. The various actors involved in the regulation of corporations are civil 
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society organisations, international organisations, business associations, and 
corporations themselves. Thus the importance of contemporary processes of 
globalisation to global corporations is twofold – on the one hand, globalisation 
has aided and abetted the increasingly powerful position of the global 
corporation  (in the sense of the prevailing neoliberal policies of the latter half of 
the twentieth century), yet on the other, globalisation has given rise to a situation 
in which there is now a multiplicity of actors involved in drawing attention to, 
and ultimately developing a new type of regulation of global corporations.  
 
3.4.2 Resistance: A Neo-Polanyian Double Movement 
In terms of developing a Polanyian explanation for the emergence of CSR, the 
thought is that its development was an inevitability that was produced by the 
pursuit and implementation of free market principles on an international level. 
Because a society dominated by principles of neoliberalism works from the 
premise that individual acquisitiveness is a basic human characteristic, a view 
that Polanyi deems to be incorrect, then a form of resistance will ultimately seek 
to rectify the dominance of such an idea. The drive towards neoliberal policies in 
the 1980s and 1990s created the institutional structure that enabled the elevation 
of individual acquisitiveness above other human characteristics.  
 
On a Polanyian view, the behaviour of individuals is inextricably linked to the 
institutional arrangements that surround them. So, the institutional arrangements 
of that time pushed neoliberal economic policies into a dominant position, in 
which the self-regulating market triumphed over state regulation, which had the 
subsequent effect of promoting and legitimating the acquisitive behaviour of 
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individuals. Thus the process is self-replicating: the creation of economic 
arrangements that privilege principles of exchange over those of redistribution 
and reciprocity affects individuals and the general ethos of wider society so as to 
privilege the values of individualism over those of reciprocity and redistribution.  
Again, as mentioned above, a similar argument is made within distributive 
justice literature – if an ethos of acquisitiveness prevails, justice is not possible, 
because an inclination towards acquisitiveness inevitably negatively impacts 
upon the least well off in society.  
 
However, as described above, the Polanyian argument suggests that because of 
the inherent and unavoidable embeddedness of the economy within social 
relations, the domination of such principles is unsustainable. Society is not 
guided only by principles of exchange; society also consists of community, trust, 
reciprocity etc. As such, prices are not just determined by market value, prices 
also have a social value. In this sense, a neoliberal agenda contains within it the 
seeds of its own downfall: the disembedding of the economy from wider society 
erodes these values, and demonstrates a fundamental contradiction in the 
construction of a market economy. Hence the Polanyian belief that ―laissez-faire 
was planned‖ (Block, 2001: xxvii). Capitalism requires societal values such as 
trust and reciprocity, and institutions such as family and community, as they are 
what ensure the stability necessary for capitalism to develop. Yet the pursuit of 
individual acquisition is anathema to this stability because it impairs individuals 
being socialised into these institutions.  
 
In the era then of post-Washington consensus, and post-Battle of Seattle, it seems 
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a form of resistance has emerged to the neoliberal globalising policies of the last 
twenty or so years of the twentieth century. To the extent that certain elements of 
global civil society have pushed the CSR agenda after a period in which the 
unsustainability of neoliberalism had become evident (for example the financial 
crises that occurred in the late 1990s in Argentina, Malaysia, India, Indonesia 
etc), it could be said that CSR is representative of the resistance to neoliberal 
policies. However, it is more accurate to explain the emergence of CSR as a 
reaction to the resistance of neoliberalism. This distinction will be drawn out in 
the remainder of this section.  
 
3.4.3 CSR as a Reaction to Neo-Polanyian Resistance  
CSR cannot be explained as a neo-Polanyian form of resistance to neoliberal 
economic globalisation because it lacks the enforcement capacity of a sovereign 
state. CSR is not a coherent policy adopted universally in a given area or a given 
industry; instead it is pick-and-choose approach to the wider responsibilities that 
a corporation has, or indeed the responsibilities a corporation decides it has, to 
society. Granted, some newer initiatives, such as the Global Compact, do purport 
to introduce a greater coherence to CSR in that it is overseen by the UN. 
However, lacking as it is in the sovereign authority of the state, the form of social 
protection offered by CSR policies falls far short of a Polanyian ideal of state-
based welfare provision.  
 
It is more accurate to describe CSR as a reaction to the resistance that emerged – 
or a way of answering the resistance – because CSR has not fundamentally 
changed much that is of significance to the system that made it necessary. In this 
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sense, the emergence of CSR is Polanyian because CSR policies support the 
capitalist system – they do not entail its complete reformation – and to a great 
extent CSR came about because of the unsustainability of the manner in which 
many global corporations were operating. CSR, then, involves an 
acknowledgement on the part of corporations of this unsustainability. The 
position taken by the thesis is that a Polanyian account offers a useful 
explanation for why CSR has emerged, in the sense of why a discourse about the 
social responsibilities of corporations exists in this particular historical period. 
The remainder of this section focuses on this former point.  
 
The relevance of Polanyi‘s argument to contemporary globalized circumstances 
is acknowledged by many (see for example Birchfield 1999; Stiglitz 2001; 
Watson 2006). Indeed, Ruggie has personally pursued the CSR project within the 
Global Compact as the globalisation of embedded liberalism (see Ruggie 1997 
and 2003). Ruggie‘s argument runs that CSR represents a harnessing of the 
power of globalisation to embed the global market within shared social values 
and institutional practices (2003: 94-95). The social compact of liberal states is 
threatened by the vagaries of globalisation (Devetak and Higgott, 1999: 8). On a 
Polanyian view CSR is seen by Ruggie, as well as others (see for example 
O‘Laughlin 2008 and Levy and Kaplan, 2007) to be one way in which social 
protection can be maintained, albeit in a wholly different way to how embedded 
liberalism as originally conceived would envisage, and, indeed, how a Polanyian 
idea of the double movement would predict.  
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On this view then, CSR can be a positive process of private sector involvement 
in governance that incorporates the global social values of human rights, labour 
rights, environmental standards etc. with the freedom of a global market, and in 
which the corporate sector balances out its expanded array of rights by 
institutionalizing its social responsibilities. Although this view is tempered with 
the caveat that this project of the global public domain is problematic and 
difficult – ―[A]nd so at the global level there will be many more zigs, many more 
zags, and quite probably many more failures (Ruggie, 2003: 117) – CSR is seen 
by many to offer one of the best ways of taming the bads of globalisation in a 
manner that accommodates the global market.  
 
However, CSR as currently constituted differs in some important ways from the 
ideas that Polanyi discussed, such that it can more accurately be described as 
Neo-Polanyian. There are three points to make in this regard. Firstly, in the 
context of contemporary processes of globalisation, the emergence of a strictly 
Polanyian resistance to the policies of neoliberal economic globalisation was 
rendered virtually impossible because of the position of the state as a result of 
these policies. However, what differentiates this period of globalisation is that 
the push towards a minimal state emanated from elements/actors that were 
unconstrained by territorial boundaries, unlike the state whose powers are 
restricted to the territory over which it has sovereignty (Scholte, 2005). The 
state‘s ability to provide social protection against the ill-effects of economic 
liberalisation was impaired because the drive towards that liberalisation was 
supra-territorial in nature.  
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Secondly, and relatedly, CSR policies are representative of a new type of politics 
that is part and parcel of globalisation. As outlined above, contemporary 
processes of globalisation mean that politics takes place in political arenas other 
than that of the state, and that social relations extend across territorial 
boundaries. Because of the difficulties that globalisation presents for the state, in 
the sense of globalisation being an essentially supra-territorial phenomenon and 
the state being bounded by territory, the adoption of self-regulation measures by 
political actors other than the state was in many ways inevitable. In the Polanyian 
sense, the inevitability arose because of the pursuit of neoliberalism during the 
latter half of the twentieth century and the perceived threat such policies 
presented to the stability of global capitalism. However, it is neo-Polanyian 
because of the incorporation of different political actors into the provision of a 
form of social protection. As Levy and Kaplan mention, this form of social 
protection is notable chiefly for its reliance on the private realm rather than the 
state (2007: 18).  
 
Thirdly, CSR operates around an idea of consensus or partnership between actors 
(stakeholders) from public and private sectors. While Polanyi spoke of counter-
movements that often ended up being defeated by increases in repressive state 
power (Block, 2007: 7), CSR and the importance given to consensus and 
inclusion of stakeholders implies the subsuming of such counter-movements into 
partnership with those who generate the first movement (the state and 
corporation). As Block argues:  
 
The neo-Polanyian approach conceptualizes modern economies as 
loosely coupled systems with many buffers and a variety of backup 
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mechanisms. A catastrophic failure that spreads from one part of the 
economy to others is still possible, but such events are unlikely and 
unusual. The more typical pattern is that economic and political actors 
find ways to keep strains or difficulties in one part of the economic 
mechanism from having a dramatic impact elsewhere. This reflects the 
cumulative impact of protective countermovements and the high cost to 
state officials of presiding over economic meltdowns (2007: 7-8).   
 
As such, CSR is a neo-Polanyian compromise to neoliberalism. While civil 
society actors could, and many do, push for more radical reforms of global 
capitalism, the CSR agenda is not designed to change the powerful position of 
the global corporations it addresses itself to, nor to address some of the 
fundamental assumptions of global capitalism that underpin it. Created (albeit for 
the most part in partnership with civil society) by corporations themselves, CSR 
is hardly a counter-movement, but does represent an acknowledgement that 
neoliberalism is unsustainable.  
 
A Polanyian perspective on the position of global corporations offers a coherent 
explanation as to why the question of CSR emerged when it did. The response 
offered by a Polanyian influenced explanation is that this happened because of 
the unsustainability of neoliberal economic policies pursued in the 1980s and 
1990s, and the inevitable resistance to such policies, in the form of market 
collapse and civil society activism. It was argued in this section that CSR is a 
reaction to such resistance. However, this explanation does not tell us why CSR 
now takes the form it does. For example, a Polanyian interpretation would 
suggest that corporate reaction to resistance might have come in the form of 
renewed enthusiasm for multilateral or state-based regulation, or even a 
curtailing of global corporate expansion such that corporate activity can be more 
easily regulated. However, this is not what happened. Thus, the thesis turns to a 
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different account in order to develop an explanation for the form and content that 
CSR takes.  
 
3.5 A Neo-Gramscian Explanation: CSR as a Regime of Accumulation 
 
This section draws on Gramscian ideas related to hegemonic control and regimes 
of accumulation that have been used by some authors to understand and interpret 
CSR. It is argued in this section that Gramscian influenced ideas have more to 
offer in terms of understanding why CSR has taken the form it has, and the sorts 
of limitations this form puts on the wider question of what a just corporation is. 
This contention gives further weight to the contention that corporations are 
intrinsically involved in the systemic harm and profound effects that the thesis 
argues are central to a question of global distributive justice.   
 
3.5.1 CSR as a Regime of Accumulation 
A neo-Gramscian explanation of the emergence of CSR construes CSR as the 
orthodoxy by which a regime of accumulation consolidates itself further. The 
―social purposes‖ from which the regime of CSR derives its authority are seen on 
this view to legitimate and endorse the profit-making motives of global 
capitalism. This critique of CSR draws on Gramscian ideas of the hegemonic 
bloc of global capitalism. A hegemonic order is one where ―consent rather than 
coercion, primarily characterised the relations between classes, and between the 
state and civil society‖ (Gill and Law: 1989: 476); a new historic bloc such as 
this ―needs persuasive ideas and arguments … which build on and catalyse its 
political networks and organisations‖ (Ibid). As such, the regime of accumulation 
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promoted by the historic bloc of global capitalism means a lot more than the 
advance of capitalist interests across national boundaries; it also involves the 
legitimisation of certain social forces. While Ruggie construes the post-war 
international order as an embedded liberal compromise, Gill and Law view it as a 
period in which leading elements in this new alliance of social forces sought to 
internationalise a certain type of regime of accumulation. 
 
There is obvious overlap between the Polanyian and Gramscian views - they 
both acknowledge the commodification of nature and labour as problematic 
(Gill, 2003: 125; Block, 2001: xxv), and both deem the logic of neoliberalism to 
be contradictory (Gill, 2003: 125; Watson, 2006: 152). However, as mentioned 
above, a Gramscian influenced perspective usefully draws attention to the form 
and content of CSR policies, which contribute towards developing a critical 
assessment of this phenomenon. Prior to the application of a Gramscian critique 
to CSR, the section offers some background information on the central ideas 
being utilised here.  
 
In the context of the neoliberal period of the 1980s and 1990s, as discussed in 
chapter two, the hegemonic bloc of global capitalism was reinforced by the 
elevation of the principles of the free market to those of basic organising 
principles of society during this period. On this view, the orthodoxy of the 
market reduced state capacity to provide social protection and corporations were 
afforded an increased level of power through their position of dominance in the 
market. This has been connected by Gill to an idea of ―new constitutionalism‖ 
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(1995), which denotes the moves to extend and deepen the power of capital in 
public and private sectors: 
 
This discourse serves to protect the privileges of the dominant agents in 
the new forms of oligiopolistic competition in the 1980s, and to restrain 
future governments from intervening to undermine such privileges. This 
is also linked to attempts to privilege business and business-oriented 
ideas in parts of the public sector (which may be difficult to privatise 
such as health and education), whilst decreasing the accountability of 
parts of the public sector. (Gill, 1995: 78).  
 
This is related to the Gramscian concept of the ―extended state‖, in which the 
state equates to both political society and civil society. The privileging of 
corporate ideas in society leads to civil society becoming more market-driven, 
and organised around notions of individualism, competition and disciplinary 
political culture and society (Ibid: 85). In this respect, while CSR could be 
construed to be the ―human face of capitalism‖, a Gramscian view would see 
CSR as representative of the shift from one type of regime of accumulation to 
another. While a Polanyian view would be that the pursuit of neoliberal policies 
inevitably leads to forms of resistance of such policies and that CSR is a reaction 
to that resistance, a Gramsican view would see CSR as a further step in the 
consolidation of capitalist interests.  
 
It is in this regard – the consolidation of capitalist interests - that the Gramscian 
critique of CSR is most useful, by drawing attention to the form and content CSR 
takes, and the inherent limitations therein. By possibly enhancing, and doing 
nothing to challenge, the profit-making goals of the global capitalist order, CSR 
partially represents the exertion of hegemonic control of capitalism over global 
society. Thus, in conventional CSR agendas, an equation is made between the 
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standard processes of CSR and the just or ethical corporation. This direct 
equation is problematic, because, as O‘Laughlin points out, CSR is contestable 
and contested: ―…the fact that a corporation claims that a particular activity has 
been undertaken as a reﬂection of its ethical concerns is no guarantee that it is 
contributing either to the general public good or to the well-being of the poor‖ 
(2008: 948). A Gramscian critique of CSR, which draws attention to the social 
forces underlying it, is useful in scrutinizing the form it has taken and the manner 
in which this form could be said to be detrimental to the overall project of the 
just corporation.  
 
3.5.2 Consolidating the Interests of Capital: CSR as an Orthodoxy 
The remainder of this section presents four Gramscian-influenced critiques of 
CSR that have emerged from CSR literature. Many of these critiques will be 
taken up again further on in the thesis and their relationship to global distributive 
justice made clearer. However, the overarching criticism presented here is that 
the manner in which CSR is discussed, debated and developed has become 
something of an orthodoxy that inherently limits the idea of what it means for a 
corporation to be just or ethical. As Blowfield discusses, the orthodoxy of CSR is 
comprised of voluntary standards, the measurement of performance in relation to 
those standards, the concept of the stakeholder, and multi-sectoral partnerships as 
a form of governance of business.  (Blowfield, 2005b: 174). Although there is 
criticism and debate about these elements of CSR, this generally involves a 
debate and analysis over the ―how to‖ of CSR, rather than a substantial debate 
about the structural conditions that promote and enable CSR (Ibid). Thus the idea 
of the just corporation is often presented as a technical question of how to do 
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CSR better, or more efficiently and less often is a question of ethical or 
normative consideration.  
 
The process, form and content of CSR are symbolic of hegemonic control of 
global capital and there is little room in conventional CSR agendas for 
questioning the social forces underpinning that control. Below are four ways in 
which this control manifests itself. In relation to justice, this is problematic 
because it cannot be assumed that the limits of justice are coterminous with the 
limits of market rationality (nor can it be assumed that they are coterminous with 
the state). As Levy and Kaplan state, ―Typically, business agrees to concessions 
that modify corporate practices at the margin, but which do not challenge the 
fundamentals of managerial authority or market rationality‖ (2007: 20). 
Gramscian ideas open up a field of critique that interrogates this assumption.    
 
First, to a great extent practitioners and supporters of CSR control the scope of 
its agenda. By defining the questions and issues that CSR deals with, and the 
manner in which it deals with them, CSR can be seen as a mechanism of global 
capitalism that legitimises the values of individualism, consumerism and 
accumulation. What this means is that the CSR agenda is never about any root-
and-branch transformation of the system of global capitalism. For instance, there 
is little mention within the literature on CSR on fairer methods of taxation and 
redistribution of profits; additionally, as Jenkins notes, transfer pricing, tax 
avoidance, the abuse of market power and the poverty impacts of business 
activities are not matters for discussion in the CSR agenda (Jenkins/UNRISD, 
2001: 528). Wider questions surrounding the reduction of state power with 
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respect to corporations are similarly not addressed, nor are the ethical 
implications of profit-accumulation as a result of CSR policies. Control of the 
scope of the CSR agenda inherently limits the extent to which we can call CSR, 
or a specific corporation that practices CSR, just or ethical.  
 
The second critique is to do with consensus. As Blowfield has discussed, this 
hegemonic hold that capitalist interests have on the CSR agenda relies on the 
existence of consensus within the debate. The idea is that by purportedly giving 
all stakeholders a say in the discussion, the ―right‖ answer will emerge. As 
Blowfield puts it: 
[consensus] allows CSR to present opposing ideas as coherent and 
unproblematic. It also allows companies to claim to engage in complex 
issues such as sustainability, environmental management, social justice, 
animal rights, governance and cultural diversity without any real 
discussion or recognition of the possibility that aspects of such issues 
might be ideationally or axiologically contradictory (2005b: 177). 
 
In this sense, in striving to establish a consensus on ―best practice‖, CSR debates 
are restricted to an uncritical approach, which takes as given the structural 
conditions that have brought it about. While the neo-Polanyian idea about 
consensus discussed above values consensus as a kind of back-up mechanism for 
the structures of global capitalism, the idea here is that consensus in the debate 
about CSR masks the inherent limitations and contestability of the subject 
matter. Blowfield makes a similar point about the idea of the stakeholder, and 
related concepts of partnership, dialogue and engagement, as well as the tools 
that are used to implement the CSR agenda (for e.g. auditing, reporting, 
verification and labelling), in that such analysis tells us nothing about the 
underlying power dynamics involved in these relationships (Ibid: 180). Similarly, 
  
 
110 
Newell remarks that in its efforts to mask conflict, CSR ―underestimates the 
importance of power and resistance in enabling or preventing outcomes 
favourable to the poor‖ (2005: 556). By establishing an ―inclusive‖ partnership, 
the agenda can easily be dictated by the most powerful stakeholders, and doesn‘t 
address which groups are in fact excluded, and how they came to be excluded – 
and in many instances it would seem that such exclusion is inherently part of 
what it is to be a just corporation.  
 
As such, by making consensus and the absence of conflict a central facet of the 
CSR agenda, and by providing intellectual and moral leadership, the structural 
conditions that confer power on to those who control that agenda are reinforced. 
In this way, the CSR process is unavoidably politicised. As Levy and Kaplan 
state:  
[…] the Gramscian concept of hegemony suggests that constructing this 
consensus is a political project of building alliances, strategic negotiation, 
and public debates. The stability of a governance system relies on a 
combination of coercive power, economic incentives, and normative and 
cognitive frames that coordinate perceptions of interest. The particular 
practices of CSR that emerge around an issue therefore reflect the balance 
of forces among competing interest groups (2007: 19-20).   
 
Thus rather than being about finding ethical or just solutions to the problems of 
corporate activity, the CSR process is shaped by the social forces underpinning 
it, and outcomes reflect the power relations of such forces. This criticism will be 
taken up again specifically in chapter six, when the importance of open and fair 
deliberation and consultation in relation to CSR and global distributive justice is 
highlighted.  
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Following on from this, the third critique is to do with these structural 
conditions, and the way in which they are perceived to be inordinately 
detrimental to the position of women, a critique that has been put forward by 
critical/Marxist feminists. A gendered dimension to this explanation of CSR 
would argue that in replicating the structural conditions of global capitalism, 
CSR policies do nothing to improve the position of women. Taking the view that 
CSR represents the values and power of global capitalism and neoliberal 
ideology in which the market is privileged and institutionalised, CSR is a means 
by which market dominated governance structures establish internal regulatory 
mechanisms (e.g. codes of conduct), thereby limiting the external scrutiny of the 
production regimes of transnational capital and its impact on labour and the 
environment (Rai, 2004: 582). On this basis, processes of globalisation and the 
operations of global corporations in the context of such processes have an 
inordinately detrimental effect upon the wellbeing and position of women. 
 
This type of gendered analysis of CSR would challenge the nature of market-
based solutions to social and political problems. Such solutions are inherently 
problematic because they reproduce structures of gender inequality. A good 
example of this is the case of homeworkers, a disproportionate share of whom 
are women. Many codes of conduct take jobs away from homeworkers because 
companies are unable to oversee such work, regardless of the fact that 
homeworkers‘ incomes make a crucial contribution to family survival. In 
replicating the structures of global capitalism, CSR reinforces the fact that 
capitalism does not place an economic value on the traditional role of women in 
the home and accords a favourable position to corporations at the expense of the 
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state and redistribution policies thus undermining the position of women (Meyer 
and Pruegl, 1999: 15) 
 
More broadly, the fourth critique is that by sticking to this uncritical approach, 
advocates of CSR retain a stranglehold on what exactly constitutes socially 
responsible behaviour on the part of corporations, thus also retaining control over 
the very meaning of (corporate) ethics itself, and how the role of the private 
sector in contemporary global political society is understood (Blowfield, 2005b: 
174-177). This view problematises the conception of CSR being a self-reflexive 
regime in the Polanyian sense. According to Best, regimes have to be self-
reflexive in order to work (Best, 2003: 368). If the ideas of ―stakeholder 
dialogue‖ and ―partnership‖ can be reduced to labels that merely provide cover 
for the deeper levels of control that the CSR agenda has over conceptions of 
global ethics or justice, then it would seem on this view that CSR offers limited 
possibilities in terms of seeking to rectify the social and environmental problems 
of global capitalism.  
 
Thus, in establishing this need for consensus, partnership and dialogue, this 
fourth critique posits that there is a deeper process of the commodification of 
ethics inherent in CSR as a result of its form and content. By making CSR 
policies part of brand value, the notion of what it means to be ethical is made part 
of the commercial value of a product; hence the vast resources devoted to the 
publication of glossy brochures and advanced websites for the CSR division of 
many global corporations. Thus ethics is something that can be bought and sold 
like any other product. However, presumably the choice about whether to 
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participate in this form of ethics and the socio-economic resources required to 
make this choice, are constrained along the lines of gender, race, class and 
ethnicity (Barnett et al, 2005: 41). Thus it becomes more possible for certain 
sectors of society to make ethical choices, and participation in ethics is inherently 
limited. Furthermore, the possibility that CSR is not ethical, or the possibility 
that a socially responsible corporation could behave differently – or even the 
possibility that what constitutes ethical behaviour on the part of a corporation is 
something for discussion – is not allowed for. This process positions the 
individual as ethical consumer, the corporation as ethical actor and establishes a 
clear relationship between both that is objectively ―good‖. In so doing, the values 
of capitalism are consolidated.  
 
In summary, this section has utilised Gramscian ideas related to the hegemonic 
control of global capital to develop a critique of the form, content and process of 
CSR. The central idea is that the control exerted on CSR renders it an orthodoxy 
by which the idea of the just or ethical corporation is inherently limited. The 
section detailed four ways in which this happens. From a Gramscian point of 
view, this commodification of ethics is problematic because it is representative 
of the exertion of hegemonic control of capital. However, if the overall process 
of CSR is indeed limited by market rationality, as the critique above has argued, 
then this is presumably also a difficulty for the Polanyian explanation detailed 
above. Part of the Polanyian critique is that unfettered capitalism leads to the 
prioritisation of the values of exchange, rather than those of redistribution and 
reciprocity. Thus, if the agenda, tools and process of CSR is limited by the extent 
to which it adds (commercial) value, then it is likely that it will lead to further 
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disembedding of economic activity from society, on the Polanyian understanding 
at least. As such, what these Gramscian ideas illuminate is that the way in which 
CSR is practiced renders it inadequate as a reaction to a Polanyian-type 
resistance of global capitalism.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented an explanation for CSR using insights from both 
Polanyian and Gramscian perspectives. In the first instance, Polanyian ideas 
were argued to be useful to understanding why the phenomenon of CSR has 
emerged, or why the question of what it means for a corporation to be socially 
responsible emerged when it did. What a Polanyian perspective tells us in this 
regard is that the emergence of CSR is a reaction to the inevitable resistance to 
unfettered capitalism; such resistance comes about as result of the disembedding 
of economic activity from wider society that is alleged to part of the process of 
global capitalism. As such, it was argued that resistance, in the form of civil 
society activism as well as various financial crises of the late 1990s, was met 
with the elevation of the question of what it means for a corporation to behave 
responsibly; CSR is the reaction to this increasingly prominent question.  
 
Moving on to the Gramscian element of the explanation, the chapter argued that 
Gramsci‘s ideas about the hegemonic control of global capitalism open up a 
useful area of critique in relation to the form and content that the CSR process 
has taken. In this regard, it was argued that the agenda and scope of CSR, as well 
as the process and tools used to implement it, are a manifestation of the 
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hegemonic control that global capitalism has on the CSR process. As such, it was 
argued that in terms of the issues that are part of the CSR agenda, those who are 
deemed eligible to participate in it, as well as the way in which CSR is practiced, 
outcomes are determined by the underlying power dynamics that are a part of 
global capitalism.  
 
In terms of how this explanation is important for subsequent chapters that discuss 
the question of global distributive justice in relation to global corporations, these 
Polanyian and Gramscian insights open up a critique that diverges from a 
discourse that is dominated by the technical question of how to do CSR better or 
more efficiently. These insights are most particularly important in terms of the 
ideas about justice that are discussed in chapter six under the heading of 
―concessive theory‖. In this, the thesis moves from an ideal view of justice and 
corporations, to a view that concedes to certain facts; in this instance, such facts 
are those of the existence of global capitalism and global corporations. By 
developing an understanding of CSR as intrinsically related to, and in many ways 
shaped by, global capitalism – both in the Polanyian sense of why CSR exists, as 
well as in the Gramscian sense of why it takes the form it does – the ideas 
articulated as concessive theory aim to strike a balance between the reality of 
CSR as it is now, as well as the normative demands that ought to be made on 
global corporations. So although the Gramscian account construes CSR an 
instance of global capitalism in which systemic harm is a feature, the core aim of 
the thesis to develop a proposal that is to some degree a feasible one, necessitates 
that such a proposal is set within that system. As such, within the concessive 
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theory proposed, the constraints of the process of CSR are acknowledged and an 
attempt is made to reform it from within.  
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4: Statist Conceptions of Global Distributive Justice  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters of the thesis focused on CSR in two ways. Chapter 
two provided details on the historical emergence of the phenomenon of CSR 
from its historical progression from corporate philanthropy, through attempts at 
multilateral regulation, to its current guise as a project of self-regulation of global 
corporations in partnership with multiple global political actors. Chapter three 
developed an explanation for the emergence of CSR, as well as the form and 
content of CSR policies that drew from Polanyian and Gramscian insights about 
global capitalism and its sustainability.  
 
The thesis now moves to the political theory element of the argument, the focus 
being on statist conceptions of global distributive justice, all of which argue that 
there is no claim of principles of distributive justice beyond the domestic state. 
Bearing in mind the overall aim of the thesis to synthesise these two areas, it 
should be noted at the outset that the question of CSR has not been dealt with 
specifically by political theory literature. As such, this chapter and the next focus 
on the manner in which the idea of global distributive justice has been discussed 
within global political theory literature.  
 
The thesis views global corporations as institutions that have a profound effect 
on people‘s life chances, and as such there is a strong normative case for 
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corporations to be subject to principles of distributive justice. The core part of 
this argument is that it is not sufficient to discount global corporations‘ activities 
because they do not fit in to national-international, or public-private dichotomies 
that surround many views of global justice. What the ‗profound effects‘ idea 
highlights is that corporations‘ role in the articulation and development of norms, 
rules and standards of social responsibility are of concern to a conception of 
global distributive justice. Thus this chapter builds on the overall argument of the 
thesis by demonstrating why conceptions of global distributive justice that are 
restricted to the state are not capable or adequate to deal with the complexities of 
the political-economic environment within which global corporations operate.   
 
In this role, a corporation can significantly shape an individual‘s life chances. 
This ―profound effect‖ could mean very different things, on a spectrum of 
positive to negative. For instance, directors and shareholders of a corporation can 
also experience these ―profound effects‖ in the sense of their income and wealth 
being determined to a great extent by the behaviour of the corporation. What is 
of concern for this thesis are the groups of people who experience such effects, 
but who do not have the opportunity to have a say in such activities.  
 
This chapter critiques statist articulations of global justice that have emerged 
within normative political theory. Such views have centred on the importance of 
citizenship, national self-determination and sovereignty in relation to distributive 
justice. This chapter outlines these views, i.e. that distributive justice is best 
restricted to a state, and deals with three different justifications that are given for 
the restriction of principles of distributive justice to a territorially bounded 
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community, namely citizenship, national self-determination and sovereignty. 
Although there is considerable overlap between these categories, for the purposes 
of clarity they serve to highlight three significant ways of thinking about global 
justice. The following section details how Rawls conceives of distributive justice 
as being largely dependent on citizenship and develops a critique of the Rawlsian 
approach to justice beyond the domestic sphere. The chapter then outlines and 
critiques Miller‘s ideas regarding the importance of the nation, and national self-
determination, with respect to global justice. The final section discusses Nagel‘s 
argument in relation to sovereignty and global justice.  
 
In relation to all three views on distributive justice, critiques are divided into 
objections to both normative and empirical claims. Generally, this means that 
various arguments are disputed on the basis that they are both normatively 
problematic, as well as empirically incorrect. What all three categories have in 
common is that the justifications put forward by each way of thinking are subject 
to challenge and contestation in the context of contemporary globalisation, and 
that ultimately these conceptions of global justice are lacking in this context.  
 
It is important to note here that all these views (citizenship, national self-
determination and sovereignty) acknowledge the value of just conduct between 
peoples or states, meaning none of them view the state as an entirely independent 
and isolated entity. What sets them out from cosmopolitan views is the thought 
that there are no redistributive responsibilities beyond the state. All approaches 
advocate some humanitarian duties and the securing of basic human rights across 
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states. However, it is in the justification of these approaches that key differences 
emerge.  
 
4.2 Distributive Justice and Citizenship 
 
The key problem surrounding the development of a theory of global distributive 
justice is the reconciliation of the position of the state therein. Westphalian 
notions of the sovereign state as the primary unit of concern are challenged by 
contemporary processes of globalisation; thus theories of distributive justice that 
are limited by state, or territorial, boundaries are similarly challenged. The use of 
the state in thought about distributive justice differs widely, but despite this, the 
restriction of the bounds of justice to a territorial entity such as the state means 
that there are many circumstances that have their origin outside of state 
boundaries that seriously affect the type and quality of life an individual 
experiences; it is the argument of this thesis that global corporations are an 
example of this.  
 
The citizenship category relates primarily to Rawls (1999, 2001b, 2005), and his 
treatment of justice beyond the domestic state. Rawls does not advocate the 
extension of principles of distributive justice to the international or global level; 
indeed, what he outlines in Law of Peoples are principles of just conduct 
between peoples or states. Distributive justice, for Rawls, has application only 
within the state, and the ties and binds of citizenship are what make this feasible. 
The first part of this section details in general terms the Rawlsian view on the 
limitation of distributive justice to citizens and the extension of that view to the 
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international realm in Law of Peoples; the second part of the section details and 
develops objections that have been made to Rawls‘s claims about international 
justice 
 
4.2.1 Rawlsian Justice: From the Domestic to the International 
The Rawlsian view is that justice in the domestic sphere and in the international 
sphere are two distinctly separate things. However, while the domestic and the 
international are viewed as being two separate entities, what applies in the sphere 
of the domestic has implications for that of the international. He states: 
 
[…] it is important to see that the Law of Peoples is developed within 
political liberalism and is an extension of a liberal conception of justice 
for a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples. I emphasize that, in 
developing the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception of justice, we 
workout the ideals and principles of a foreign policy of a reasonably just 
liberal people (Rawls, 2001b: 9-10; emphasis in original).  
 
So, distributive justice is fundamentally a matter for the state first, and what may 
be required in the sphere of the international will be influenced by the domestic. 
 
It is the ties of citizenship that make the state the most feasible and desirable 
locus of distributive justice for Rawls. In a stable liberal democratic society (the 
ideal from which principles of distributive justice can be derived), Rawls argues 
that citizens can be assumed to hold differing ―reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines‖, thus various moral, religious and philosophical viewpoints that result 
in the existence of a variety of possibly opposing world-views (2005: 58-66). 
However, when it comes to the matter of distributive justice, citizens are unified 
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by a common political conception of justice that is informed by ―public reason‖. 
Public reason can be defined as: 
  
Political society…has a way of formulating its plans, of putting its ends 
in an order of priority and of making its decisions accordingly. The way a 
political society does this is its reason; its ability to do these things is also 
its reason, though in a different sense: it is an intellectual and moral 
power, rooted in the capacities of its human  members (Ibid: 212-213).  
 
Public reason provides citizens with a fair standard of judgement by which 
principles of distributive justice can be justified amongst them. What binds 
public reason with a citizenry is the criterion of ―reciprocity‖; this view of fellow 
citizens as free and equal beings enables them to identify which reasonable 
principles, rules or standards might govern how others are treated, and how they 
themselves might expect to be treated: 
  
[…] citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in 
a system of  social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer 
one another fair terms of cooperation according to what they consider the 
most reasonable conception of political justice; and when they agree to act 
on those terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular 
situations, provided that other citizens also accept those terms. The criterion 
of reciprocity requires that when those terms are proposed as the most 
reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must also think 
it at least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, 
and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior 
political or social position (Ibid: 446) 
 
There is thus important normative value in the restriction of the principles of 
distributive justice to citizens of a common state. By confining distributive 
justice in this manner, the principles are easily justifiable among citizens, even 
amongst those who may hold conflicting ideas about certain aspects of life. It is 
this ideal relation amongst citizenry that informs both the manner in which 
  
 
123 
principles of distributive justice are developed (for instance, the use of ―the veil 
of ignorance‖3), as well as what principles are decided upon (the redistributive 
aspect, as detailed in the second principle of justice
4
).   
 
There is a well-established critique of the intricacies of what Rawls proposes for 
distributive justice and the domestic society (for key critiques and developments, 
see for example Cohen, 2000 and 2008; Dworkin, 2000; Nozick, 1974; Okin, 
1989). However, what is of concern to this thesis is the manner in which these 
ideas influence and relate to his view of justice in the international sphere.  
 
As mentioned above, this view of distributive justice within the domestic state 
informs the corresponding view of just conduct between peoples, as articulated 
in Law of Peoples. Given the relations that tie citizens together, which result in 
just societal arrangements for those who are part of the same society, there is no 
corresponding need beyond the level of the domestic to guarantee redistributive 
measures. This is the key difference between Rawls‘s view of the domestic and 
the international in that his conception of justice at the international level begins 
from importantly different premises (Rawls, 2001b).  
 
International justice, in the Rawlsian conception, is a more limited idea, as the 
assumption is that distributive justice has been addressed at the domestic level. 
                                                        
3
 The veil of ignorance is a tool Rawls uses to describe the fairest way individuals might decide 
on principles of justice from the original position. Behind the veil of ignorance, individuals do 
not know the essential features of their place in the hypothetical society to which the principles of 
justice will apply - ―his class position, or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like….This ensures 
that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural 
chance or the contingency of social circumstances‖ (Rawls, 1999: 11).  
4 
The second principle states: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (Rawls, 1999: 72) 
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As such, the priority in the thought experiment at the international level is the 
interests of peoples, not individuals (Rawls, 2001b: 32). The outcome, then, is a 
series of principles that govern relations between peoples. Within Rawls‘s 
‗Society of Peoples‘ there are two different types of societies – liberal and non-
liberal but decent. He lists three other types of societies: outlaw states, societies 
burdened by unfavourable conditions, and benevolent absolutisms (Ibid: 3-4).    
The latter three are not taken to be part of the Society of Peoples and thus 
representation at the international level is by peoples of liberal societies, and 
non-liberal decent hierarchical societies. The thought here is that there are some 
types of society that are not necessarily liberal, but that the liberal requirement 
for toleration necessitates the inclusion of certain non-liberal societies in the Law 
of Peoples. This is a replication of the requirement for toleration at the domestic 
level - a liberal society is required to respect its members differing 
comprehensive doctrines, ―provided that these doctrines are pursued in ways 
compatible with a reasonable political conception of justice and its public 
reason‖ (Ibid: 59). Similarly, as long as a society‘s basic institutions meet certain 
conditions of justice at the domestic level, they are deemed by Rawls to be 
decent, and thus equal participants in the Law of Peoples (Ibid: 59-60).  Relations 
between liberal and non-liberal decent societies are encapsulated by a series of 
principles of good conduct (See Appendix 1). 
 
Relations between liberal and non-liberal decent societies on the one hand, and 
societies burdened by unfavourable conditions on the other, are constituted by a 
duty of assistance. This is not a distributive principle, but instead is aimed at 
helping burdened societies to manage their own affairs reasonably and rationally 
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and eventually to become a member of the Society of Peoples (i.e. liberal, or 
non-liberal but decent) (Ibid: 106-113).  
 
 By restricting representation at the international level to peoples, rather than 
individuals, Rawls ensures that a moral primacy is accorded to peoples at the 
international level, and in matters of distributive justice, the key political 
community is assumed to be the state. In the context of the relationship between 
contemporary processes of globalization and theories of distributive justice, it is 
primarily this assumption that is problematic.  
 
The justification Rawls gives for choosing peoples as the representative body in 
Law of Peoples is that at the level of the international, different fundamental 
interests have to be taken into account. At the domestic level, such fundamental 
interests are in primary social goods - rights, liberties, opportunities, and income 
and wealth, and residual self-respect (Rawls, 1999: 54). The purpose of a fair 
basic structure is to ensure that all individuals within a given society can achieve 
such primary goods. This justification is discussed in the next subsection.  
 
Rawls‘s perspective on international justice is a statist account that restricts 
principles of distributive justice to a domestic society and limits consideration 
within the international realm to how states should interact with one another. As 
Rawls states, it is a theory for foreign policy, not global justice, and while he 
admits that it is perhaps oversimplified, he contends that it is also realistic in that 
it proceeds from how the world is (2001b: 82-83). The thesis develops a series of 
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normative and empirical critiques of Rawls‘s argument in the remainder of this 
section.  
 
4.2.2 Normative Critique 
Rawls‘s position on international justice is explicitly informed by his views on 
justice in the domestic realm, and the extension of the domestic to the 
international is the basis of the normative critique of Law of Peoples. This 
extension into the international realm is motivated by a view of individuals that 
accounts for their autonomy as ―free and equal moral persons‖. On the basis that 
(liberal) states are able to take care of citizens‘ interests with respect to 
distributive justice at a domestic level, the task at an international level is to 
regulate inter-state (people) relations - thus peoples have different interests to 
individuals. Primarily, within the Society of Peoples, peoples‘ interests are to do 
with the protection of their political independence, culture and liberties in order 
to guarantee the security, territory and well-being of their citizens; as well as this, 
peoples also have an interest in recognising, and being recognised as, equal 
participants in the Society of Peoples (2001b: 34-35).  Their interests are not to 
do with the distribution of primary social goods, because this is something that 
has taken place at the domestic level. This is a replication at the international 
level of the respect for the autonomous life plans and comprehensive doctrines of 
individuals at the domestic level; as such the right of peoples to be liberal, or 
non-liberal but decent, is allowed.  
 
The justification for this replication is the value placed on toleration by 
liberalism, and Rawls‘s views on this seem are directly influenced by what is a 
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central concern to him in his domestic theory. In Political Liberalism, Rawls 
articulated what he deemed to be the central problem of political justice: ―How is 
it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and 
equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical and 
moral doctrines?‖ (2005: xxv). Thus in the international realm, what is of 
concern is how to reconcile the fact that people live in different states, with 
different cultures and different beliefs that will inevitably clash. His solution to 
this dilemma is guided by the principle of toleration that is at the core of 
domestic liberal theory. He states:   
 
Just as a citizen in a liberal society must respect other persons' 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines provided they 
are pursued in accordance with a reasonable political conception of justice, 
so a liberal society must respect other societies organized by 
comprehensive doctrines, provided their political and social institutions 
meet certain conditions that lead the society to adhere to a reasonable law 
of peoples. (Rawls, 1993: 43)  
 
The purpose of Law of Peoples, then, is how to regulate or manage inter-
state/inter-people relations. However, as Blake states, this is a flawed analogy, 
because it is not clear that there is such a direct route from the autonomy of 
individuals to the autonomy of states/peoples (2005: 37-38). Respecting the 
autonomy of individuals means giving them the right to pursue their own life 
plans free from unjustified coercion. However, respecting the autonomy of 
peoples to organise politically as they wish – and in so doing permitting some 
peoples to be governed in illiberal ways, and according equal respect to such 
peoples in the international original position – Rawls allows some individuals to 
deny the rights of autonomy to other individuals (Ibid).  
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Similarly, Caney (2005b: 81) argues that in pursuing the principle of toleration in 
this way, Rawls in actual fact allows for intolerance on the part of peoples, by 
allowing the majority in a collective unit to impose their values on individuals or 
minorities. Not only does this extension of toleration cause problems for the idea 
of toleration itself, it is also problematic for Rawls‘s conception of moral 
individualism. Allowing the autonomy of peoples at the international level 
implies collective responsibility on the part of those peoples for their fate – as 
will be discussed further below, Rawls works on the basis that a territorially 
bound people are able to control their own fate. Such collective responsibility is 
problematic because, as Tan argues, individual citizens are being held 
responsible for a country‘s policies which they most likely have had little to do 
with; so, ―while Rawls‘s moral individualism sets firm limits on the extent to 
which collective decisions may affect individual well-being in his domestic 
conception of justice, there seem to be no similar limitations in his international 
theory‖ (2004: 73; see also Caney, 2005b: 130).  
 
Rawls responds to this critique in the Law of Peoples by arguing that the self-
determination of peoples is to be valued in its own right as an important good. 
He argues that the achievement of self-determination ought to be an aim of the 
duty of assistance (2001b: 111), as there is intrinsic value in individuals and 
associations being attached to their particular culture. This idea feeds into 
another reply, hinted at above, which is to do with collective responsibility. With 
self-determination comes responsibility for the decisions taken by a people; 
Rawls gives two examples of two contrasting sets of regimes that make different 
policy choices and thus have different levels of wealth (Ibid: 117-118). Given the 
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fact that such regimes have taken these decisions independently and 
autonomously, on the Rawlsian view there is no injustice in this situation. 
Indeed, to attempt to alter this situation through some form of egalitarian 
redistribution, as would be required by a cosmopolitan view, would be 
manifestly unjust on Rawlsian terms, as autonomous peoples would be asked to 
take responsibility for the failure of decisions taken freely by other autonomous 
peoples.  
  
A further normative criticism related to toleration has been articulated by Pogge, 
who argues that in preserving the autonomy of peoples/states, no indication is 
given as to how far tolerance of illiberal regimes will extend, i.e. what level of 
tyranny/poverty/inequality is deemed to be ―decent‖? (Pogge, 2001b: 247). The 
principles of the Law of Peoples are effectively inter-state relations. So, while 
Law of Peoples provides guidelines for how liberal and non-liberal decent 
peoples should interact, no specific criteria are given as to how far the autonomy 
of decent peoples is tolerated. 
 
One reply to Pogge‘s criticism in this respect would be that, in the inclusion of 
human rights within the Law of Peoples, Rawls does provide a measure of the 
extent to which tolerance could be extended. With respect to nonliberal but 
decent societies, human rights are regarded as one of two essential criteria such a 
society must have in order to be deemed decent, and not, say, an outlaw society. 
Human rights on this reading include  
 
[…] the right to life (to the means of subsistence and security), liberty (to 
freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient 
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measure of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and 
thought); to property (personal property); and to formal equality as 
expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be 
treated similarly (Rawls, 2001b: 65).  
 
The role played by human rights, as envisaged by Rawls, is that they act as a 
limitation on both a society‘s right to go to war, and on its internal sovereignty. 
They are not peculiar to liberal countries, and he refutes the idea that it is only 
liberal countries that can guarantee human rights. This is because human rights 
are sufficient to deem a society decent (if not necessarily just, by the standards of 
justice as fairness) (Ibid: 80). Non-fulfilment of human rights earns a society the 
tag of an outlaw state, and in reply to Pogge‘s objection, (as understood within 
the Law of Peoples), the extent to which tyranny/poverty/inequality is tolerated 
would be the parameter of fulfilment of human rights: 
  
 What I call human rights are, as I have said, a proper subset of the rights 
possessed by citizens in a liberal constitutional democratic regime, or of 
the rights of the members of a decent hierarchical society. As we have 
worked out the Law of Peoples for liberal and decent peoples, these 
peoples simply do not tolerate outlaw states. This refusal to tolerate those 
states is a consequence of liberalism and decency. If the political 
conception of political liberalism is sound, and if the steps we have taken 
in developing the Law of Peoples are also sound, then liberal and decent 
peoples have the right, under the Law of Peoples, not to tolerate outlaw 
states (Ibid: 81).  
 
Human rights, then, act as a way of circumscribing the independence of peoples, 
so that internally, within their territory, certain standards of decency are met. The 
consequences of not meeting these standards of decency essentially are non-
inclusion within the Law of Peoples, and the tag of an outlaw state. Rawls also 
refers to condemnation by other states and possible coercive intervention by 
other peoples as consequences of non-compliance with human rights standards, 
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as well as the possibility of economic sanctions and ostracism from any schemes 
of international cooperation (Ibid: 38 and 93).  
 
Thus the Rawlsian argument from toleration hinges on the limitations that human 
rights place on autonomy. It is here where the stipulation of human rights as a 
limit on autonomy fails with respect to contemporary globalising processes, or 
where the normative primacy given to the autonomy of peoples is to a large 
extent trumped by empirical reality.  The responsibility of adhering to, and to a 
certain extent, policing human rights standards across peoples falls to peoples 
themselves, who are constrained by their status of a sovereign government within 
a given territory.  While coercive intervention is allowed for (albeit in an under-
specified way – Rawls states that this is not a question to which political 
philosophy has much to add; 2001b: 93), no indication is given as to how 
violations of human rights standards by supra-territorial, non-state actors ought 
to be dealt with. In fact, it seems there is an assumption that human rights 
violations that emanate from governments or states are the only ones that are 
relevant, given that there is no mention of other actors who may perpetrate 
human rights violations. In Rawls‘s defence, it can be argued again this is where 
the importance of the role of domestic governments comes into play. On Rawls‘s 
understanding, human rights violations by non-state actors would presumably 
come under the guise of the domestic law of the country in which they operate; 
as such, these sorts of human rights violations are not of concern in Law of 
Peoples.  
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Setting aside the empirical problem posed by restricting concern about human 
rights violations just to those committed by states or governments, there are other 
normative objections to Rawls‘s position in relation to human rights. Caney 
points out that we are not given objective reasons for the inclusion of some rights 
(freedom of conscience for example), and not others (equality of opportunity) 
(Caney, 2005b: 127). Following on from that, one of the rights that Rawls denies 
is a human right to democratic government; yet as Caney asserts, the realisation 
of some rights, (he uses the right to subsistence as an example, a right which is 
endorsed by Rawls) may be dependent on a right to democratic government 
being recognised as well (Ibid:128). Again the basis of Rawls‘s view is that once 
a right to democratic government is ensured at the domestic level, it is not 
necessary for it to be guaranteed at the international level.  
 
These sorts of criticisms point to the idea that while Rawls‘s central arguments 
hinge on the direct transition that can be made from the realm of domestic theory 
to that of international theory, such a transition is not as clear as is assumed in 
Law of Peoples. So while the goal is to extend tolerance and autonomy to a 
world of peoples who have different cultural beliefs, the outcome of Rawls‘s 
ideas are problematic for his own liberal theory in many ways.  
 
By focussing on peoples as the principal agents in the international original 
position, Law of Peoples constitutes an interactional conception of international 
justice, whereas at the domestic level, it is an institutional conception (Pogge, 
2006: 213). This distinction, Pogge argues, denotes the idea that at the domestic 
level, what is of concern is the institutional order to which principles of justice 
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apply; thus the basic structure of society constitutes the most important set of 
institutions that influence the sort of life a person has. At the international level, 
Rawls proposes an interactional conception, which is effectively a set of rules 
about how peoples are to interact with each other. The domestic/institutional 
conception allows for flexibility in how states can adapt to changing 
circumstances; the international/interactional, conception does not have this 
flexibility and commits peoples to a fixed set of international rules (Ibid). In so 
doing, Rawls assumes the lack of an institutional order at the international or 
global level that is significant enough to warrant the application of redistributive 
principles of justice to it. What this distinction points us to is the second set of 
empirical objections that can be made to Rawls‘s argument, all of which draw 
from the contention that there is a global institutional order that warrants the 
application of principles of justice.  
 
4.2.3 Empirical Critique  
In the first instance in this regard, it can be argued that the choice of 
peoples/states as the unit of concern in Law of Peoples is historically contingent 
as opposed to morally correct. As Buchanan argues, ―peoples‖ are based on key 
Westphalian assumptions - economic self-sufficiency, and political homogeneity, 
resulting in distributional autonomy (Buchanan, 2000: 701). However, a 
Westphalian system of self-governing states is but one form of political 
organisation (albeit one that has dominated the recent past). Rawls addresses this 
objection of arbitrariness: 
 
It does not follow from the fact that boundaries are historically arbitrary 
that their role in the Law of Peoples cannot be justified. On the contrary, 
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to fix on their arbitrariness is to fix on the wrong thing. In the absence of 
a world state, there must be boundaries of some kind, which when viewed 
in isolation will seem arbitrary, and depend to some degree on historical 
circumstance. In a reasonably just (or at least decent) Society of Peoples, 
the inequalities of power and wealth are to be decided by all peoples for 
themselves (Rawls 2001b:39, emphasis in original). 
 
Arbitrariness of borders is not considered relevant then - what matters from a 
moral point of view is how the territory within those borders is governed. As 
Freeman argues, ―historical arbitrariness of existing boundaries does not mean 
that it is arbitrary whether or not a people has a territory to reside in and control 
which is respected by others‖ (Freeman, 2003: 48). It is the right to self-
determination of peoples that matters, and Law of Peoples is about securing that 
right. 
 
However, this does not address a second more specific objection that can be 
made here. The right to self-determination, as a means of securing internal 
justice and thus international peace and security, cannot be disputed as an 
intrinsically important part of the picture of global justice. Similarly, the fact of 
boundaries, however arbitrary, is something that must be dealt with. However, it 
is the stark choice presented by Rawls that is a crucial shortcoming. Law of 
Peoples views the world in terms of that which takes place at the domestic level 
and that which takes place at the international level; there is interaction between 
such levels, and there is interaction between peoples at the international level. 
However, the emergence of rules and standards at the level of global governance 
tells against this division. In this division of the world along a 
national/international dichotomy, the possibility for non-territorially specific 
global governance (as opposed to government) is not allowed for. As Pogge 
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notes, Law of Peoples offers ―no reasons for opposing a future in which the 
significance of states is fading while that of other crosscutting and overlapping 
territorial and non-territorial associations and communities increases‖ (2001b: 
248).  
 
What is inferred by this distinction is that ―government‖ implies a sovereign 
body whose scope of responsibility and capability is constrained by the territory 
over which it is sovereign, incorporating the laws and policies of a domestic 
government, as well as the inter-state agreements to which such governments 
assent.  Global governance, on the other hand, is more difficult to specify, but 
broadly refers to the series of rules, standards and norms developed by both state 
and non-state actors within public and private global regimes. These actors 
include states, private corporations, non-governmental organisations, and 
international organisations (for an overview see Murphy 2000; more specifically 
on the part played by different types of actors in global governance see for 
example Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; Cutler, Haufler, Porter, 1999; Braithwaite 
and Drahos, 2000; O‘Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams, 2000).  
 
The key point here is that the rules, standards and norms that emerge from 
structures of global governance are significant with respect to the type and 
quality of life people experience. The uniting feature of this diverse and complex 
network of actors is that they do not apply to, or are not responsible for, any one 
territory, be it (in terms of Rawls‘s dichotomy) a domestic government or a 
world state. In making a stark division such as this, no allowance is made for a 
state of affairs in which (global) governance has become highly complex and 
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inter-linked, and which does not fit neatly into a national/international 
dichotomy. The specific features of global governance relevant to the thesis, 
namely forms of private authority such as global corporations, will be dealt with 
further in the next chapter. However, in relation to the point at hand, and to 
extend Pogge‘s criticism, not only does Rawls not provide reasons to object to a 
future such as this, he does not countenance the possibility that such a ―future‖ 
is, in fact, significantly present. 
 
The third point in this regard is that in assigning peoples/states this degree of 
centrality, Rawls makes an empirical claim about the ability (regardless of the 
desirability of self-determination as a goal) of peoples/states to self govern, that 
does not hold in the context of contemporary processes of globalisation. This is 
demonstrated in the priority Rawls gives to the domestic conditions of a 
burdened society in the objective that it becomes well-ordered. In relation to the 
Duty of Assistance, liberal societies have to recognise that it is the public culture 
of a burdened society that has to be changed in order for it to become well-
ordered; it is not just a matter of dispensing money.  He states: 
 
I believe that the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes 
lie in their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral 
traditions that support the basic structure of their political and social 
institutions, as well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of its 
members, all supported by their political virtues. I would further 
conjecture that there is no society anywhere in the world - except for 
marginal cases - with resources so scarce that it could not, were it 
reasonably and rationally organised and governed, become well-ordered 
(Rawls, 2001: 108).   
 
There are two aspects of this statement that together seem something of an 
anomaly in the context of globalising processes. Firstly, the notion of a well-
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ordered liberal society is one of the companion ideas of ‗justice as fairness‘, and 
conveys three things: 
 
• A society in which everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else 
accepts, the very same principles of justice. 
• Its basic structure is publicly known, or with good reason believed, to 
satisfy these principles.  
• Its citizens have a normally effective sense of justice and so they generally 
comply with society‘s basic institutions, which they regard as justice. 
(Rawls, 2005: 38).  
 
In the international sense, what is required in order for a nonliberal decent 
society to be deemed to be well-ordered is less clear. Certainly it is not required 
that decent societies view their citizens as free and equal; however, Rawls does 
state that nonliberal decent peoples ―are seen as decent and rational and as 
capable of moral learning as recognized in their society. As responsible members 
of their society, they can recognize when their moral duties and obligations 
accord with the people‘s common good idea of justice‖ (Rawls, 2001b: 71). 
Therefore well-orderedness denotes different things in liberal and nonliberal 
societies, with the requirements of a liberal society being more demanding that 
those of a nonliberal society. The key point is that the concept of well-
orderedness leaves the substantive content of justice open to its citizens.  
 
Rawls‘s statement above, that any society anywhere can become well-ordered, 
can be read as saying that any society has the capacity to become if not just, then 
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at least decent, regardless of resource scarcity, as long as it is well-ordered. 
However, in the context of how we find the world, the possibility for the 
establishment of such a coherent group that can agree unproblematically on how 
a society should be organised within a given territory is questionable. Increased 
migration, understood to be part of globalisation, points towards increased 
fragmentation within societies, such that the ability of citizens to agree about 
principles of justice is threatened. As Buchanan points out, this is an assumption 
that hinges on deep political unity within a state being a standard case from 
which ideal theory can be derived; in respect of this, he states, ―Why is this the 
standard case? If by the standard case, we mean the typical case, it is certainly 
not the standard case in our world, nor is it likely to become standard‖ (2000: 
717). Furthermore, given that many causes of injustice have their origin outside 
of a domestic society and are to a great extent outside of its control, it is also 
questionable whether or not being well-ordered matters to the extent that Rawls 
argues it does. Perhaps citizens are able to agree easily on what constitutes 
justice, but in many cases it is in fact external circumstances that violate their 
own principles of justice.  
 
Rawls also refers to the causes of wealth of a society, the assumption being that 
its government can solely determine a society‘s degree of wealth. Again, this is 
questionable in the context of economic globalisation. The causes of wealth of a 
society are linked in quite a serious way to the extent to which such a society 
copes with structures of governance that operate outside of its territorial 
boundaries (for instance, the degree of ―openness‖ of a domestic economy to 
international trade). To isolate the creation of wealth as something that relates 
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only to the sphere of the domestic is to overplay the role of a government‘s 
capacity to act.  
 
In summary, this section has given a descriptive account and critique of how 
Rawls deals with the question of justice in the international realm. The 
overarching idea of this section has been that Rawls‘s essentially statist account 
is problematic for both normative and empirical reasons. In normative terms, the 
general idea presented was that despite the fact that Rawls makes his arguments 
on the basis that he is protecting the liberal value of tolerance, the consequences 
of this are, in many respects, problematic for the very nature of tolerance. While 
Rawls offers human rights as an internal limitation on the extent to which 
nonliberal societies can be deemed to be decent, it was argued that this account is 
limited for both normative and empirical reasons. In the case of the latter, it was 
argued that Rawls neglects the very real human rights abuses that can be 
perpetrated by non-state actors, and there is no provision for this within Law of 
Peoples, the assumption being that this is a concern for domestic government 
rather than one in the international realm. In terms of normative objections to 
Rawls‘s account of human rights, it was argued that without justification he 
includes some rights and omits others, which is especially problematic in that the 
fulfilment of some rights can sometimes be contingent on the fulfilment of rights 
that are not included – such as the right to subsistence (included) being 
dependent on the right to a democratic government (not included).  
 
In empirical terms, it was argued that Rawls‘s account of justice in the 
international realm does not adequately deal with the world as we find it, despite 
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it stated premise at the outset to proceed from that world as it is now. The 
restriction of principles of distributive justice to co-citizens within states neglect 
some important realities about the role and capacity of states in the context of 
contemporary processes of globalization. In this regard it was argued that the 
choice of peoples (or states) as the chief unit of concern is historically 
contingent, dependent on a view of the world that was once correct. Furthermore, 
it was argued that the dichotomy that Rawls draws between the domestic and 
international realms neglects structures of global governance that are involved in 
the development of rules, standards and norms. Such structures have a profound 
effect on people‘s lives, yet they cannot be easily dealt with in such a dichotomy. 
Following on from this, it was argued that in Law of Peoples, Rawls is making 
an empirical claim about the ability of states to become well-ordered and 
wealthy. In terms of being well-ordered, this claim was objected to on the 
grounds that it overplays the unity within contemporary states regarding 
agreement on conceptions of justice; in terms of societal wealth, this claim was 
also rejected as there is ample evidence to suggest that a state‘s participation in 
and cooperation with external structures of governance is linked to their ability to 
become wealthy.  
 
Thus Rawls‘s argument in Law of Peoples is not adequate for the question of 
CSR and global distributive justice. This is not a surprise, as it is certainly not 
the aim of Law of Peoples to deal with such questions. However, some of 
Rawls‘s ideas are very useful in making the case for the applicability of justice to 
corporations and, as will be argued in the next chapter, it is sufficient in 
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Rawlsian terms to argue that profound effects on people‘s life chances are 
enough for principles of distributive justice to apply.  
 
4.3 Distributive Justice and National Self-Determination 
 
This section of the chapter develops a critique of conceptions of distributive 
justice that are constrained by the perceived normative value of national self-
determination. As mentioned above, national self-determination is important in 
the Rawlsian account in Law of Peoples, the broad idea being that distributive 
justice is not necessary beyond the national realm, because people must be in 
some sort of relation in order for them to have redistributive responsibilities. The 
difference in the following account is that what is important in this respect is the 
cultural ties of the nation (as opposed to the political ties of the state). Miller has 
advocated this approach most recently (2007). There is some similarity between 
Miller‘s and Rawls‘s account, in that both reject the claim of global egalitarians 
that global redistributive principles are necessary and both see a value in a 
division of labour between the domestic and international spheres.  In addition, 
both accounts discuss human rights as a minimum guarantee of justice and view 
the collective responsibilities of peoples (Rawls), or nations (Miller), as central 
to international justice. This section first gives a description of Miller‘s account, 
which is followed by a critique of this account once again based on normative 
and empirical objections.  
 
Miller‘s view is a non-redistributive view of global justice, with a territorially 
bounded political community at its core. However, it is the ties of a nation, 
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culturally understood, rather than the political ties of citizenship that are the 
justification for this view. Again, similarly to Rawls, Miller‘s views on justice 
beyond the domestic realm are explicitly shaped by his conception of justice 
within the domestic; his view is based on the idea that it is the communal ties of 
national identity that make distributive justice possible, i.e. it is the solidarity that 
exists between co-nationals that enables the reciprocal relations necessary for 
distributive justice (De Schutter and Tinnevelt, 2008: 370-371). Nations, 
politically organised into states, have the responsibility of ensuring social or 
distributive justice. The role of a just international sphere, then, is ―to create the 
conditions under which that responsibility can be discharged‖ (Miller, 2007: 20-
21).  
 
In this respect, there are three core aspects to nationality that together give 
substance to the claim that it is the nation that is centrally responsible for 
distributive justice. These are: 
1. Nationality is legitimately part of someone‘s identity 
2. Ethical claims that national communities have special duties to 
one another.  
3. Political claims that people who form a national community have 
a good claim to self-determination - the right to develop an 
institutional structure to collectively decide matters that affect 
their community. (Miller, 1995: 10-12; see also 2007: 124-130) 
 
All three claims are interlinked, but the third one relating to national self-
determination reinforces the first and second one: ―The fact that the community 
in question is either actually or potentially self-determining strengthens its claims 
on us both as a source of identity and as a source of obligation‖ (1995: 12). This 
view is expanded elsewhere: 
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[…] the more open and democratic a society is, the more justified we are 
in holding its members responsible for the decisions they make and the 
policies they follow. In these circumstances, there would seem little 
objection to requiring the members to bear the costs of what they decide 
to do (2007: 130). 
 
Thus, for Miller, the question of responsibility is central in respect of global 
justice. He develops an account of responsibility that starts from the individual, 
extends to the collective, then to the national and finally to responsibility for the 
national past (De Schutter and Tinnevelt, 2008: 374). In circumstances where a 
nation is ruled from the outside, or governed from within by an autocratic 
individual or elite, the demarcation of responsibility is not so clear; but when a 
nation is democratically self governed, Miller claims it is the nation alone that is 
responsible for determining the quality of life people experience, thus any claims 
of distributive justice must be situated within a self-determining nation state.  
 
On this basis, Miller proposes two principles of global justice that derive from 
his views on nationality, collective responsibility and self-determination. The 
first is a list of basic human rights, the second the stipulation that international 
co-operative practices between nations be fair and non-exploitative. This 
account, described by Wenar as ―sufficiency not equality‖ (2008: 401), on 
Miller‘s view ensures a basic minimum level of justice is guaranteed in the 
international sphere and that the wider context in which nations operate enables 
them to make autonomous decisions regarding distributive justice that have an 
affinity with their national and cultural identity.  
 
While Rawls‘s account of global justice turns on the preservation of certain key 
liberal values, such as tolerance and autonomy, Miller‘s account hinges on the 
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ethical primacy of the nation as a culturally cohesive unit in which members are 
collectively held responsible for determining their own fate. Both accounts 
advocate a global minimum of basic human rights, and fair terms of cooperation 
between peoples or nations; yet Miller‘s view rests on the cultural value of 
common identity and responsibility in relation to justice, rather than the specific 
value of citizenship and reciprocity in relation to justice. 
 
In relation to the central claim of this thesis, that principles of global distributive 
justice apply in circumstances where institutions have a profound effect on 
peoples‘ life chances, the primary difficulty with Miller‘s account is that it is not 
as clear as he argues that national self-determination is the central concern of 
global justice. Like the critique of Rawls provided above, the objections of the 
thesis to Miller‘s argument are focused on his normative and empirical claims.  
 
4.3.1 Normative Critique 
The centrality of the nation in Miller‘s account is a normative claim about the 
moral appropriateness of the nation as the ideal community within which an 
individual should live. The thought is that the assumed stability of national 
culture and identity within the nation is an arrangement that offers the greatest 
possibility for people to experience a just life. National identity implies a number 
of different things: common belief; historical continuity; active identity; 
geographical place; national character, or common public culture (1995: 21-26). 
This common public culture is a set of understandings a nation has about how 
their collective life should be led - principles that set the terms of political 
association, and guide political decision-making (2007: 124), foremost amongst 
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which is the protection of national culture (Ibid: 131). It is the practice of this set 
of common ideas and beliefs over time that lead to the charge that nations are 
solely responsible for the welfare of those that reside therein: 
  
Global justice, on the view I am defending, is justice for a world of 
difference, not merely because ironing out differences between nations 
would be unfeasible or involve high levels of coercion, but because 
people greatly value living under their own rules and according to their 
own cultural beliefs (Ibid: 21).  
 
However, culture and identity as a basis of a claim of distributive justice 
represent too fluid an idea to warrant decisions about the distribution of benefits 
and burdens within a society. Just as the strict association of citizenship with 
territory is subject to challenge in globalising circumstances, so too is the idea 
that the primary identity and culture to which people legitimately subscribe is 
defined by the nation. Miller allows for the existence of different beliefs and 
dissent within nations, but holds that there must be a core set of attitudes and 
understandings in order for a nation to exist, and in order that that nation is held 
responsible for its members. Yet if culture and identity are subject to change and 
―erosion by external forces‖, as Miller acknowledges (Ibid: 131), their value as 
justification for the use of the nation as the locus of claims of distributive justice 
is surely questionable. Miller might object to this criticism by countering that 
culture and identity are indeed subject to erosion but that this is merely 
regrettable rather than a reason to change the fundamental basis of distributive 
justice claims; in ideal circumstances this wouldn‘t happen.  
 
However, what is at stake in questions of justice is surely the type and quality of 
life chances people experience – not the maintenance of cultural identity within a 
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historically contingent idea of the state as the locus for that identity. Culture and 
identity are politically important, of course, but this importance is minor in 
relation to that of distributive justice. Similarly, collective responsibility is also 
important, but in questions of justice, it is reasonable to argue that it has a limited 
range of application. If resource allocation or the distribution of goods within a 
society, or indeed globally, becomes too unequal, then surely concern about 
identity and responsibility is of lesser import. The point here is that the 
restriction of justice claims to the nation on the basis that justice is only possible, 
and desirable, in communities held together by common identity and a sense of 
collective responsibility focuses our attention on the wrong thing, i.e. the 
perceived solidarity of nations, rather than the existence of pervasive injustice. 
The argument here is not that national self-determination is not important, or 
indeed part of a wider picture of global justice (in fact some cosmopolitans view 
national self-determination as important), but that it is not a key determinant of 
justice. 
 
A related point is the value of self-determination of the nation as central to global 
justice. Miller holds that once a nation is politically self-determining, it is wholly 
responsible for the distribution of benefits and burdens experienced by its 
members - as indicated in the above quote, the more self-determining a nation is 
(i.e. the more democratic it is), the more responsible it is. There are limitations to 
the extent to which responsibility can be said to rest solely with the nation - for 
example in nations subject to external rule, where cultural divisions run deep - 
but aside from these cases ―where nations act in ways that impose burdens on 
themselves or on others, responsibility for such burdens falls on every member, 
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even on those opposed to decisions or policies. This turns on the sharing of 
beliefs and attitudes that characterises national communities, and on the benefits 
that membership brings‖ (Ibid: 133). Self-determination is seen by Miller to be a 
limit to global egalitarian claims regarding distributive justice, but also, he points 
out, as a limit on global inequality, in that nations should not deprive other 
nations of their own right to self-determination (Ibid: 74 n22).  
 
The problematic assumption here is the extent to which a nation is wholly in 
control of the circumstances that affect the distribution of benefits and burdens 
within a society. There is a clear political value to the self determination of a 
nation, both for practical and ethical reasons. But, similarly to the point about 
cultural identity and justice, it is not so clear that the existence of a self-
determining nation ought to be the parameter by which principles of distributive 
justice are decided. While it can be reasonably be said that it is just for an 
individual‘s life to be shaped significantly by the society in which they live, it 
does not necessarily follow that there should not be redistributive measures that 
regulate global arrangements. A good analogy here is that of the family, and the 
extent to which family membership can be legitimately allowed to determine 
individual life chances (see Brighouse and Swift, 2008 for a recent discussion of 
this question). It is reasonable to suggest that everyone has an interest in being 
part of a family and having their interests partially determined by that family. 
However it would be unjust if people‘s life chances should be entirely 
determined by their family, or that their status as family members would 
supersede their status as individuals. In other words, while societies have a clear 
interest, and duty, in there being social and political mechanisms that protect 
  
 
148 
individuals‘ wellbeing and enhance their life chances, this should not be limited 
to the family, or indeed the nation. The question of justice is larger than that of 
the preservation of such social and political mechanisms, to the extent that a 
legitimate interest in national self-determination is surely superseded by a 
concern for people‘s life chances, regardless of their culture or nation. 
 
4.3.2 Empirical Critique 
Following on from this, the preservation of self-determination as an intrinsic 
determinant of the type of life a person experiences is also an empirical 
conjecture about the ability of self-determining nations to ensure a just life for 
their citizens. Miller employs, as Bader points out, a ―split-level analysis‖ 
divided into nations and state governments on the one hand, and global 
institutions on the other (Bader, 2008: 547). Similarly to the point made above 
about Rawls and Law of Peoples, this stark dichotomy of the world deviates too 
much from the world as we find it, such that Miller‘s general argument is 
rendered less useful. Structures of global governance mean that are there are a 
variety of rules, norms, standards and organisations that do not fit into Miller‘s 
dichotomy but that are important from the point of view of justice and the type 
and quality of life that people experience. Miller‘s own focus on the importance 
of loyalties, common identities and solidarities to the realisation of justice is 
hampered by his neglect of the extensive range of complex loyalties that people 
employ, something that is exacerbated by contemporary globalising 
circumstances. In this regard, Bader mentions multi-level and multi-layered 
citizenship, trans-national polities such as the EU and trans-national citizenship 
in particular, all of which ―provide promising opportunities to accommodate 
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transnational and global shifts in affiliations, loyalties, identities and obligations‖ 
(Ibid).   
 
A further empirical objection to Miller‘s account is his assumption that national 
government can easily determine the fortunes of its people without impact from 
outside the nation. In many ways, Miller‘s account treats the development of 
policy and the actions of governments as if they take place in a vacuum. Whilst 
he acknowledges the extent to which the global economic order impacts upon 
those who live in poor countries, and thus advocates the development of fair 
terms of cooperation between rich and poor countries (2007: 253), the treatment 
of this empirical reality is circumscribed by the normative primacy of national 
self-determination. Thus, again similarly to Rawls, Miller works on the basis that 
as long as nations are allowed to decide their own fate within a fair international 
order, global redistributive principles are not necessary. As argued above, this is 
both normatively and empirically problematic. What is missing then is the idea 
that as a consequence of globalisation, the power to determine the terms of 
cooperation of the international order does not rest solely with governments and 
citizens; similarly, the circumstances of injustice experienced by many are not 
directly attributable to the policies of self-determining nations.  
 
For instance, when the IMF imposes conditionalities related to economic reform 
that negatively impact upon a country‘s poorest people, it may be the nation‘s 
government that has agreed to and implemented the policies, thus we can 
attribute some direct responsibility to the government. However, the 
development of such policies is attributable to the IMF which is made up of a 
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number of different governments and which wields considerable power. 
Similarly, with global corporations, it is the case that national governments allow 
them to locate within their territory, and thus subject them to local laws and 
taxes; however this occurs in a situation in which the mobility of capital, versus 
the immobility of national governments, means there is an imbalance between a 
government‘s ability to regulate a global corporation, and a corporation‘s ability 
to relocate to more favourable locations.  
 
In relation to such objections, Miller could counter that the task of the political 
philosopher is not to address such empirical questions, in a similar way that 
Rawls argued that political philosophy has nothing to say about coercive 
intervention in cases of human rights, this being instead the task of the policy 
maker. Indeed, Miller responds to Bader‘s criticisms by stating ―I fear that 
attempts to be specific about, say, the design of the international institutions that 
would best serve the cause of global justice will quickly fall foul of the problem 
of empirical disagreement‖ (Miller, 2008: 555). As such the task at hand is to 
develop just principles that are not constrained by empirical realities to the extent 
that what is just is determined by what is possible. This is a valid point and is 
something that is discussed in chapter six. However, it suffices to argue here that 
Miller‘s reluctance to deal with how the world is shapes his theory in a way that 
makes it difficult to see how it would apply in contemporary circumstances, for 
both the empirical and normative reasons listed above.  
 
In summary, Miller‘s argument is that global justice is constituted by the 
achievement of national self-determination for all nations. On the basis that an 
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individual‘s life chances are best served by the development and implementation 
of principles of justice at the domestic level, Miller argues that once all nations 
are democratically self-determining, there is no need for global redistribution. 
This claim hinges on the idea that nations are constituted of a cohesive unit of 
people who are able to agree on principles of justice. This claim was disputed on 
both normative and empirical grounds.  
 
4.4 Distributive Justice and Sovereignty  
 
So far this chapter has discussed two ways in which the restriction of principles 
of distributive justice to a territorially defined community like the state or nation-
state is problematic. Primarily the claims made by advocates of these views have 
been justified on the basis of the political ties of citizenship, or the cultural ties of 
the nation. This section deals with similar claims that have been justified on the 
basis that it is the joint authorship of rules that restricts distributive justice to the 
state. This argument has most recently been articulated by Nagel (2005), 
although it has also been stated elsewhere (see for example Miller 1998 and 
Blake 2002). On this view, global distributive justice is also ruled out because it 
is thought that people must be part of some sort of established political relation, 
or subject to the same set of rules, in order to justify redistributive measures. 
Similarly to the previous two sections, this section will first provide a descriptive 
overview of Nagel‘s account, and then once again develop a critique that is based 
on his normative and empirical claims.  
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Nagel‘s starting point is the Hobbesian claim about the relationship between 
justice and sovereignty: 
  
What creates the link between justice and sovereignty is something 
common to a wide range of conceptions of justice: they all depend on the 
coordinated conduct of large numbers of people, which cannot be 
achieved without law backed up by a monopoly of force ... This 
collective self-interest cannot be realized by the independent motivation 
of self-interested individuals unless each of them has the assurance that 
others will conform if he does. (2005: 115) 
 
He articulates a political conception of justice that has sovereign states at its 
core; it is the existence of states that give the value of justice its application. 
Duties of justice are not owed to everyone in the world: 
   
Justice is something we owe through our shared institutions only to those 
with whom we stand in a strong political relation … The full standards of 
justice, though they can be known by moral reasoning, apply only within 
the boundaries of a sovereign state, however arbitrary those boundaries 
may be. Internationally, there may well be standards, but they do not 
merit the full name of justice (Ibid: 121-122).   
 
There is considerable overlap between what Nagel and Rawls advocate, the 
primary general difference being that Nagel specifically addresses the matter of 
global justice. However, he is of the view that Rawls was broadly correct; despite 
the moral appeal of cosmopolitan global egalitarian claims, Nagel believes that 
the political conception of justice is what most people hold to be correct, and is 
what works: 
  
[…] the defence of the political conception of justice would have to hold 
that beyond the basic humanitarian duties, further requirements of equal 
treatment depend on a strong  condition of associative responsibility, that 
such responsibility is created by specific and contingent relations such as 
fellow citizenship, and that there is no general moral requirement to take 
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responsibility for others by getting into those sorts of relations with as 
many of them as possible...This makes it a very convenient view for those 
living in rich societies to hold. But that alone does not make it false (Ibid: 
126)   
 
On Nagel‘s view, the choices surrounding global justice are either a 
cosmopolitan application of principles of distributive justice, mediated through a 
world government (Ibid: 119), or the political conception, which ensures 
distributive justice within states. On this latter conception, there can certainly be 
broad humanitarian concerns related to global poverty (which, as he argues, are 
so grim that relatively speaking justice itself may be a side issue - Ibid: 118), but 
these are distinct from duties of justice.  
 
This restriction quite clearly leads to the charge that it is morally arbitrary, and 
such arbitrariness is unacceptable in the context of claims about distributive 
justice. For Nagel, it is the joint authorship of sovereignty that provides us with 
the necessary condition to justify his argument: 
  
A sovereign state is not just a cooperative enterprise for mutual 
advantage. The societal rules  determining its basic structure are 
coercively imposed: it is not a voluntary association. I submit that it is 
this complex fact - that we are both putative joint authors of the 
coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms, i.e., expected to 
accept their authority even when the collective decision diverges from 
our personal preferences - that creates the special presumption against 
arbitrary inequalities in our treatment by the system (Ibid: 129).  
 
The thesis presents two central critiques of Nagel‘s argument. This first is 
empirical, and broadly argues that even if Nagel is correct to say that 
requirements of justice only apply between people who are related through the 
exercise of authority and the co-authorship of rules, he is wrong to argue that this 
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does not apply globally. The second point is normative, arguing that sovereignty 
is not necessary for justice to apply – requirements of justice can be triggered in 
circumstances where no one has been asked to obey any rules.  
 
4.4.1 Empirical Critique 
The empirical critique of Nagel‘s argument is similar to the points that have been 
made in previous sections. Nagel‘s view of global politics is that extensive 
institutional governance arrangements at the international level are significant 
enough to assert that we are clearly in some sort of institutional relation with one 
another globally, but that such relations are not significant enough to warrant the 
application of principles of distributive justice globally: 
 
Current international rules and institutions may be the thin end of a 
wedge that will eventually expand to seriously dislodge the dominant 
sovereignty of separate nation-states, both morally and politically, but 
for the moment they lack something that according to the political 
conception is crucial for the application and implementation of 
standards of justice: They are not collectively enacted and coercively 
imposed in the name of all individuals whose lives they affect; and 
they do not ask for the kind of authorization by individuals that carries 
with it a responsibility to treat all those individuals in some sense 
equally (Ibid: 138).  
 
 
There are two points to be made here. The first is that Nagel goes on to observe 
that the majority of international rules and institutions are founded on state 
authority and involve some form of delegation of state authority in order to 
function (Ibid: 138-139). He also argues that the fact that such institutions are 
founded on state authority does not mean that the claims of justice that are 
applicable to the state are also applicable to international institutions that rely on 
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state sovereignty to exist. Moreover, he also mentions newer forms of 
international governance, such as global and regional networks, and views these 
to be similarly founded upon state authority and representative of the self-
interested bargaining that takes place between states. If this is indeed the case – 
that all international governance is merely a partial transfer of state authority up 
one level, as it were – then surely on Nagel‘s own argument it follows that 
justice claims are applicable, precisely because (in his view) justice applies in 
sovereign relations.  
 
Even if he is correct in saying that justice applies only in sovereign relations of 
authority, and that all international governance is based on state-based sovereign 
authority, the logical conclusion of this seems to be different to that which Nagel 
arrives at. If representatives of states within international institutions make 
decisions and bargain on behalf of their citizens, who live under the collectively 
imposed rules of such international institutions, it would seem that there is a 
relationship of authority between such citizens and institutions, and such 
authority is founded upon sovereign states. Thus there is a claim of distributive 
justice. Nagel argues there isn‘t, because it is an ―an indirect relation to citizens 
that is morally significant‖ (Ibid: 139). However, it is not really explained why 
this indirect relation is morally significant.  
 
The second point is that Nagel‘s view is incorrect in relation to international 
governance, in terms of its make up as well as in terms of voluntariness. Of 
course he is correct that many institutions, or more particularly the ―old‖ 
institutions, such as the UN, the IMF or the World Bank, are founded on state 
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authority, and newer institutions such as networks of global governance also 
have states participating. However he is incorrect to say that institutions of 
international governance are constituted solely by states bargaining with one 
another. This perception of international governance neglects the fact that many 
interests at that level are not representative of one state function, or one state. All 
the international organisations he mentions allow civil society representation, 
which often are organised on the basis of a particular issue, or geographical 
region and so span across states. Regional governance bodies also form 
collective representative groups within international organisations; for instance, 
the EU bargains collectively in many instances. Business interests also form 
representative groups within international organisations, bargaining on behalf of 
industry interests that may be demarcated by region or industry type etc, but not 
by state. Cohen and Sabel characterise this scenario as global rule-making, 
elaboration and application, global contestation and reshaping of such rules, 
permanence of the rules, and the encouragement of conduct abiding by those 
rules by the creation of incentives, sanctions and a high cost of withdrawal 
(2006: 164-165). While this picture of global rule making does not involve the 
coercive imposition of rules, as in the state, it is significant enough to warrant 
attention from the point of view of justice.  
 
So in relation to the first point, if international governance institutions are only 
made up of state authority then it is not clear why claims of justice are not 
applicable; in relation to the second point, the make up of international 
institutions of governance cannot be understood in terms of states bargaining 
with each other – global governance arrangements are much more complex than 
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that. This would seem to endorse Nagel‘s view about there being an indirect 
relation between such institutions and citizens that is of moral significance. After 
all, the more complex the arrangements, then presumably the more indirect the 
relation. However, this is where the argument about voluntariness is significant. 
Nagel‘s view is that states enter into international governance arrangements 
voluntarily and thus can exit such arrangements equally voluntarily. This seems a 
deviation too far from the world as we find it.  
 
It is difficult to see how withdrawal of membership of any such organisations 
would be in any state‘s interest. Given Nagel‘s view that states enter into such 
arrangements in order to protect their own self interest, it seems unlikely that 
states would voluntarily withdraw. As was discussed in the previous chapter, 
international institutions of governance were founded as part of an ―embedded 
liberal compromise‖ that enabled states to participate in structures of global 
capitalism while protecting their domestic citizens. To posit that states can 
simply voluntarily leave such institutions is to suggest that such states withdraw 
from global capitalism. In terms of an empirical reality, this does not seem to be 
a very realistic or helpful conjecture. Furthermore, states participate in 
international institutions of governance in order to find solutions that they simply 
cannot solve alone – global climate change is the most obvious case in point. If 
states participate internationally purely in terms of self-interest, then it seems 
clear that it is in their interest to remain within such institutions.  
 
Thus the picture Nagel paints of the nature of global politics can be disputed by 
reference to empirical knowledge about how global politics functions in present 
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circumstances. Globalising processes render the dichotomy drawn between 
sovereign states and international governance institutions quite problematic. He 
addresses this problematic dichotomy by introducing the idea of a ―sliding scale‖ 
of requirements of justice, which would relate to different degrees of engagement 
between individuals: 
  
The claim would have to be that since we are both participating members 
of this network of institutions, this puts us in the same boat for purposes 
of raising issues of justice, but somehow a different and perhaps leakier 
boat than that created by a common nation-state (Ibid: 142).  
 
As well as being impractical, Nagel rejects this idea as morally unfeasible, less 
plausible than either the political conception he advocates, or a full-scale 
cosmopolitan conception of global justice. This is because he sees sovereignty as 
central to justice and on this sliding scale of interactions that individuals may 
have with institutions of international governance, there is no consistently 
identifiable sovereign relation. Thus, a middle ground approach according to 
Nagel is not possible.  
 
4.4.2 Normative Critique 
This leads to the normative critique of Nagel‘s argument. Of course if 
sovereignty is viewed to have such a central role in regard to distributive justice, 
the ―sliding scale‖ Nagel outlines is a non-starter. However, the argument 
presented in this thesis leads to a different discussion,  (the second objection to 
Nagel‘s conception of global justice), which is that in focussing on the condition 
of sovereignty in relation to global justice, Nagel focuses on the wrong thing, and 
asks the wrong questions. If the central criterion surrounding global justice 
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relates to how it might be integrated with traditional notions of sovereignty, the 
political conception of justice appears the more appealing one. Yet Nagel 
mentions the moral appeal of a cosmopolitan conception, and acknowledges the 
morally distressing nature of the questions a theory of global justice would 
presumably address. In fact it seems there is an interest in taking global justice 
further, but the constraints of the political conception does not allow for this.  
 
The point here is that it is not necessarily the case that sovereignty is so crucial to 
trigger requirements of distributive justice. The previous sections argued that the 
political ties of citizenship and the cultural ties of the nation are not central 
determining factors when it comes to the scope of distributive justice. In the case 
of the former, it was argued the priority given to liberal toleration is not 
justifiable. In the case of the latter, the priority given to national self-
determination is also not justifiable. In terms of Nagel‘s argument, the priority 
given to sovereignty is equally problematic. It is not clear from Nagel‘s position 
why sovereignty or the co-authorship of rules is necessary to trigger principles of 
distributive justice. 
 
What defines sovereignty as this special trigger of norms of justice, according to 
Nagel, is the co-authorship of rules within a society – all members of a society 
are subject to coercively imposed rules, with which they are involuntarily 
associated, and which require the ―active engagement‖ of their will in order to be 
justifiable. He states 
 
The society makes us responsible for its acts, which are taken in our name 
and on which, in a democracy, we may even have some inﬂuence; and it 
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holds us responsible for obeying its laws and conforming to its norms, 
thereby supporting the institutions through which advantages and 
disadvantages are created and distributed. Insofar as those institutions 
admit arbitrary inequalities, we are, even though the responsibility has been 
simply handed to us, responsible, and we therefore have standing to ask 
why we should accept them (Ibid: 128-129).  
 
Thus co-citizens are asked to accept as legitimate forms of state coercion in order 
that the arbitrary inequalities of that system can be mitigated, through principles 
of distributive justice; Nagel argues that it is only within a state, not at the global 
level that this occurs; a similar argument is also made by Blake (2002: 265). Yet 
this seems an arbitrary way in which to think about justice, and surely leaves out 
many circumstances of injustice, merely because people‘s will has not been 
actively engaged in accepting rules that are imposed on them.  
 
Pevnick argues that this ―double jeopardy‖ is troublesome for two reasons: first 
that it makes justice dependent on states‘ leverage in pre-institutional power 
structures (or that strong states are able to ensure that there is no coercively 
imposed system to which parties must agree because it may be to their advantage 
to do so); following on from that, secondly, is that this allows strong states to 
ignore claims of justice from weaker ones (2007: 404-405). Thus Pevnick views 
Nagel‘s conception as problematic for a state-based conception of international 
governance, in which unequal states engage in bargaining at the international 
level. Caney also points out that Nagel‘s argument does not necessarily lead us 
where he wants to go – states acting ―in the name of‖ their citizens at the 
international level might also be legitimately expected to take on a cosmopolitan 
political morality of acting honourably and justly, and not necessarily act purely 
from reasons of self-interest (2008: 513). Thus it is not the case that states should 
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not be expected to allow claims of justice at the international level. As Caney 
asserts, cosmopolitan egalitarians could claim this is a requirement of state 
behaviour.  
 
However, it is the contention here that this problem extends beyond the unequal 
status and behaviour of states engaged with each other at the international level. 
The thesis argues that what is of concern for a conception of distributive justice 
is in situations where an institution has a profound and unavoidable effect on an 
individual‘s life chances. As has been argued in this chapter, the thesis perceives 
global politics to be constituted by a more complex picture of interaction than 
that of states bargaining with each other. Global governance structures involve a 
wide variety of actors and groups in the development of rules, standards and 
norms that do not fit into this inter-state conception of global politics. Whilst 
Nagel to an extent acknowledges these global governance structures, as was 
argued above, he is incorrect to assert that all behaviour in this context can be 
explained by representatives of states bargaining with each other from a position 
of state based self-interest. However, in normative terms, in a situation where 
there are rules that are imposed on people, that have a profound effect on life 
chances, but do not engage the ―active will‖ of those people on whom they are 
imposed, it is still the case that principles of distributive justice are applicable.  
 
Again, the example of the family can be used as an analogy. Membership of a 
family is not a voluntary association – it is not an active engagement of will to be 
born into a particular family. Rules within a family can be coercively imposed 
upon family members that are unjust, without those members agreeing to such 
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rules. A case in point could be the prevention of female members of the family in 
pursuing higher education on the basis of their gender.  This is an unjust coercion 
of female members of the family, without there being any active engagement of 
their will to actually be part of that cooperative arrangement. A similar analogy 
could be in relation to employees losing their jobs unfairly, say for example 
because a company opts to relocate production to another country, where labour 
costs are lower. We cannot say that the employer-employee relationship is one of 
justifiable coercion and compliance with rules. An employee‘s will is not 
actively engaged by an employer in the manner of the relationship between state 
and citizen. However, the loss of the employee‘s job, through no action of his or 
her own, would seem to be an unjust situation. Nagel would presumably counter 
that the employer-employee relation is a voluntary association, in that either 
party are free to leave, and thus distributive justice is not applicable. However, it 
would seem to be the case that the employer‘s decision has a profound effect on 
the life chances of the employee, and even though it is not a coercive 
relationship, there is sufficient interaction between employer and employee for 
their to be a claim of justice.  
 
The key point here is that in focussing on sovereignty, Nagel focuses on the 
wrong thing. If it is a concern of justice to mitigate suffering and distribute 
benefits and burdens fairly, then sovereignty is less relevant. Nagel expresses a 
concern that the facts of global poverty and inequality are so grim that perhaps a 
focus on global justice is in fact a side issue: ―Whatever view one takes of the 
applicability or inapplicability of standards of justice to such a situation, it is 
clearly a disaster from a more broadly humanitarian point of view… some form 
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of humane assistance from the well-off to those in extremis is clearly called for 
quite apart from any demand of justice, if we are not simply ethical egoists‖ 
(2005: 118). Yet approaching such questions from the point of view of 
humanitarianism is not necessarily an adequate way forward, given that many 
problems of global poverty are systemic in nature, and not resolvable by the 
transfer of funds from wealthy countries to poor ones. As he admits, justice 
demands much more than humanitarian concern.  
  
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented three prominent state-based views of the requirements 
of global justice and has critiqued these views using empirical and normative 
arguments. In relation to Rawls, it was argued that his preservation of liberal 
tolerance actually works in ways that are problematic for the value of tolerance 
itself and that his mechanism of extending tolerance (his human rights 
stipulation) is quite arbitrary in the rights its covers and does not cover. In 
relation to Miller‘s arguments about national self-determination, it was argued 
that the value of cultural identity and collective responsibility are not solid 
enough arguments for priority being given to the nation in questions of global 
justice. While both values are important, cultural identity is subject to change, 
and collective responsibility is only one interest that people may have in terms of 
justice; in this regard, it was argued that it is not clear why national self-
determination ought to be the parameter by which principles of justice are 
decided. In relation to Nagel, it was similarly argued that it is not clear why the 
existence of sovereign relations between people ought to be a determinant of 
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justice claims; while sovereignty exists in some justice claims – i.e. those within 
a sovereign state – it is not the case that these are the only valid claims of justice 
that there can be. It was argued that there are circumstances of injustice in which 
there is no one demanding compliance with rules, as happens in the case of the 
active engagement of the will of people within a state, and that this is sufficient 
criteria to trigger requirements of justice.  
 
The chapter also presented some objections to the empirical claims made by all 
three arguments. It is an important contention of the thesis that discussions of 
global distributive justice ought to strive to achieve a balance between what is 
morally desirable and what is empirically feasible. As the above paragraph 
argues, the thesis makes the case that the three statist positions on global justice 
are morally problematic; it was also argued that such positions deviate too far 
from the world as we find it. At the core of this is the idea that contemporary 
globalising processes are constituted in part by structures of global governance 
that are responsible for the development, elaboration and application of norms, 
rules and standards that have an important impact on people‘s lives but that do 
not fit easily into a national-international dichotomy. As was discussed in the 
previous chapter, a significant part of this wider picture is the participation in 
such structures of non-state actors, like global corporations and NGOs. While the 
previous chapter served to explain why CSR has emerged and why it takes the 
form it does, this chapter has set up the argument for the application of principles 
of justice to corporations by articulating the view that state-based conceptions of 
global justice do not cover the activities of these sorts of actors within global 
governance structures.  
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Thus the thesis so far has presented the emergence of CSR as a neo-Polanyian 
reaction to resistance of unregulated global capitalism that takes the form it does 
because of a Gramscian type of hegemonic control of CSR‘s mode of operation 
and agenda. What is being inferred here is that global corporations, as part of 
global capitalism, produce unjust outcomes, and the dominant resolution of such 
outcomes has emerged to be CSR. The present chapter has argued that statist 
conceptions of global justice do not take any of these circumstances into account, 
and thus omit circumstances that would seem to be central to questions of global 
justice. On the basis of having demonstrated the inadequacies of these accounts 
to the complex circumstances within which global corporations operate, the 
thesis now moves its attention to cosmopolitan conceptions of global distributive 
justice.  
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5: Cosmopolitan Conceptions of Global Distributive Justice 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, the chapter critiques established 
cosmopolitan conceptions of global distributive justice. In the context of the 
previous chapter, this chapter develops the argument further by providing an 
analytical overview of the manner in which cosmopolitans have treated the 
matter of global distributive justice. Second, the chapter opens up the argument 
about the applicability of principles of justice to global corporations by 
discussing the political theoretical debate about the institutional make up of the 
basic structure. In terms of the overall thesis argument, this chapter serves the 
purpose of extending a cosmopolitan view of justice that incorporates the 
activities of global corporations, and opens up the possibility for a conception of 
justice being based on the contention that it is institutions that have profound 
effects on people‘s life chances that triggers the requirements of justice.  
 
The basic normative idea of all cosmopolitan conceptions of justice is that the 
principles of justice should not be restricted to one particular society. The 
individual is the primary unit of normative concern. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, conceptions of justice that are restricted to the confines of particular 
territories have been rejected on both normative and empirical grounds. In 
relation to the argument of this thesis, the restriction of the scope of justice to 
peoples or states is highly problematic. For reasons outlined in the previous 
  
 
167 
chapter, in the context of contemporary intensified globalisation, the normative 
significance of the state, or indeed any territorial unit, is limited in terms of its 
ability to shape and govern people‘s lives. Accordingly, this chapter recognizes 
the centrality of cosmopolitan modes of thought in moving away from state-
based assumptions, and in moving towards the development of principles of 
global distributive justice that pertain to contemporary circumstances.  
 
The chapter also seeks to identify a gap in existing cosmopolitan thought with 
regard to the significance of global private actors in these circumstances. 
Although global corporations are widely viewed to be integral parts of what we 
now know as globalization (i.e. they are both part of and responsible for it), 
many treatments of cosmopolitan distributive justice either have not 
acknowledged this, or have not dealt with this in a systematic way. This chapter 
exposes this gap by detailing how most cosmopolitan thought with respect to 
justice has addressed the importance of the reform of global public institutions of 
governance. This is both necessary and valuable. However, the argument of this 
thesis is that such accounts are incomplete if we are to produce a meaningful idea 
of global distributive justice. The final section of the chapter consolidates this 
argument by drawing from existing debates within political theory pertaining to 
the make up of the basic structure, and highlighting how insights from this 
debate further the contention that global corporations are subject to the demands 
of justice.  
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first section details different 
variants of cosmopolitan thought. A loose characterization of different strands of 
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this mode of thought has been adopted for the purposes of clarity. These strands 
are methodological, moral, political and legal cosmopolitanism. There is clear 
overlap and blurring of the boundaries between these strands, and in many 
instances they are inseparable. However, it is useful to delineate these strands to 
overcome the difficulty of defining what it is to be ―a cosmopolitan‖.  
 
The second section outlines the reasons why there is an argument for global 
distributive justice, as given by various cosmopolitan political theorists, as well 
as detailing the principles of global justice such theorists have developed. The 
third section sets up the argument in relation to how corporations may be 
integrated into a conception of global justice, by addressing explicitly the 
question of the types of institutions that make up the basic structure, and 
discussing the role played by legally noncoercive institutions within the basic 
structure, as well as the importance of publicity to the institutions to which 
principles of distributive justice apply.  
 
5.2 Cosmopolitan Paradigms of Thought 
 
In the context of the restriction of many political theories of distributive justice to 
the boundaries of the sovereign state, and the consequent difficulties such 
restriction presents us in the attempt to redefine the scope of distributive justice, 
the sentiments and motivations behind various cosmopolitan ideas offer a 
possible solution. The purpose of this section is to sketch a general picture of 
such ideas, and to distinguish between the different variants of the broad notion 
of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism is, as highlighted throughout, a mode of 
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thought that manifests itself in different ways; for heuristic purposes, this section 
is divided into methodological, moral, political and legal cosmopolitanism. Such 
categorization must not be seen as definitive – there is high degree of overlap 
between all categories.  
 
5.2.1 Methodological Cosmopolitanism  
The first general point to be made about cosmopolitanism is that it encompasses 
a particular outlook or worldview, part of the purpose of which (within the social 
sciences) is to move beyond what has come to be known as methodological 
nationalism. Whereas methodological nationalism assumes the centrality of the 
nation state as a focus for those concerned about ―society‖, a worldview shaped 
by cosmopolitanism does not automatically make this assumption, thus 
acknowledging the existence and significance of forms of society that are not 
coterminous with the nation state. Methodologically speaking, this is a 
significant departure within the social sciences, and although historically, 
cosmopolitanism has its lineage in the work of Kant, and his ideas regarding a 
federation of republican states, it is contemporary processes of globalization, and 
the challenges posed to assumptions regarding the sovereign state as a result, that 
have provoked renewed interest in cosmopolitanism. As such, in a similar way to 
the emergence of the cross-disciplinary study of globalization or global studies, 
cosmopolitan sentiments can be identified in disciplines such as sociology, law, 
political philosophy, politics, cultural studies, and social theory (Fine, 2003: 
452). Indeed, cosmopolitanism has been suggested by some as a way in which 
the entire social sciences could be reconceptualised (Beck and Sznaider, 2006; 
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Beck, 2004), in order to reflect what is argued to be the cosmopolitan condition 
of the twenty-first century.  
 
The question of which society cosmopolitanism is concerned with is necessarily 
ambiguous. Beck argues that cosmopolitanism ought to focus on every society, 
and none, as it were; he lists global cities, international organizations, bi-national 
families, multi-national co-operations as organizations in which cosmopolitan 
principles might be found (Ibid: 3). More generally, others see the entire world as 
the point of departure – as such, cosmopolitanism is a philosophy that 
encourages us to be ―citizens of the world‖ (Vertovec and Cohen: 10). Others 
focus on the importance of global political institutions (Held, 1995), some of 
which already exist, like the UN or EU; elsewhere cosmopolitanism is evidenced 
in an emergent global civil society, comprised of non-governmental 
organizations, and transnational, or global, social movements (see for example 
Kaldor 2001).  
 
Thus methodological cosmopolitanism offers two possibilities. First, it allows us 
to expand our scope of concern to nations, states, or indeed any form of 
territorial unit in particular. Consequently, methodological cosmopolitanism 
points us in the right direction in terms of finding an explanation for various 
political, economic and social processes that are supra national in origin. Second, 
in the context of the argument of this thesis, cosmopolitanism offers a theoretical 
framework, as well as a methodological strategy, for a ―way around‖ the 
problems posed by state-bound theories of distributive justice, as articulated in 
the previous chapter. The ambiguity of the societal focus of cosmopolitanism 
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helps in this regard; by adopting an outlook that is not fixed on the nation state as 
the site of justice, cosmopolitanism opens up the possibility of thinking about 
distributive justice in contemporary globalising circumstances.  
 
5.2.2 Moral Cosmopolitanism  
Cosmopolitanism, then, involves the adoption of a particular perspective that 
does not place high value on territorial boundaries. While this is an inherently 
methodological position, it is at the same time an intrinsically moral, or ethical, 
position; the popular term for this aspect of cosmopolitanism is moral 
cosmopolitanism (See Beitz 1994; Beitz 2005a; Pogge, 2008: 175). A 
cosmopolitan worldview articulates a particular view of humanity, which 
expresses notions of empathy and solidarity with, and equality of, human beings. 
Nussbaum describes a cosmopolitan as ―the person whose primary allegiance is 
to the community of human beings in the entire world‖ (Nussbaum, 1994). 
Pogge describes the central idea of moral cosmopolitanism as the idea that 
―every human being has a global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern‖ 
(Pogge, 2008: Ibid). This ethical position feeds into cosmopolitan prescriptions 
for both politics and morality: ―It is at once a theoretical approach towards 
understanding the world, a diagnosis of the age in which we live, and a 
normative stance in favour of universalistic standards of moral judgement, 
international law and political action‖ (Fine 2003: 452).  
 
Most importantly, these notions are delinked from their association with 
territorial boundaries. This is not to argue that such boundaries do not matter, but 
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to argue that the unquestioned assumption that boundaries determine the moral 
worth of human beings is something that needs to be demonstrated explicitly:  
 
Considerations of global justice have to start from the assumption that the 
moral relevance of the distinction between insiders and outsiders has to be 
demonstrated rather than presupposed. Put differently, the moral 
significance of boundaries cannot simply be postulated as a vital element of 
the political theory of the state (Linklater, 1999: 477).  
 
Such a moral outlook has clear political implications, and directly opposes 
communitarian conceptions of justice such as Miller‘s. However, it should be 
noted here that the adoption of a moral cosmopolitan worldview does not imply 
the necessity of statelessness per se in order to identify oneself as cosmopolitan. 
Indeed a cosmopolitan worldview can introduce a moral critique to inter-state 
relations, where before ―international moral skepticism‖ prevailed (Beitz, 1979: 
181). The introduction of moral cosmopolitanism implies that ―there are no 
reasons of basic principle for exempting the internal affairs of states from 
external moral scrutiny, and it is possible that members of some states might 
have obligations of justice with respect to persons elsewhere‖ (Ibid: 181-182). 
As such, cosmopolitanism does not necessarily mean that states have no meaning 
or value, but that morally speaking, state boundaries ought not to define the 
limits of moral concern. As was discussed in the previous chapter, certain ideas 
that have been used in defence of state based theories of distributive justice – 
such as citizenship, toleration, national self-determination and sovereignty – are 
all valuable, politically and morally speaking. However, what is problematic 
from this perspective is when such ideas become the limit of concern for a 
conception of global distributive justice.   
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Pogge makes a distinction within moral cosmopolitanism that is useful to 
addressing the role of global corporations. He differentiates between 
interactional moral cosmopolitanism and institutional moral cosmopolitanism 
(2008: 176-183); the former, he characterizes as an approach that assigns direct 
responsibility for the fulfillment of human rights to individual and collective 
agents; the latter assigns responsibility to institutional schemes. Pogge‘s focus is 
on the latter. While he sees both approaches as relevant and compatible, he 
focuses on the institutional one because it is as a result of the emergence of the 
global institutional order ―that all unfulfilled human rights have come to be, at 
least potentially, everyone‘s responsibility‖ (Ibid: 177). Thus an interactional 
moral cosmopolitanism that focuses our attention on individual or collective 
agency in respect of injustice focuses on the incorrect thing; instead what we 
ought to be concerned about is the (global) institutional order that enables 
(global) injustice. This seems a key distinction for the argument presented here. 
The focus of the thesis is on global corporations and the part they play in the 
current global institutional order. Thus this dimension of cosmopolitanism 
enables us to view corporations as actors that have a role to play in a 
cosmopolitan morality, rather than as somehow separate from this. Furthermore, 
the institutional focus offers a step towards a political cosmopolitan outlook – in 
other words a political reform agenda.  
 
The global institutional order within which global corporations operate is 
constituted and underpinned by a system of global capitalism. As such, an 
institutional moral cosmopolitanism points towards an inevitable critique of the 
system of capitalism. However, the relationship between cosmopolitanism and 
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capitalism seems ambiguous. For example, Fine sees cosmopolitanism as a way 
of thinking that declares itself in opposition to the economic imperatives of 
global capitalism (Fine 2003: 452, my emphasis), while Calhoun sees 
cosmopolitanism as largely the project of capitalism, flourishing in the top 
management of multinational corporations (Calhoun, 2002b: 109). However, in 
the sense that global corporations transcend the territorial boundaries of states in 
their activities, they are exemplary twenty-first century cosmopolitan actors; 
their impact is felt worldwide, and they are often ubiquitous.  
 
The incorporation of a moral cosmopolitan critique of global corporations infers 
that such corporations warrant ethical assessment on the basis that they are not 
merely commercial actors whose sole purpose is to make a profit. In this sense, 
the widespread adoption of CSR policies by corporations is about them 
validating their perceived identity as moral cosmopolitan actors. However, it is 
also an invitation to develop a moral critique of their activities in a way that 
would not be possible if they did not adopt such policies. As such, corporations‘ 
own self-identification as moral actors through the practice of CSR does not 
simply endorse them as ―moral‖; instead it opens up an area of critique that 
perhaps is not the intention of CSR. 
 
However, the move from viewing corporations as moral actors that have ethical 
duties, to viewing them as political actors that have duties of justice is a big one, 
and needs to be justified: moral and ethical commitments that span territorial 
boundaries are distinct from global distributive justice commitments. This could 
be expressed as the difference between humanitarianism and distributive justice; 
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as Tan articulates, the defence of a global ethic does not necessarily mean then a 
defence of global distributive justice, and vice versa (Tan, 2004: 23). Thus, the 
idea that corporations have duties of global distributive justice needs a political 
dimension – this is dealt with further on in the chapter. The next section, 
however, does some of the groundwork required for this, and articulates some of 
the ways in which cosmopolitan writers have expressed the political project of 
cosmopolitanism.  
 
5.2.3 Political Cosmopolitanism 
The political dimension of cosmopolitanism is the way in which the broad 
methodological and ethical or moral sentiments and worldview of 
cosmopolitanism, articulated in the above two sections, might be translated into 
the potential reform of political institutions. While the moral and methodological 
frameworks outlined above provide the basis for political cosmopolitanism, the 
former does not necessarily imply the latter – moral cosmopolitans may endorse 
a state-based system of governance (Hutchings, 1999: 153). Broadly speaking, 
political cosmopolitanism can be seen as a way of conceptualizing any political 
practice or institution that operates external to the nation-state, or as Hutchings 
describes it over, above or across the nation-state (Ibid: 154).  
 
There are differences, however, in particular strands of political 
cosmopolitanism, both in how they assess the need for the reform they advocate, 
and in the type of reform they endorse. Hutchings differentiates between liberal 
internationalism, cosmopolitan democracy and radical democratic pluralism, 
while McGrew uses radical communitarianism in place of radical democratic 
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pluralism (See Hutchings, 1999: 153-181; McGrew, 1997: 254). In terms of the 
position of this thesis, it is useful at this stage to point out that liberal 
internationalism is premised on the idea that liberal democratic states provide the 
basis for political reform; as such, this strand of political cosmopolitanism is less 
useful to the argument being made here.  
 
Where political cosmopolitanism does prove to be useful for this thesis is in 
widening the scope of the type of institutions that warrant reform, and the 
philosophical underpinnings of such reform. A prominent strand of political 
cosmopolitanism has emerged as a cosmopolitan democracy project, (Held, 
1995). The project moves the parameters of concern beyond merely a state and 
inter-state system, to include global, regional, and local political institutions.  
 
The case for cosmopolitan democracy is the case for the creation of new political 
institutions which would coexist with the system of states but which would 
override states in clearly defined spheres of activity where those activities have 
demonstrable transnational and international consequences, require regional or 
global initiatives in the interests of effectiveness and depend on such initiatives 
for democratic legitimacy (Held, 1998: 24).  
 
The foundational principle of Held‘s cosmopolitan democracy is that of 
democratic autonomy, in which the ―self‖ equates to ―a structural principle of 
self-determination where ‗the self‘ is part of the collectivity or the ‗majority‘ 
enabled or constrained by the rules and procedures of democratic life‖ (1995: 
156). The impetus for this model of cosmopolitan democracy is that the 
  
 
177 
―operation of states in an ever more complex international system both limits 
their autonomy (in some spheres radically) and impinges increasingly upon their 
sovereignty‖ (Ibid: 135). Importantly, what particularly characterizes these 
circumstances is the existence of multiple ―overlapping communities of fate‖ 
(Held, 2000: 400), that are not delineated by nation states, and that are shaped by 
a variety of different political, social, economic, technological processes, and are 
essentially global in character.  
 
As such, cosmopolitan democratic reform has included reform at the domestic, 
inter-state, or global level for some (Archibugi, 1998: 198-231), and reform at 
local, national, regional and global levels for others (Held, 1995: 235). 
Cosmopolitan democracy advocates reform of existing international institutions, 
such as the World Bank, the WTO or the UN, but also promotes the 
incorporation of cosmopolitan democratic principles within political institutions 
of governance at levels ―below‖ the global. Held uses the example of 
environmental problems as one way in which such issues necessitate attention at 
all levels of governance (Ibid: 236).  
 
Importantly, cosmopolitan democratic reform does not rule out the activities of 
private actors such as corporations. Indeed, the activities of corporations are seen 
by Held to be a way in which cosmopolitan democratic law might be entrenched 
into everyday life; he argues that the same principles of cosmopolitan democracy 
that ought to apply to institutions of governance ought also to apply to the 
internal activities of corporations (Ibid: 252). As such, company operations 
would have to be based around the principle of autonomy; Held envisages this 
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modus operandi as the provision of a framework in which the company does not 
violate the requirement to treat its employees as free and equal persons. In 
practice this would mean the pursuit of working conditions that:  
 
[…] sustained health and safety, learning and welfare, the ability to 
engage in discussion and criticism (including of the company and its 
staff), and the capacity to join independent associations. But the 
entrenchment of democratic public law within companies would mean, 
above all, a commitment surmounting the economic sources of 
nautonomy
5
 and, thereby, to a ‗basic income‘ and ‗access avenues‘ to 
productive and financial property (Ibid).   
 
Held advocates a reorganization of the free market around principles of 
democracy, requiring legislation that would tie processes of investment, trade 
and production to democratic processes. He sees this legislation as stemming 
from the global level, but being overseen and implemented at lower, more local 
levels of governance. Flouting cosmopolitan democratic law would bring the 
consequence of exclusion from the international trading system (Ibid: 255).  
 
In relation to CSR as presently construed, given the purported inclusion of many 
democratic values within CSR policies, such as accountability and 
representation, some notion of cosmopolitan democracy is at least implied. 
Presumably, also, the UN Global Compact, in the way that it institutionalises 
CSR at the global political level, is a step in a cosmopolitan democratic direction.  
However, as is discussed in more depth in chapters six and seven of the thesis, 
the constraints of CSR as currently construed mitigate against the realisation of 
many cosmopolitan democratic values, in a similar way to how they mitigate 
                                                        
5 Held defines nautonomy as ―the asymmetrical production and distribution of life chances which 
limit and erode the possibilities of political participation… Nautonomy refers to any socially 
conditioned pattern of asymmetrical life chance which places artificial limits on the creation of a 
common structure of political action. (Held, 1995: 171).  
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against the realisation of justice. CSR, in the sense of it being a form of self-
regulation and predominantly at the discretion of corporations, does not come 
close to meeting the ideal of cosmopolitan democracy. More fundamentally, 
CSR is not about the reorganisation of the free market in any sense. However, 
Held‘s account can be seen as an attempt to strike a balance between the ideal, 
and the feasible. In terms of its engagement with the internal operation of a 
corporation, the account addresses some concrete realities. On the other hand, the 
implication of cosmopolitan democratic law seems to be that Held‘s proposal is 
global regulation of corporations. This idea, while similar to the ideal-
aspirational theory outlined in chapter six, differs from the central focus of the 
thesis, which is how to develop a conception of global distributive justice that 
concedes to relevant and pressing facts about the world as we find it.  
 
As so far articulated, political cosmopolitanism advocates the reform of political 
institutions of governance, at many different levels, and the application of 
principles of democracy to economic actors, like global corporations. Another 
vital part of the spectrum of political activity important to cosmopolitanism is 
global civil society. In the sense the global civil society actors provide a 
mechanism for advocacy and reform of political institutions (at all levels of 
governance), global civil society organisations exist within a renewed 
cosmopolitan global public sphere.  
 
5.2.4 Legal Cosmopolitanism 
Legal cosmopolitanism is the dimension within cosmopolitan thought that 
advocates the expression of cosmopolitan ideals through a mechanism of 
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universal rights and duties. In the sense that this is also about institutional 
reform, legal cosmopolitanism is not wholly distinct from political 
cosmopolitanism.  
 
The idea of a cosmopolitan law finds its earliest incarnation in Kant‘s Perpetual 
Peace. Archibugi has identified different strands in the interpretation of Kant‘s 
ideas about cosmopolitan law: one view is that it is about creating an 
international society of individuals (although this is more aligned with 
cosmopolitanism per se, rather than cosmopolitan law). Another is that 
cosmopolitan law is about a set of rules designed to regulate a state‘s relations 
with citizens of another state (Archibugi, 1995: 430). Archibugi himself sees 
Kantian cosmopolitan law as the precursor to the type of international society 
aspired to by the UN and other international organizations, and as a forerunner to 
legal documents such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Ibid). Held 
echoes this interpretation of Kant, stating that Kant viewed cosmopolitan law as 
a necessary complement to existing domestic and international law (1995: 227). 
Key notions within Kantian cosmopolitan law include universal hospitality and a 
pacific union between states (Ibid: 228-229).  
 
Held grounds his articulation of the idea of cosmopolitan democracy within a 
cosmopolitan democratic law. This is a development of Kantian cosmopolitan 
law, but, importantly, framed by the principle of democratic autonomy; this 
―entails a duty to work towards the establishment of an international community 
of democratic states and societies committed to upholding democratic public law 
both within and across their own boundaries: a cosmopolitan democratic 
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community‖ (Ibid: 229).  Yet this is a state-based articulation of cosmopolitan 
law, and presumably a different orientation is required in terms of corporations.  
 
5.2.5 Summary 
This section has detailed four different strands of thought that emerge from 
paradigms of cosmopolitan thought – methodological, moral, political and legal. 
In terms of methodology, cosmopolitanism requires the abandonment of 
methodological nationalism, or, the rejection of frameworks of thought that 
prioritise the nation-state as the most important form of society. While this could 
include extreme ideas that disregard the significance of the nation-state entirely, 
it does not necessarily have to be so. A cosmopolitan methodology could also 
entail the recognition of the importance of the nation-state, in tandem with other 
forms of society; what is important is that the methodological point of departure, 
as it were, is not solely defined by national boundaries.  
 
Following on from this, the moral component of cosmopolitanism expresses an 
ethical sentiment that views the status of individuals as being equal across 
territorial boundaries. As such, the moral worth of a human being ought not be 
defined by the place in which they are born. This has particular resonance in 
relation to distributive justice; in this regard, it means that the assumption that 
the terms of distributive justice are limited to, and defined by, a domestic 
government and its citizens is morally unacceptable on the basis that individuals 
are viewed to be the focus of moral concern. However, as mentioned above, a 
cosmopolitan moral critique could equally apply to a critique of inter-state 
relations – on its own, it is not inherently a globalist position. To bridge the gap 
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between adopting a moral critique of corporations, and making the argument that 
they are political institutional actors that have distributive justice obligations, a 
political cosmopolitan perspective becomes important.  
 
Political cosmopolitanism expresses an agenda of political reform of global 
governance institutions. While it is already manifest in existing institutions of 
global governance (for instance, the EU, the UN are viewed by some to be 
cosmopolitan political institutions), political cosmopolitanism also incorporates a 
normative agenda, detailing the sort of global political institutions that ought to 
be aspired to in the context of globalization.  In this regard, global corporations 
are seen to be powerful actors within a system of global capitalism and are 
increasingly involved in government-like functions. As such, given that a 
cosmopolitan political agenda aims to respond to the challenges of contemporary 
globalization, the necessity for the involvement of corporations within 
institutional reform is clear. Legal cosmopolitanism is the manner in which a 
cosmopolitan reform agenda might be expressed through law.  
 
Although four different strands have been identified, they ought not be viewed as 
entirely separate ideas. All of them overlap and intertwine; they have been 
separated here for purposes of clarity. In relation to CSR and distributive justice, 
it is the political dimension of cosmopolitanism that is most relevant, in the sense 
that political cosmopolitanism has been developed as something of a reform 
agenda for both global and domestic political institutions. As is articulated 
further on, it is this institutional dimension that is important in terms of global 
distributive justice. While CSR is perhaps grounded in a form of moral 
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cosmopolitan sentiment, it is argued in this thesis that global corporations and 
CSR represent a form of political institution to which principles of global 
distributive justice apply. As such, the thesis presents global distributive justice 
as a political cosmopolitan agenda of institutional reform.   
 
5.3 Existing Conceptions of Cosmopolitan Global Distributive Justice: 
Justifications and Principles  
 
Having outlined in the previous section the broad strands of thought that can 
loosely be categorized as cosmopolitanism, this section of the chapter turns to the 
matter of global distributive justice within a global sphere of governance. As 
mentioned above, most cosmopolitan conceptions of distributive justice are 
addressed at institutions of global public governance. The purpose of this section 
is to first discuss the justifications that have been given by various authors as to 
why distributive justice ought to be thought of in a global, rather than domestic, 
sense. Second, the aim is to outline the principles of global distributive justice 
they advocate.  The overarching critique here is that little if any attention has 
been paid to the question of how corporations fit into cosmopolitan conceptions 
of global distributive justice.  
 
The accounts of cosmopolitan distributive justice that have received most 
attention are those that have sought to re-articulate Rawls in a way that avoids 
the state-centrism that dominated The Law of Peoples (Beitz, 1979 and 1999; 
Buchanan, 2000; Caney 2005b; Pogge, 2002 and 2008; Tan, 2004). Such 
contributions to the literature on distributive justice are to be noted for the 
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manner in which they seek to cope with some of the complexity that processes of 
globalization present for thought about distributive justice, and for attempting to 
overcome the restrictions of Rawls‘s later work. All accounts acknowledge the 
presence of some form of global basic structure (although this is interpreted and 
articulated in different ways) that is important from the point of view of 
principles of distributive justice, and in some cases (Beitz) necessitates the 
extension of Rawls‘s difference principle to the world as a whole. In other cases 
(Pogge; Caney) new principles are developed which are, in the case of the 
former, based on negative duties not to harm that apply to individuals; and, in the 
case of the latter, based on a premise of global egalitarianism. This thesis does 
not seek to rule out any one of these attempts at resolving the difficulties of 
global poverty and inequality; instead the goal is to expose a gap within this 
literature relating to the significance of global corporations in such difficulties, 
and to point to how existing literature may contribute to filling this gap. 
 
5.3.1 Justifications 
This subsection summarises the various different reasons and justifications 
cosmopolitan writers have provided for thinking about justice in a global, as 
opposed to a domestic sense.  
 
Many of these ideas take Rawls as their starting point, and have discussed and 
elaborated on the idea of a global basic structure, often characterized by levels of 
global interdependence that constitutes a scheme of social cooperation, such that 
principles of distributive justice are applicable to such a structure. The earliest 
articulation of this was Beitz‘s work (1979, revised in 1999), which perceived 
contemporary circumstances of international interdependence as such a scheme; 
this, he argued ―lends support to a principle of global distributive justice similar 
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to that which applies within domestic society (Beitz, 1999: 144). This conception 
of justice was disputed by other Rawlsians, on the basis that it incorrectly makes 
justice dependent on pre-existing social schemes of co-operation (Barry, 1982, 
cited in Tan, 2004: 58; Caney, 2005a: 392), or that it incorrectly inverts the 
relationship between justice and institutions (Tan, 2004: 34). Beitz readdressed 
this criticism in later work and more recently has said that what matters for 
distributive justice is circumstances that ―have the capacity to influence 
fundamentally the courses of their lives‖ (1999: 203), regardless of whether they 
are domestic or global.  
 
The idea of the global basic structure has been articulated elsewhere. Buchanan 
has argued that the basic structure is constituted variously by international trade 
agreements, international financial regimes, and a global system of private 
property (Buchanan, 2000: 706). Some of its basic operating assumptions, such 
as state sovereignty, resource ownership, free trade, etc, are contributory factors 
in the perpetuation of structures of poverty and inequality (Tan, 2004: 25), and 
persisting in utilizing a ―morality of states‖ approach is focusing on the wrong 
thing if what we are in fact concerned with is individuals‘ lives (Ibid: 35-39). On 
this basis, it is ―unjustifiable‖ to ignore the existence of this basic structure, as it 
has clear distributional effects (Buchanan, 2000: 706; Beitz, 2005b: 420). Fraser 
also invokes the notion of a basic structure of sorts (albeit with different 
language) when she argues for the necessity of ―reframing‖ the question of 
justice to take account of the move beyond a Keynesian/Westphalian framework 
of analysis (2005 and 2008). She argues that the continuation of the use of such a 
framework of analysis perpetuates injustice, by shielding powerful actors, such 
as transnational private powers, from the scope of justice, on the basis of an 
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anachronistic belief that it is nation-states that we ought to be primarily 
concerned with (2005: 78).  
 
Thus the idea of the global basic structure requires the abandonment of ways of 
thinking that assume the existence of an interstate system, and a focus on some 
form of global institutional structure. In terms of previous section, this is both a 
shift in methodological thinking and moral outlook away from the idea that the 
domestic state is the sole institution by which an individual‘s life chances can be 
determined; it also necessitates the development of a political agenda for reform 
of the global basic structure. There are both empirical and normative reasons for 
doing this. Empirically, many authors invoke the global system of finance, trade 
and investment, as well as global corporate power. On the basis of these 
empirical facts about the global basic structure, and the knowledge that it has 
distributional effects on people‘s lives, it is argued by authors such as Beitz that 
individuals within a global original position would choose global distributive 
principles, rather than domestic ones. The normative idea expressed within this is 
that what matters is the quality and type of life an individual experiences and that 
if the distributional effects of the global basic structure are such that their life is 
predominantly shaped by global factors, then the existence of territorial 
boundaries should not determine the principles of distributive justice that govern 
their lives. However, what is missing in existing accounts is the role that global 
corporations play in this global basic structure.  
 
The idea that there exists a global basic structure, or ―global institutional order‖ 
that triggers requirements of global justice is also part of Pogge‘s argument for 
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global redistribution (Pogge, 2002). The moral duty that triggers a requirement 
of global distributive justice is, however, the negative duty that ―we‖ (meaning 
those who live in developed countries) must not cause harm. Pogge cites three 
aspects of the global institutional order that are responsible for sustaining global 
poverty and inequality: legal-political features, such as the International 
Resources Privilege and the International Borrowing Privilege (2001a: 19-21 and 
2002: 112-116), which allow corrupt governments to legitimately borrow money, 
and use the resources of a country for corrupt purposes; a history of violent 
colonialism, which has created structures of inequality between developed and 
developing countries (2002: 203); and the fact of uncompensated exclusion of 
many developing countries from the use of much of the world‘s natural resources 
(Ibid: 202).  
 
What ties these three factors together, and what consolidates his claim regarding 
global justice is that they all violate a negative duty of justice - the duty not to 
inflict harm on others. Pogge develops an institutional understanding of human 
rights and justice, under which all have a duty to work for an institutional order 
and public culture that ensure that all members of society have secure access to 
the objects of their human rights (Ibid: 64-67). The appeal to negative duties is 
normally associated with libertarianism - the idea that we are only responsible 
for the harms for which we are causally responsible. On the basis of the above 
three factors, Pogge‘s claim is that the current global institutional order is such 
that there is a direct line of causality between the situation of those who live in 
severe poverty and inequality and that of those who live in relative affluence. He 
formulates his proposal on the basis of the third factor listed above, the fact of 
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uncompensated exclusion of some people from the use of natural resources, 
because it ―narrows the field by suggesting a more specific idea: those who make 
more extensive use of [...] resources should compensate those who use very 
little.‖ (Ibid: 203-4). Modesty, in terms of a proposed conception of global 
justice, is important according to Pogge, in order to build consensus between 
otherwise opposed views about how to approach global justice.   
 
Caney makes his argument from a somewhat different premise. He grounds his 
cosmopolitan principle of global equality of opportunity (Caney, 2005b) by 
making the argument that existing theories of domestic justice, by their own 
reasoning, actually lead to the global application of their principles: ―the standard 
justifications of principles of distributive justice entail that there are 
cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice‖ (the ―scope 2 claim‖; 2005b: 
107). Tan (2004) makes a similar claim. This point is also made by Buchanan 
(2000). Caney contends that his account is not dependent on there being 
extensive economic globalization, like Pogge‘s; rather it argues that 
cosmopolitan principles of justice are a natural extension of domestic liberal 
theories of distributive justice (2005b: 264). In the same way that we would 
object to better opportunities being afforded to a person within a society on the 
basis of their class or social status, we should also object to a situation in which a 
person is penalised because of the country or community that they are from 
(Caney, 2001a: 115).  
 
O‘Neill and Nussbaum use different language in their justification for advocating 
principles of global distributive justice; they both question the usefulness of 
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discussing ―rights‖, and prefer to focus instead on which agents and institutions 
possess which duties or obligations (O‘Neill, 2000 and 2001; Nussbaum, 2003). 
According to both, the complexity of modern circumstances justifies not just the 
development of principles of global justice, but also a move away from purely 
contractarian, rights-focused approaches, and a move towards thinking about 
which institutions and agents possess what duties in order to fulfill such 
principles (O‘Neill, 2001: 185); Nussbaum, 2003: 475). What is important here 
for the argument of this thesis is that both Nussbaum and O‘Neill accept the 
possibility that non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, wield 
significant degrees of power over people‘s lives, such that they ought to be 
subject to principles of global justice. As O‘Neill states, the motivations of 
corporations being involved in matters of ethical concern is not important; what 
matters is the capacity they have to influence the type and quality of life people 
experience (2001: 193-4). 
 
In summary, the justifications for global justice provided by the above 
conceptions have included: the existence of a global basic structure, as an aspect 
of contemporary processes of globalization; the inadequacy of the state as the 
primary unit of moral concern as a result of this; the concomitant assumption of 
the notion of rights being at the heart of global justice; and the inevitable 
development of globalised principles as a result of domestic principles of 
distributive justice. The purpose of this discussion is to strengthen the case for 
the motivation behind the argument of the thesis: that profound effects on 
people‘s life chances suffice to require the application of principles of 
distributive justice. While all justifications provide valid reasons to think in 
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terms of global justice, this thesis agrees that it is the existence of a global basic 
structure that provides the most compelling reasons to think about a theory of 
global distributive justice. 
  
The idea of a global basic structure is compelling for both normative and 
empirical reasons, as mentioned above. What the global basic structure offers the 
argument of the thesis is the idea that there is an unavoidable institutional 
structure that profoundly affects people‘s lives in a way that is significant for a 
conception of distributive justice. As is discussed further on in the chapter, there 
is a strong case that can be made from important arguments within political 
theory for the unavoidability of the basic structure in determining people‘s life 
chances, but also that global corporations ought to be included in this basic 
structure. While some of the conceptions discussed here include corporations, the 
specific activities of global corporations are not part of the general justifications 
provided. Thus the thesis attempts to synthesise ideas from within political 
theory regarding the profound effect of the basic structure with arguments 
regarding global corporations and CSR.  
 
The principles proposed by the various cosmopolitans detailed above differ 
significantly. Beitz advocates a simple extension of the Rawlsian principles of 
distributive justice to the world as - due to the existence of a global basic 
structure - this is what parties in the original position would rationally choose. 
Pogge has developed various different proposals, the most comprehensive of 
which are a re-structuring of sovereignty along a vertical dispersion and a global 
tax on natural resources. In these ideas, he expresses a notion of political power 
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that is tightly linked with states, and state-based authority. Caney presents a 
principle of global egalitarianism.  
 
5.3.2 Extended Rawlsian Principles  
Beitz‘s proposal involves an extension of a Rawlsian difference principle to the 
global basic structure. It was noted above that, according to Beitz, it is the 
existence of this global basic structure that is responsible for the distribution of 
benefits and burdens; the role of distributive justice then is to decide the fairest 
way in which to do this (Beitz, 1999: 152). Thus, ―principles of distributive 
justice must apply to the world as a whole and, derivatively, to nation states. The 
appropriate global principle is Rawls‘s difference principle, perhaps modified by 
some provision for intra-national redistribution in relatively wealthy states once a 
threshold level of international redistributive obligations has been met‖ (Ibid: 
170). Pogge also made a similar proposal, in his earlier work, in which he argued 
that principles of justice apply between individuals across societies (Pogge 
1989). Similar attempts have also been made by Kuper (2000), and Buchanan 
(2000).  
 
The subjects of this global extension of the difference principle are primarily 
individuals; it is the position of the globally least advantaged person (or groups 
of persons) that is to be maximised, and as Beitz points out, there is no reason to 
assume that the membership of this group will be coextensive with that of a state 
(Beitz, 1999: 153). However, this does not rule out the participation of states 
within a global scheme of distributive justice. Indeed, Beitz argues that states 
may be more ―appropriately situated‖ than individuals to carry out the 
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requirements of justice. What makes this sort of scheme different is that ―the 
international obligations of states are in some sense derivative of the more basic 
responsibilities that persons acquire as a result of the (global) relations in which 
they stand‖ (Ibid).  
 
The idea that the obligations of states would be derivative of the needs of 
individuals is discussed by Buchanan, who argues that ‗peoples‘ (used 
interchangeably with states) would, if they knew of the existence of a global 
basic structure, choose principles for it, rather than just for their own societies 
(Buchanan, 2000: 708-709). As such, the existence of states is viewed as a 
practical element of the construction of principles of global justice, rather than, 
qua Rawls, the defining unit of organisation on which such principles would be 
based.  
 
5.3.3 The Global Resources Dividend 
Pogge‘s ideas about global justice come from similar sentiments (i.e. the idea of 
a global basic structure and the need for a cosmopolitan inspired conception of 
global justice), and are based on the contention that there is global institutional 
order, part of which is the global economic order, that is responsible for much 
injustice. However, what he proposes is a somewhat different solution to global 
distributive justice, in the sense that he develops a concrete policy proposal. The 
thought behind this is that any proposed solution to world poverty ought to be 
easily achievable, and that modesty is important to build support (2008: 211). He 
proposes two central ideas, the first being a country-based solution based on 
natural resources, and the second being based on the intellectual property rights 
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and pharmaceutical companies. The first, the Global Resources Dividend (GRD), 
is a general proposal, while the second is a more specific policy proposal related 
to one particular industry.  
 
The GRD proposes a tax on any natural resources that are exploited, the revenue 
from which will be ring-fenced to ensure all human beings can meet their needs 
with dignity (Ibid: 210-211). This is based on the idea that governments should 
have control of the natural resources in their territory (Ibid: 211), and that those 
who make extensive use of natural resources ought to compensate those who use 
very little. Pogge develops this proposal with modesty and likelihood of success 
in mind – he views it as a policy that is easy to implement.  
 
However, it would seem that this type of proposal and Pogge‘s own assessment 
of the sovereign states system are in some ways speaking past each other. On the 
one hand, Pogge is adamant that a conventional system of state sovereignty 
cannot deal with global difficulties (Ibid: 201), and proposes the idea of a 
vertical dispersal of sovereignty to deal with this (Ibid: 174-201). The GRD is a 
country (read state, in this instance) based solution, and the idea regarding the 
vertical dispersal of sovereignty away from states still perceives the most 
important locus of political power as being tightly linked to territory: 
Dispersing political authority over nested territorial units would decrease 
the intensity of the struggle for power and wealth within and among 
states, thereby reducing the incidence of war, poverty and oppression. In 
such a multilayered institutional order, borders could be redrawn more 
easily to accord with the aspirations of peoples and communities. (Ibid: 
174-175).  
 
So on the one hand what is being proposed is a redrawing of sovereign 
boundaries so that the global institutional order can deal with difficulties that are 
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globally pervasive and that do not begin and end with territorial boundaries; on 
the other, the main solution for the problem of global poverty relies on 
territorially bounded sovereign governments for its implementation and 
oversight. The GRD is cosmopolitan in outlook yet it is also a predominantly 
state-based solution to a global problem and therein lies the central difficulty.  
 
Presumably the central rationale behind the proposal is to do with being able to 
garner support for such a proposal – i.e. that a proposal to eradicate global 
poverty should not be so difficult to implement that it can be immediately 
rejected. This is valid, and in many ways is a similar motivation to that which 
inspires the ideas discussed under concessive theory in the next chapter. It is 
important for justice to be realisable. However, Pogge‘s ideas display a degree of 
contradiction that is problematic. While seeking to reshape traditional 
sovereignty on the one hand, he reinforces it on the other.  
 
A further rationale for the GRD is the contention that in the context of a free and 
open global market system, this tax on the use of natural resources would 
eradicate poverty (Ibid: 211). Thus the GRD is based on the contention that a 
state-based system of taxation on natural resources will alleviate global poverty 
and inequality under (global) free market conditions. As such, the inference is 
that justice is possible if the market is open and fair, and a small GRD exists to 
balance out the ―ordinary centrifugal tendencies‖ of the market.  
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This leads to the second proposal that Pogge has developed which attempts to 
open up access to essential medicines for people who cannot afford them. The 
central difficulty that Pogge has with the global intellectual property regime that 
regulates pharmaceutical companies is that it negatively impacts upon the life 
chances of the world‘s poorest people. The proposal is too lengthy to detail fully 
here (Ibid: 222-261), but in summary it involves the reform of the global 
intellectual property rights of essential medicines so that the results of successful 
pharmaceutical innovation are provided globally as a public good. 
 
The intricacies of the debate about the global intellectual property regime and 
Pogge‘s proposal are outside the scope of the thesis. However, the patents 
proposal is relevant to the topic of the thesis in that it is an example of a 
concessive approach to the subject matter of global justice, in the form of a 
concrete policy proposal. Like the GRD outlined above, part of Pogge‘s central 
concern is to develop ideas that are likely to be adopted; thus he makes the case 
that this proposal would be financially rewarding to such companies. By 
conceding to certain facts, Pogge focuses on the likelihood of success of the 
programme, and thus appeals to the profit incentive.  
On the one hand it can be argued that Pogge does not concede enough. 
Pharmaceutical companies have prominent and large CSR programmes in which 
they deal with the question of access to essential medicines. However it is rare to 
see the question of intellectual property rights in relation to essential medicines 
discussed by such corporations in their CSR programmes. In many instances, 
global pharmaceutical companies‘ response to the question of access to such 
medicines is a discretionary act of charity (such as giving away a certain amount 
  
 
196 
of free drugs), through a process of CSR. It might perhaps be more fruitful to 
focus on the manner in which corporations deal with such questions – i.e. CSR 
processes, rather than through multilateral rules.  
 
On the other hand, it can also be argued that this proposal concedes too much. If 
the central concern of the proposal is to open up access to essential medicines for 
poor people, then it seems that the realities of the market are given priority over 
the aspiration to justice. The problem with this is that if justice is made 
contingent on the free operation of market forces, presumably there will be 
instances when the latter impedes on the former. For instance, it has been argued 
by some that Pogge‘s proposal will not guarantee profit-making on the part of 
companies (Sonderholm, 2009). As well as this, the reliance of this proposal on 
the enforcement of just rules is problematic from the perspective articulated in 
the thesis. As will be argued later on, justice is always about ethos, not just 
obeying just rules.  
 
Clearly, Pogge‘s aim is to strike a balance between what is feasible and what is 
desirable – this is a central concern of the next chapter of the thesis. The 
difficulty with the proposal he has laid out is that its feasibility is contingent on 
corporations making a profit, which in itself is contingent on market forces 
operating normally under just rules. In terms of justice, it is argued in the thesis 
that the latter scenario – market forces operating normally under just rules – that 
it may not be sufficient to guarantee justice. Justice may also require making just 
choices within those rules. In a concessive sense, additionally, Pogge‘s proposal 
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presents a dilemma because the account does not specifically engage with CSR, 
which is, in fact, the manner in which large pharmaceutical corporations address 
the question of TRIPS and essential medecines.  
 
5.3.4 Global Egalitarianism 
Caney discusses two different ways of approaching the question of global justice. 
First, he analyses what he calls the minimalist case: a series of policy measures, 
which he says could play a part in achieving global justice. These measures 
include debt cancellation, forms of global taxation (e.g. Pogge‘s GRD, the Tobin 
Tax), abolition of barriers to trade, fair trade/labour regulation, decreasing carbon 
emissions, aid, migration, civil and political rights, peace, and reform of 
international borrowing rights (Caney, 2005b: 122-134). No single one of these 
measures will work on its own, and many are interdependent, and some have 
priority over others (Ibid: 134).  
 
 
However, his extensively developed proposal involves four cosmopolitan 
principles of global justice: persons have a human right to subsistence; persons 
of different nations should enjoy equal opportunities: no one should face worse 
opportunities because of their nationality; everyone, without any discrimination, 
has the right to equal pay for equal work (Article 23 (2) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights) – Caney replaces ―equal pay‖ with ―equal 
remuneration‖; benefiting people matters more the worse off these people are 
(cited from Parfit 1998: 12; 2005b: 123) 
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What such principles have in their favour, according to Caney, is that they avoid 
being overly onerous, so they are plausible, without avoiding the charge that they 
are too minimalist, like some subsistence-based arguments. Equally, these 
principles appeal to a broad church of theoretical perspectives, and do not rely on 
any one particular theory to back them up. Finally, if Caney‘s ―scope 2 claim‖ is 
true, then there is no option but to accept these principles; as such, if we accept 
principles of distributive justice at the domestic level, and we accept that 
domestic theories of distributive justice lead inevitably to cosmopolitan ones, 
then these principles are an unavoidable consequence  (Ibid: 123-124).  
 
The background to a situation in which such principles would be upheld is a 
multi-level system of governance in which supra-state authorities monitor the 
conduct of states and powerful social and economic institutions. In this regard, 
Caney subscribes to the views of Held and Linklater that globalization 
necessitates global (cosmopolitan) democratic institutions. He states, ―the 
rationale for the democratic right to exercise control over the institutions and 
processes that affect persons‘ ability to exercise their rights entails (given 
globalization) that there should be a global democratic political framework‖ 
(2005b: 159). It is this rights-based approach that informs Caney‘s suggestions 
for the types of global political institutions that need to exist so as cosmopolitan 
principles of distributive justice can be protected at the global level. He lists: a 
new economic institution with an overview for all economic matters that can 
coordinate the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank in the pursuit of global norms 
of distributive justice; the creation of a permanent UN volunteer force; 
strengthening the role of the International Court of justice; and highlights that 
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there is a compelling case for a cosmopolitan court for transnational corporate 
wrongdoing (Ibid: 162). This approach involves an adaptation of sovereign 
statehood, in which the relevant political units lack certain features of more 
traditional conceptions of sovereignty, such as comprehensiveness and 
supremacy (Ibid: 163-164).  
 
Caney provides a comprehensive list of areas for reform in order to fulfill his 
principles of global justice. However, the role private actors like corporations 
play is not addressed explicitly. A high bar of global egalitarianism is set as the 
ideal principle of global justice, yet without incorporating global corporations 
within his list of institutions that ought to be reformed, it is difficult to see how 
such a principle would work. The stipulation of ―equal remuneration for equal 
work‖ goes some way towards this, but unless a systematic analysis of where 
corporations fit into the picture of global justice is provided, we don‘t know how 
this could be guaranteed.  
 
This subsection has outlined three well-known conceptions of global justice – the 
extension of Rawlsian principles to a global level; a Global Resources Dividend; 
and principles of global egalitarianism. In none of these conceptions, is it made 
clear how or where global corporations might become part of the wider picture, 
and as such, we do not have a comprehensive analysis of the role corporations 
might play in global distributive justice. Although all the above conceptions are 
set out as cosmopolitan conceptions, they are all in some way based on the 
assumption of state-based authority, either through international organisations or 
through the activities of states at the international level. As mentioned earlier, it 
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is not the argument of the thesis that this is in itself incorrect, but that it is instead 
an incomplete notion of global distributive justice. The next section of the 
chapter discusses how corporations may be integrated into a more complete 
conception.  
 
5.4 Profound Effects on People’s Life Chances and the Publicity 
Requirement: the Case for the Application of Principles of Global 
Distributive Justice to Corporations 
 
The previous section raises the question of the institutional structure that is of 
concern to a theory of justice,i.e. the site of justice. Within liberal political 
theory, how can a justification be made for the inclusion of global corporations 
within a theory of justice?  It is the argument of the thesis that principles of 
global distributive justice that are limited to such state-based institutions are 
incomplete to the extent that they do not pay due regard to the impact that global 
corporations have on people‘s lives. This debate has primarily been discussed in 
relation to a domestic society and predominantly in an abstract sense; as such, 
the argument being made here is extrapolated from such circumstances, and the 
thesis focuses on the central ideas of this debate, rather than the intricate details. 
However, the debate that has emerged over the type of institutions that are 
included within the purview of justice is useful to the thesis argument in the 
sense that it differentiates between legally coercive and legally noncoercive 
institutions and the role they play in distributive justice. What is at issue here is 
whether justice requires compliance with (just) rules, or whether justice requires 
more than that, in the form of an egalitarian ethos within a society.  
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The next subsection discusses the Rawlsian perspective on the institutional 
make-up of the basic structure, and Cohen‘s critique of it as being either 
arbitrarily limited to the coercive outline of society, or as including ―non-public‖ 
institutions such as the family or the market economy. Cohen‘s central 
contention is that justice should be concerned with those institutions that display 
a profound effect on people‘s life chances; the thesis is in agreement with this. 
The final subsection discusses Williams‘s contribution to this debate, which 
argues that Cohen‘s wide construal of the basic structure is too demanding a 
conception of justice. Instead, Williams‘s contention is that justice, while 
applicable to the institutions that have this profound effect, also requires that 
there is an element of publicity to the sets of rules and institutions it applies to. 
The thesis contends that global corporations fulfill both these criteria.  
 
5.4.1 The Institutional Make–Up of the Basic Structure 
Recall that the basic structure is, for Rawls, the primary subject of justice, and is 
made up of the background institutions of a society, to which principles of 
justice apply. There are three specific instances within Rawls‘s writing where the 
make up of the basic structure is addressed. More formally, he describes it as: 
 
[…] the way in which the major social institutions fit together into one 
system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the 
division of advantages that arise through social cooperation. Thus the 
political constitution, the legally recognized forms of property, and the 
organization of the economy and the nature of the family all  belong to the 
basic structure. (Rawls, 2005: 258) 
 
Elsewhere, he states that the major institutions of the basic structure 
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[…] define men‘s rights and duties, what they can expect to be and how 
well they can hope to do. The basic structure is the primary subject of 
justice because its effects are so profound and present from the start. The 
intuitive notion here is that this structure contains various social positions 
and that men born into different positions have different expectations of 
life determined, in part, by the political system as well as by economic and 
social circumstances. In this way the institutions of society favor certain 
starting positions over others, these are especially deep inequalities… It is 
these inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic structure of any 
society, to which the principles of social justice must in the first instance 
apply…The justice of a social scheme depends essentially on how 
fundamental rights and duties are assigned and on the economic 
opportunities and social conditions in the various sectors of society (Rawls, 
1999: 6-7; emphasis added). 
 
Thus the basic structure consists of the legally coercive institutions of society – 
property ownership, the political constitution, for instance. Legally noncoercive 
institutions, such as the family, are also mentioned, and the stipulation that the 
basic structure includes institutions whose effects are ―profound and present 
from the start‖ would seem to imply that principles of distributive justice apply 
to such institutions.  
 
The issue of the inclusion, or not, of the institution of the family within the basic 
structure has been the basis of feminist critique of Rawls (see for example Okin 
1989 and 1994). The content of this critique is not directly relevant to the 
argument being made here; however, its existence is important in the way that it 
highlights the differentiation that has been made between legally coercive and 
legally noncoercive institutions in relation to distributive justice.
6
 While Rawls‘s 
                                                        
6 The term ―legally noncoercive‖ requires explication. What is meant here are institutions that 
exert a coercive force on the shape and type of life that people experience, but that do not exert 
that coercion through legal means, but rather through informal social pressure. This interpretation 
derives from Cohen‘s position regarding the basic structure. Regarding this, he uses the family as 
an example, stating ―Family structure is fateful for the benefits and burdens that redound to 
different people, and, in particular to people of different sexes, where ―family structure‖ includes 
the socially constructed expectations which lie on husband and wife… Yet such expectations 
need not be supported by the law for them to possess informal coercive force… Here, then, is a 
circumstance, outside the basic structure, as that would be coercively defined, which profoundly 
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view on this matter seems to be an unresolved ambiguity in the literature 
(Nussbaum, 2003: 500; Cohen, 2002: 137), perhaps his final statement on this 
matter, given in ―The Idea of Public Reason Revisited‖ (2001b: 156-164), can be 
taken to be conclusive: 
  
[…] the primary subject of political justice is the basic structure of society 
understood as the arrangement of society‘s main institutions into a unified 
system of social co-operation over time. The principles of political justice 
are to apply directly to this structure, but are not to apply directly to the 
internal life of the many associations within it, the family among them… 
[the principles] do impose essential constraints on the family as an 
institution and guarantee the basic rights and liberties, and the freedom and 
opportunities, of all its members. This they do, as I have said, by specifying 
the basic rights of equal citizens who are the members of families. The 
family as part of the basic structure cannot violate these freedoms (Ibid: 
158-159). 
 
Thus, in this statement, he makes clear that while institutions such as the family 
have obvious importance in terms of the type of life a person experiences, there 
is a limit to which principles of justice can interfere with the internal operation of 
legally noncoercive institutions. This limit is indicated by the specification of 
basic rights and liberties, as guaranteed by legally coercive institutions. As such, 
principles of justice can shape institutions such as the family, but only insofar as 
those who are affected by such institutions are protected by their rights as 
citizens. The question of how this statement, and others related to the family, 
have been interpreted and discussed by Rawlsian critics is not for further 
discussion here. The more general question of how the profound effects of 
legally noncoercive (yet political) institutions ought to be dealt with in relation to 
                                                                                                                                                     
affects people‘s life chances, through the choices people make in response to the stated 
expectations, which are, in turn, sustained by those choices‖ (2002: 139).  
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distributive justice and corporations forms, however, a central part of the 
argument of the thesis.  
 
Ultimately, Rawls‘s position is that justice applies to a coercively defined basic 
structure, in which people are free to make their own choices, within just rules. 
This position requires brief explanation (for a more thorough discussion, see 
Cohen 1991 and Rawls 1999).  This coercive definition of the basic structure is 
to do with the creation of incentives for society‘s ―talented people‖. Rawls‘s 
difference principle requires the acceptance of some inequalities so that those 
talented people will have incentives to take socially beneficial jobs or to work 
harder, which will be advantageous for society‘s least well-off. Thus Rawls‘s 
belief, which is manifested in the difference principle, is that a just society is one 
in which any inequalities are of the greatest benefit to the least advantaged in that 
society. In short form, the idea is that it is just for talented people to be rewarded 
disproportionately to people who are less talented, because this discrepancy in 
reward ultimately will pay off for the latter group of less talented people, in the 
form of taxation paid by the more talented people.  
 
There are two bases for Rawls‘s view. One is that people ought to be free to 
make their own choices with regard to how hard they work and how productive 
they are; the same idea motivates the issue of the family and the basic structure. 
The second one, more relevant to this argument, is to do with background justice. 
In an ideally just Rawlsian society, the inequalities that are inevitable in a society 
are corrected by the basic structure of society: 
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[…] we start with the basic structure and try to see how this structure itself 
should make the adjustments necessary to preserve background justice. 
What we look for, in effect, is an institutional division of labour between 
the basic structure and the rules applying to individuals and associations 
and to be followed by them in particular transactions. If this division of 
labour can be established, individuals and associations are left free to 
advance their ends more effectively within the framework of the basic 
structure, secure in the knowledge that elsewhere in the social system the 
necessary conditions to preserve background justice are being made 
(Rawls, 2005: 268-269).  
 
Thus, on Rawls‘s coercive definition, justice is possible when the basic structure, 
governed by Rawls‘s two principles of justice, is the broad coercive outline of 
society, and not comprised of individual‘s choices or the activities of private 
associations.  
 
5.4.2 The Basic Structure and a Just Ethos 
This idea, however, is not without disagreement. Most notably, Cohen contests 
the make up of the basic structure and his arguments form a point of departure 
for the thesis, in terms of making the argument that justice applies to global 
corporations (see Cohen 1997, 2002 and 2008). On his view, Rawls‘s position is 
undermined by his coercive definition of the basic structure. In this regard, 
Cohen presents Rawls‘s dilemma thus: 
 
[…] he must either admit application of the principles of justice to (legally 
optional) social practices, and, indeed, to patterns of personal choice that 
are not legally prescribed, both because they are the substance of those 
practices, and because they are similarly profound in effect, in which case 
the restriction of justice to structure, in any sense, collapses; or, if he 
restricts his concern to the coercive structure only, then he saddles himself 
with a purely arbitrary delineation of his subject matter (Cohen, 2002: 
139). 
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As such, the way Cohen views it, Rawls‘s argument presents two possibilities 
about the institutional make-up of the basic structure. Either the basic structure 
contains legally noncoercive institutions – Cohen uses the examples of the 
market economy and the family – and thus the principles of justice apply to the 
circumstances within those institutions; or, as he says, the basic structure and the 
application of principles of justice are arbitrarily limited to legally coercive 
institutions. This is an arbitrary choice in the sense that, according to Cohen, 
justice and a society‘s ethos are linked in an important way.  
 
The connection that Cohen sees between justice and ethos requires explanation. 
For Cohen, it is important from the point of view of justice that there is some 
sense of fraternity or egalitarianism within a society, a sense that people are 
willing to comply with certain egalitarian requirements. This is because he sees 
society‘s ethos and the institutional make up of the basic structure as being 
interlinked in the way in which they determine people‘s life chances, i.e. it is not 
the case that the basic structure determines people‘s life chances without any 
impact from society‘s ethos. In this regard, Cohen uses the example of the 
consequences that widespread use of the birth control pill had on the American 
basic structure in the 1970s (2008: 378). Thus, he rejects the idea that a social 
ethos is entirely determined by the basic structure, arguing instead, ―If the basic 
structure is said to be the site of justice because of its influence on the ethos, 
then, by the same argument, the ethos is the site of justice‖ (Ibid). Thus rules and 
ethos are co-constitutive, and in order for people, or society, to behave in a 
particular way, there does not have to be legally enforceable rules to get them to 
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do so. It is often enough that social norms are created, and that pressure exists to 
conform to these norms: 
   
The constraints and pressures that sustain the noncoercive structure reside 
in the dispositions of agents which are actualised as and when those agents 
choose to act in a constraining or pressuring way…When A chooses to 
conform to the prevailing usages, the pressure on B to do so is reinforced; 
and no such pressure exists, the very usages themselves do not exist, in the 
absence of conformity to them. Structure and choice remain 
distinguishable, but not from the point of view of the applicability to them 
of principles of justice (Cohen, 2002: 138). 
 
Cohen‘s argument, then, is that whether or not a society is just is dependent on 
people making just choices in what might be called their private transactions; 
within any society, there exist informal social pressures for people to make 
particular choices and to conform to particular expectations - he mentions the 
socially constructed expectations of husband and wife as an example (Ibid: 139). 
As such, institutions do not have to be legally coercive for them to impact upon 
how just a society is. It is enough that such institutions shape and govern 
people‘s lives and choices and that this creates a certain ethos within a society, to 
which there is a social or informal pressure to conform.  
 
Furthermore, in the absence of a just ethos, according to Cohen, it is the least 
advantaged people within a society who will suffer the most. Within a Rawlsian 
theory of justice, there is an assumption of pre-existing inequalities within a 
society, and it is these inequalities that the application of principles of justice to 
the basic structure is supposed to rectify. If justice applies only to the legally 
coercive institutions of society, and the informal force of a society‘s ethos is 
viewed as a separate (or private) matter, then it is inevitable that those who are 
worse off initially will suffer more. As Cohen argues: ―by virtue of 
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circumstances that are relevantly independent of coercive rules, some people 
have much more power than others to determine what happens within those 
rules‖ (Ibid). This disproportionate power that some people have to determine 
the rules results in what Cohen terms market maximizing behaviour, which most 
often will produce ―severe inequalities and a meagre level of provision for the 
worst off ―(Ibid: 140).  
 
5.4.3 Global Corporations and The Basic Structure 
This debate has consequences for applications outside of the field of political 
theory, and presents an opportunity to make an argument for the extension of 
principles of justice to global corporations. As Cohen put it, the debate about 
what the basic structure consists of is a debate about ―where the action is‖ 
(1997). If we are not concerned with the correct site of justice (where the action 
is), then we are missing out on circumstances that are responsible for instances of 
injustice. In relation to corporations, what this debate encourages us to consider 
is this: does justice require that corporations merely abide by the rules of the 
game (the rules of the market), or does justice require more than that?  
 
This thesis argues, in agreement with Cohen, that it is enough that legally 
noncoercive institutions, such as global corporations, display profound effects on 
people‘s life chances in order for principles of distributive justice to apply. This 
brings the critique of chapter four, and the critique of this chapter, one stage 
further: in chapter four, it was argued that the restriction of justice to the state 
neglects many circumstances of injustice. In this chapter, it has been argued that 
cosmopolitan conceptions of justice, which are not restricted to the state, have 
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mainly been directed at global public institutions of governance. What this 
debate about the basic structure brings to the thesis is the idea that justice is not 
just about the laws that states and global public institutions of governance pass. 
Justice is also about non-state actors, and their choices, that have a profound 
effect on people‘s life chances. As Cohen puts it: 
 
Why should we care so disproportionately about the coercive basic 
structure, when the major reason for caring about it, its impact on people‘s 
lives, is also a reason for caring about informal structure and patterns of 
personal choice? (Ibid).  
 
Thus, in the same way that restricting principles of global distributive justice to a 
territorially-bound state omits many of the unjust circumstances a satisfactory 
theory of global distributive justice would seek to address, ruling out all legally 
noncoercive institutions from such principles neglects the fact that such 
institutions can be equally as important as the political constitution, or legal 
structure of a domestic society. 
 
In relation to corporations, they clearly operate within a coercive basic structure 
– there are legal obligations that they must abide by. However, there are two 
elements to global corporations that make the designation of them as institutions 
that have a profound effect on people‘s life chances important. Firstly, although 
there is always a legal (coercive) structure to which corporations must conform, 
the globality of many large corporations means that the same corporation must 
abide by different rules in different territories. In essence, corporations are able 
to choose which legal rules they must abide by. This state-by-state approach 
means that there is no overarching principle by which corporations must abide. 
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Thus the rules by which corporations currently operate are not set up to cope 
with the global mobility of corporations.  
 
Secondly, and relatedly, CSR policies have emerged as the corporate solution to 
addressing the question of responsible corporate behaviour within global 
corporations that spans territorial boundaries. In a sense, CSR is a particular 
ethos that has come to prevail across the corporate world. It has emerged in many 
cases in place of state-based regulation of corporations, and for most large global 
corporations is a standard aspect of their corporate profile. In the same way that 
Cohen argues that the ethos that exists within a domestic society is important in 
relation to distributive justice, so too is the fact that CSR has become a prevalent 
ethos. The phenomenon of CSR, as discussed in chapter three, came about as a 
result of a widespread perception that corporations were behaving in an unjust 
manner. A corporate response to this perception was the creation of an ethos 
amongst large corporations of self-regulation and self-monitoring, rather than 
changing the rules within which they operate. Thus the question of corporate 
responsibility is being primarily dealt with through the use of CSR policies, 
which can be seen as a particular type of ethos, albeit one that is dominated by 
the requirements of global capitalism, as is discussed in chapter three. The rules 
within which corporations operate are seemingly less important to such 
questions, the focus instead being on voluntary self-regulation.  
 
To summarise the argument so far, the thesis argues, in agreement with Cohen, 
that justice is about more than regulating the coercive rules of society; global 
corporations cannot be described as being coercive in a legal sense, but they have 
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a profound effect on people‘s life chances. This case can be made because, 
following Cohen, the types of choices that people make are important for justice, 
in the way that choices are manifested in an ethos, and an ethos in turn affects the 
rules that are made. In this co-constitutive way, in order for people to live a just 
life, we must be concerned with the rules by which society is organized, but we 
must also be concerned with the choices that are made within those rules. Global 
corporations operate within a legally coercive structure that changes on a state-
by-state basis. Globally, their activity is to a significant extent self-regulated 
through the use of CSR policies. Thus while an ethos of ―responsibility‖ has 
emerged as a result of allegations of corporate injustice, the rules within which 
they operate rarely change. 
 
However, a coercive reading of the global basic structure to which principles of 
global distributive justice would apply, would omit any circumstances of 
injustice caused by corporations (apart from those circumstances that are caused 
by activities that break the rules). And yet if we are concerned with justice per 
se, then it would seem an omission too far to proceed with such an interpretation 
of the basic structure. It is the contention of the thesis that a purely coercive 
reading of the global basic structure is unconvincing.  
 
5.4.4 The Publicity Requirement 
Cohen did not address the specific questions of corporations, and this debate is 
generally viewed as a critique of Rawlsian theory. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that the conclusion of his argument, if applied to corporations, would be 
that it is unjust for corporations to engage in market maximizing behaviour. As 
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such, justice requires both the existence of just tax rules, by which corporations 
must abide, as well as corporations themselves restricting the extent of the profit 
that they make. This is quite a demanding view of justice. In reply to this, it 
could be argued, as per the Rawlsian argument, that restrictions on corporate 
profit making would constitute a restriction on liberty, and indeed justice 
requires that such profits are made, in order that they are of benefit to less 
advantaged groups within society.  
 
This objection is important. A view of justice this demanding is unlikely to be 
realised, but also it is not clear that it would be desirable. Aside from the 
question of incentives and profit-making, there is also the question of whether 
justice requirements ought to extend that far into all forms of ―private‖ activity. 
In this regard, Williams (1998) has resisted elements of Cohen‘s argument on the 
grounds that justice is about public rules; this objection is also important for the 
thesis argument. 
 
Williams perceives a difficulty with Cohen‘s conception of the basic structure. 
While he views market-maximizing behaviour as being problematic in terms of 
justice, he contends that a different account of the basic structure is possible 
(1998: 232). Recall that the basic structure is first and foremost a set of 
institutions, and the manner in which Rawls defines institutions suggests that 
they must be in some sense public. Williams uses elements of Rawls‘s discussion 
of institutional publicity to highlight the way in which Cohen‘s critique fails to 
address an important element of the basic structure, and thus an important aspect 
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of justice – that inclusion in the basic structure requires an institution to display 
elements of publicity.  
 
It is important to note here the manner in which Williams uses the word ―public‖. 
He uses Rawls‘s definition of institutional publicity, and it is worth elaborating 
this definition here for clarification. As Rawls states: 
 
[…] by an institution I shall understand a public system of rules which 
defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and 
immunities, and the like. These rules specify certain forms of action as 
permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain penalties and 
defenses, and so on, when violations occur. As examples of institutions, or 
more generally social practices, we may think of games and rituals, trials 
and parliaments, markets and systems of property (Rawls, 1999: 47-48).  
 
The publicity element of an institution is that which enables everyone who is 
affected by that institution to know what the rules specified by that institution 
expect of them: 
 
A person taking part in an institution knows what the rules demand of him 
and of the others, he also knows that the others know this and that they 
know that he knows this, and so on. To be sure, this condition is not always 
fulfilled in the base of actual institutions, but it is a reasonable simplifying 
assumption.  The principles of justice are to apply to social arrangements 
understood to be public in this sense … The publicity of the rules of an 
institution insures that those engaged in it know what limitations on 
conduct to expect of one another and what kinds of actions are permissible. 
There is a common basis for determining mutual expectations. Moreover, 
in a well-ordered society, one effectively regulated by a shared conception 
of justice, there is also a public understanding as to what is just and unjust. 
(Ibid: 48-49). 
 
Williams uses this specification of institutional publicity to make the case that 
―the [basic] structure comprises those actions which realise public rules in a way 
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that exerts profound and unavoidable influence on individuals‘ access to social 
primary goods‖ (Williams, 1998: 234).   
 
However, as Williams acknowledges, there is still a potential claim that this is an 
arbitrary distinction. Just as a purely legally coercive conception of the basic 
structure may be thought to be arbitrary, so too may one that defines it as a 
system of public rules. Williams answers this claim by invoking Rawls‘s 
requirements of not just publicity, but also stability. This denotes that people 
within a society know, understand and accept a conception of justice, and that 
they comply with such a conception because they know that others will, and that 
such a conception is congruent with their other values (Ibid: 244). This produces 
stability over time within a society, and is viewed by various authors as both 
instrumentally and intrinsically valuable (Ibid).  
 
Williams‘ conclusion, then, is that publicity is an integral part of justice. On his 
reading, Cohen‘s wide construal of the basic structure neglects the importance of 
publicity within a conception of justice. Based on a conception of institutions as 
public systems of rules, that are known, understood and complied with by those 
who are affected by them, Williams‘ argument is that our concern in relation to 
justice is those sources of inequality that can be regulated by public rules. Given 
the fact of limited information (i.e. that it is most often impossible for everyone 
to know about the ―extent to which individuals suffer unchosen labour burdens, 
or achieve their full productive potential‖ Ibid: 245), we have to reject 
conceptions of justice, like Cohen‘s, that are too demanding in this sense. On this 
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basis, Williams favours, as he puts it, ―trusting in tax rather than moralized 
markets as the instrument of egalitarian justice‖ (Ibid: 246).  
 
Cohen‘s arguments, as well as Williams‘s publicity requirement, are very useful 
to the argument being made here. There are two aspects to this. First, Cohen‘s 
wide construal of the basic structure opens up the claim that global corporations 
are susceptible to principles of justice. The phenomenon of CSR demonstrates 
some form of acknowledgement by corporations that their behaviour is a source 
of some injustice, or at the very least that their behaviour profoundly affects 
some people‘s life chances, and that their scope of responsibility is more than 
that of profit-making. Thus if we have a conception of the basic structure that 
allows for the inclusion of institutions that have a profound effect on people‘s 
life chances, (not just legally coercive institutions that have this effect), we can 
view this acknowledgement as corporations placing themselves within the realm 
of discussion about what constitutes responsible corporate activity, and thus what 
constitutes justice. While it has been argued that CSR is largely a way of 
avoiding state-based or multilateral regulation, this is in some senses less 
relevant than the actual fact of admission by corporations of their responsibilities 
extending beyond their remit as commercial actors.  
 
Secondly, in relation to the publicity requirement, a characteristic of CSR 
policies is that their content is made publically available to anyone who might 
seek them out. Indeed, there is a concerted effort by many corporations to make 
these policies public. Although it may be claimed in this regard that such 
publicity is for promotional purposes (or, the ―wrong reasons‖), this would not 
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seem to matter in the sense that the information is still within the public domain. 
As is discussed further in the next chapter, the extent of corporations‘ publicity 
about their activities, as well as the type of information they make public, is a 
crucial part of justice. However it suffices here to state that CSR constitutes a 
practice whereby corporations make public the standards and rules which they 
expect themselves to meet and abide by. Furthermore, they also make public 
their performance in relation to such rules. In the case of CSR that is 
underpinned and instituted by a global governance institution, for instance the 
UN Global Compact, it is evident that such policies are devised, monitored and 
communicated in a public manner. This is indicative of a wider contemporary 
phenomenon whereby governance activities are not just executed by state and 
state-based authorities, or indeed by international organizations that are 
underpinned by state-based authority. Within structures of global governance, 
―private‖ organizations, like global corporations, are to a great extent involved in 
the articulation, development and maintenance of sets of public rules that purport 
to govern their behaviour. Similarly to Cohen, it is not Williams‘s intention to 
deal with an issue such as global corporate activity; however from the 
perspective of the thesis, the argument about publicity strengthens the case being 
made here.  
 
Thus Williams‘s argument pitches itself in between that of Rawls and Cohen. 
While he disputes Cohen‘s ambitious contention that the Rawlsian conception 
justice requires the application of principles to all private transactions, because of 
the need for publicity and stability, neither does he rescue the Rawlsian position. 
Williams does not argue that individuals may maximise their own gains in the 
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market if it is constrained by a just tax structure, which is what seems to be 
Rawls‘s position. Instead, Williams is arguing that some kinds of ethos are 
publically realisable, while others aren‘t. His example is the family, which he 
describes as unjust, say, the choice to send a son rather than a daughter to higher 
education. This does not break any rules, but it is reasonable to say that an ethos 
that accepts such choices is unjust. Similarly with corporations, if the right to a 
minimum wage is not enforced by law in a particular country where a 
corporation has operations, and that corporation therefore underpays staff in 
comparison to operations in other countries, no rules or laws have been broken, 
but again it seems reasonable to suggest that the public ethos underpinning this 
choice is unjust.  
 
In summary, the thesis contends that this scenario, in which (a) corporations have 
a profound effect on people‘s life chances, and (b) corporations are involved in 
the development of, and are regulated by, sets of public rules that are known (or 
can be known) to those who are affected by them, warrants the application of 
principles of global distributive justice to their activity. As discussed in this 
section, the make up of the basic structure is a key element to the argument of the 
thesis. What this argument brings to the thesis is a strong case for the inclusion 
of corporations within a theory of global distributive justice. This is not an 
uncontroversial contention. What is at issue here is a re-construal of justice that 
is problematic for widely held conceptions of justice that rely on a ―moral 
division of labour‖ (Nagel, 1991), such that individuals and groups should be 
free to act as they wish within coercive rules designed to achieve justice. The 
thesis agrees that the coercive rules of states (for it is presumably only states that 
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can be described as coercive in the legal sense) are most certainly important. 
Such a view, which concentrates on coercive rules, is effectively the focus of 
Pogge and the other cosmopolitan writers that were critiqued earlier in the 
chapter. Under these sorts of views, the argument in relation to corporations is 
that justice requires that the rules be altered so that corporations must abide by 
just rules. However, the original contribution of the thesis is the argument that 
global corporations are in fact involved in the creation and maintenance of the 
rules and standards which govern their activity in a self-regulated sense, that to a 
great extent this is done in a public way, and so they ought to be a focus of 
concern within a theory of global distributive justice.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Having rejected state-based conceptions in the previous chapter, it was necessary 
in this chapter to provide a broad outline of the different strands of thought 
within cosmopolitanism, and more specifically to discuss distributive justice in 
relation to this. Cosmopolitanism, in the way in which it offers a methodological 
alternative to territorialism, is the obvious framework within which a conception 
of global distributive justice ought to exist. As well as a methodological position, 
cosmopolitanism also encompasses a moral perspective regarding the importance 
of the human being as a focus for justice. Both the methodological and moral 
aspects of cosmopolitanism are played out in political and legal 
cosmopolitanism, which advocate programmes of reform for global governance 
institutions, based on the idea that state-based reforms are unable to contend with 
the supra-territorial processes of globalization.  
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In moving to cosmopolitan conceptions of global distributive justice, the second 
section of the chapter outlined the justification given by various authors as to 
why we ought to think about justice in a global, rather than domestic sense. 
These justifications included the existence of a global basic structure, the moral 
duty we have not to inflict harm on others, the inevitable progression of liberal 
domestic principles to cosmopolitan global principles, and the inadequacy of the 
state in dealing with globalising circumstances. The thesis aligns itself 
predominantly with the first of these justifications, i.e. the existence of a global 
basic structure, but argues that this ought to explicitly include non-legally 
coercive institutions, such as global corporations. The remainder of the section 
detailed the various different principles of global distributive justice, and made a 
similar point - that a complete theory will include the activities of global 
corporations.  
 
The fourth section of the chapter made use of a debate within political theory 
about the institutional make up of the basic structure, in order to provide a basis 
on which corporations can be incorporated into distributive justice. The thesis 
agrees with Cohen‘s argument that the basic structure of society includes legally 
noncoercive institutions, and as such principles of justice are applicable to such 
institutions. However, it is also argued, in agreement with Williams, that 
institutions that are subject to principles of justice necessarily need to be public 
ones – public in the sense that their rules and practices are known and understood 
by all those affected by them.  
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Thus, on the basis of what has been discussed in this chapter, the criteria for 
inclusion into a theory of global distributive justice can legitimately be an 
institution that displays profound and lasting effects on peoples‘ life chances, and 
that conducts its activities in a public manner. Global corporations and corporate 
social responsibility policies meet this description. The next chapter develop a 
set of proposals regarding justice and corporations that reflects this argument.  
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6: Aspiration and Concession: Global Corporations and 
Principles of Global Distributive Justice 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The thesis has argued so far that it is in circumstances where institutions display 
a profound effect on people‘s life chances that principles of distributive justice 
apply; it has also been argued that global corporations are an instance of this. In 
terms of justice, this is the relationship that is of significance. Two primary 
justifications have been discussed for the contention that global corporations are 
subject to principles of global distributive justice. The first is that state-based 
theories of distributive justice do not adequately deal with the globalised 
circumstances within which global corporations operate. The second is that while 
a cosmopolitan-oriented approach is justified, existing cosmopolitan ideas 
regarding global justice are incomplete. In their dominant focus on the reform of 
global public institutions of governance, most cosmopolitan conceptions of 
justice neglect the profound effect on life chances that global corporations have, 
and thus a coherent normative set of principles for the activities of corporations 
has not yet developed. 
 
This chapter aims to set out such a set of principles, and in doing so expands the 
argument in relation to profound effects, by setting out a proposal for justice that 
reflects the complex political-economic circumstances within which corporations 
operate. One of the central issues in this regard is that of feasibility, which is in 
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tension with the normative ideals that underpin the central argument of the thesis. 
We live in a world that is not perfect, and corporations, as we find them in the 
world, are not perfect, and most likely never will be. This imperfection is in the 
context of the organisation of global economic life around the requirements and 
demands of (global) capitalism. In the context of the dominance of state-based 
theories of justice, global corporations are most usually missed out in discussions 
about what constitutes global justice. As such, a tension exists between what 
ideal circumstances of justice would mean and the reality of the existence of 
corporations. There is also a tension between an ideal, and what is actually 
feasible or achievable. On this basis the thesis seeks to address both demands for 
what Estlund calls ―aspirational‖ theory, and for what he calls ―concessive‖ 
theory (2008: 258-277). The thesis proceeds from the contention that articulating 
the ideal circumstances of justice is necessary, even if such circumstances are 
unlikely to ever emerge, or even if they are unfeasible. That it is unlikely is not a 
good enough reason not to articulate it. However, the thesis also aims to make 
the normative ideals expressed within it display a degree of feasibility, and 
applicable to the world as we find it. Hence the contribution of concessive 
theory. 
 
The chapter articulates, first, an idea of the ideal circumstances of distributive 
justice in relation to corporations, which draws on Rawls‘s ideas about property-
owning democracy (2001b). This is based on the requirement for a base level of 
equality within a Rawlsian society, and makes suggestions about the ownership 
of private property and productive property. This section also appeals to Cohen‘s 
ideas about justice and rules (2002 and 2008) and argues that a Cohen-inspired 
  
 
223 
conception of justice in relation to corporations would require the existence of 
both just rules as well as a just ethos in which corporations make just choices 
within the rules.  
 
The chapter then moves into the realm of concessive theory, and addresses what 
a just corporation would look like once we concede to the facts of corporations 
and global capitalism. The thesis contends that it is this concessive approach to 
justice that shows that the desired link between justice and corporations is 
possible, thus more attention is paid to concessive theory. The central idea of 
these proposals is that corporate activity ought to be subject to both a do no harm 
principle as as well as an all affected interests principle (AAIP). These principles 
relate to substance and procedure. In relation to substance, the do no harm 
principle specifies a basic normative minimum which should be acceptable to all 
views on justice and corporations. The AAIP is to do with procedure, and 
appeals to legitimacy by arguing that people have a right to a say in decisions 
that affect their lives. The chapter outlines three reasons for the adoption of this 
principle. The chapter then discusses five conditions that corporate activity 
would have to meet to abide by these requirements. Some of these are 
institutional components, whereas some are certain types of activities.  
 
The central idea is that there are a variety of ways in which corporations affect 
people‘s life chances, and the AAIP attempts to mitigate this. To this end, it 
seems necessary that this principle is abided by in a number of different ways 
and institutional settings, from ensuring that those affected have the knowledge 
and tools to understand the manner in which they are affected and to take action 
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as a result, right through to enabling redress of corporate wrongdoing. The 
chapter aims to avoid creating a stark dichotomy between an argument about 
state-based regulation, and one about international legal requirements. This is a 
reflection of the view of global distributive justice as neither a clear question of 
state-based conceptions, or one of cosmopolitan reform of global public 
institutions.  As such, the proposals outlined here aim to cover the ―beginning, 
middle and end‖ of the effect of corporate activity.  
 
The five conditions are as follows. The first two relate to the availability and 
acquisition of knowledge and information: are pre-consultative learning and 
transparency and disclosure of information. The third condition is an institutional 
component, and is to do with the establishment of a global consultative forum, 
which enables affected parties to participate in and impact upon corporate 
decisions that affect them. There are a variety of key features that this forum 
would need to display in order that it could be deemed to be fair or just. Such 
features are discussed in detail below. The fourth condition is to do with the 
evaluation of corporate activity and corporate commitment to the AAIP. The idea 
here is that the decision of whether a corporation is acting responsibly needs to 
be made by institutions or people who are separate from that corporation. This 
would seem fundamental to upholding the legitimacy of the entire process. The 
fifth condition is another institutional component, and is to do with the provision 
of a redress mechanism for instances in which the AAIP and /or the do no harm 
principle has demonstrably not been abided by.  
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As such, there is a distinct contrast between the two main sections of the chapter. 
While the first section appeals to Rawlsian ideal theory and Estlund‘s idea of 
aspirational theory, the second section attempts to strike a balance between what 
is normatively desirable, given the previous arguments in the thesis about 
corporations and the requirements of justice, and what is feasible once certain 
facts about the world are conceded to. These facts broadly pertain to the 
existence of global corporations within a system of global capitalism, but more 
specifically attempt to address the multi-polar nature of global governance 
institutions, within which CSR policies often exist. Thus what is proposed here 
attempts to clarify the role of global corporations, as well as other actors, in 
determining the extent to which the ideal of a just corporation might be realised.  
 
The basic principles cut across all conditions, and within each condition there is 
a role for actors such as NGOs, governments, international organisations, as well 
as corporations themselves. Increasingly, as CSR becomes legitimised at the 
level of global governance institutions, this approach is recognised as necessary 
to bridging the gap between calls for state-based regulation (which on the basis 
of the argument of the thesis would seem both an inadequate way to deal with the 
problem, as well as likely to be rejected, and/or avoided by corporations 
themselves), and the inherent restrictions placed on CSR by global capitalism. 
While this addresses the question of feasibility, it also sets up the discussion for 
the next chapter, in which the application of the ideas expressed here to the UN 
Global Compact is discussed.  
 
6.2 Ideal - Aspirational Theory: Compliance with Rules and Just Choices  
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This section discusses the Rawlsian conception of a ‗property-owning 
democracy‘, and posits that the ideas expressed therein offer the opportunity to 
set out both an ideal and aspirational theory of distributive justice for global 
corporations. However, the argument also draws on Cohen‘s ideas about the 
importance of making just choices within the rules, as well as complying with 
rules. As such, the argument is made that (ideal) justice in relation to 
corporations requires circumstances akin to Rawls‘s property-owning 
democracy, as well as that corporations are involved in the creation of a just 
ethos; it is this latter requirement that prompts the requirement of just choices.  
 
6.2.1 Ideal-Aspirational Theory 
Firstly, however, it is necessary to explicate more thoroughly the meaning and 
value of ideal theory, and subsequently aspirational theory. Ideal theory is a 
Rawlsian idea that is to do with the assumption of strict compliance with the 
requirements of justice (2001b: 13). The Rawlsian conception of this is that an 
ideal theory of justice sets out the principles of justice that guarantee background 
justice within a society over time. Thus the focus of a theory of justice is on the 
basic structure of society, which is made up of institutions that have a profound 
effect on people‘s life chances. This fundamental idea of Rawlsian theory has 
been subject to much debate, as was discussed in chapters four and five. As is 
discussed below, the Rawls-Cohen debate elaborates two different ways of 
thinking through what ideal theory (denoting scenarios in which there is full 
compliance with a conception of justice) in relation to global corporations would 
demand. 
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As well as ideal theory, what is discussed in this section is also classified as 
aspirational theory, drawing from Estlund‘s characterisation (2008). He discusses 
both aspirational and concessive theory as a means of avoiding what he calls 
―utopophobia‖. Aspirational theory lies between the two extremes of complacent 
realism, and utopianism (Ibid: 259). To clarify these terms, complacent realism 
denotes resignation to how things are and as Estlund uses it, it is a derogatory 
term, in that it is a position that eschews all aspiration (Ibid: 268). Utopianism, 
on the other hand, describes ideas that are impossible for humans to ever meet 
(Ibid).  
 
In relation to corporations, then, it could be said that a position of complacent 
realism would imply an uncritical acceptance of the manner in which 
corporations understand their social responsibilities, and the CSR process as 
currently practised. Utopianism in regard to corporations would presumably be a 
simple statement that corporations ought not to exist, without an articulation of 
how it might be possible for corporations to aspire towards justice. Thus, 
aspirational theory deals with what is possible to achieve, but unlikely.  
Concessive theory, on the other hand, is to do with conceding that at times, there 
are certain facts or human failings that necessitate thinking about what is the best 
that can be done while acknowledging this reality. The remainder of this section 
details two facets of ideal-aspirational justice theory in order to clarify first what 
just corporations would like in a scenario of full compliance with justice and 
second what aspirations towards justice and the corporation might look like.  
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A Rawlsian ideal argument would be that in a property-owning democracy, 
justice requires that corporations abide by the rules of the basic structure. Once 
those rules oversee basic just behaviour on the part of corporations, individual 
choices made by corporations are not relevant to questions of justice. As such, 
ideal theory requires compliance with ―just‖ rules, and nothing else. As per the 
argument of the previous chapter, there is an important disagreement between 
Rawls‘s and Cohen‘s position on whether or not non-legally coercive institutions 
are part of the basic structure. Rawls‘s argument would be that they are not, and 
as such, the just corporation merely has to abide by the rules. As such, it is 
necessary to explore the rules a Rawlsian property owning democracy would 
advocate for global corporations.  
 
On the other hand, if we consider corporations to be outside of the basic structure 
(on a lax interpretation), this is not to say they are ―exempt‖ from the 
requirements of justice. Rawls emphasizes that ―no institution or association in 
which [members of a society] are involved can violate their rights as citizens‖ 
(2001b: 166). As such, any violation of basic rights on the part of corporations is 
seen to be unjust.  
 
Cohen‘s argument, however, provides more scope for discussion in relation to 
corporations. His position is that justice also requires that individuals‘ private 
choices are just ones (2002). This mitigates against the development of an ethos 
of accumulation within a society which is inevitably bad for those who are least 
well-off. As argued in chapter five, this is a demanding view of justice, and in 
agreement with Williams (1998), the thesis posits that in order for principles of 
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justice to apply, the institutions that they apply to must meet a requirement of 
publicity. It was also argued that global corporations, in the manner in which 
CSR is practised, meet this publicity requirement. Thus this position states that 
ideal theory would demand that even in circumstances where there is full 
compliance with the principles of justice that apply to the basic structure, it is 
still necessary for justice to be part of choices and transactions that take place 
outside of that basic structure.  
 
In relation to corporations then, both arguments would have different 
consequences. The pure Rawlsian position would be that as long as corporations 
comply with the rules of the basic structure, CSR is not really necessary; 
however, presumably the rules would permit different things than the current 
situation – this will be discussed further on. Cohen‘s position, however, would 
be that CSR policies are necessary (in their guise as voluntary self-regulation – 
i.e. just choices), in addition to the existence of just rules that apply to global 
corporations. Given that CSR is effectively about generating an ethos of 
responsibility amongst corporations, but rarely about changing the rules or 
regulating corporations differently, the Cohen argument seems apt here. 
However it is important to be clear that Cohen‘s argument would be that there 
are just rules, as well as a just ethos.   
 
6.2.2 Corporations and a Property-Owning Democracy: Just Rules 
In the pure Rawlsian position of a property owning democracy, a central feature 
is that property rights are to allow a ―sufficient material basis for personal 
independence and a sense of self-respect, both of which are essential for the 
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adequate development and exercise of the moral powers‖ (2001b: 114). People‘s 
moral powers are what Rawls calls their capacity for a sense of justice and for a 
conception of the good (2005: 19); people‘s possession of these attributes renders 
them free and equal and thus they are fundamental to Rawls‘s conception of 
justice. These interests - in developing a sense of justice and a capacity for a 
conception of the good - justify his requirement that every individual should 
enjoy access to a range of (primary) goods—various liberties, educational and 
employment opportunity, and wealth and income (and health care) to use their 
freedoms (Rawls, 1999: 78-81). Thus Rawls sees the basic right to property as 
important in realising justice.  There are other notions of property rights, which 
Rawls does not see as ―basic‖, but rather as something to be decided at the 
legislative stage: the right to private property in natural resources, and means of 
production generally, and the right to property as including the equal right to 
participate in the control of the means of production and of natural resources, 
both of which should be socially, not privately owned (Ibid). Thus what Rawls 
means is that the question of private property in the means of production is to be 
judged ―within a political conception of justice that can gain the support of an 
overlapping consensus‖ (Ibid: 114-115), and according to the historical and 
social contingencies of the time.  
 
However, as well as this, a property owning democracy would also ensure the 
widespread ownership of productive assets and human capital, against a 
background of fair equality of opportunity. This means that the institutions of the 
basic structure must: 
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[…] from the outset, put in the hands of citizens generally, and not only of 
a few, sufficient productive means for them to be fully cooperating 
members of society on a footing of equality. Among those means is human 
as well as real capital, that is, knowledge and an understanding of 
institutions, educated abilities and trained skills. Only in this way can the 
basic structure realize pure background procedural justice from one 
generation to the next (Ibid: 140).  
 
On this basis in relation to global corporations, a number of things would be 
different in a property-owning democracy.  
 
First, as mentioned in the quote above about associations outside of the basic 
structure, any violation of basic rights of citizens by corporations is immediately 
seen as unjust in the Rawlsian conception. This might seem an obvious point, but 
given that CSR is often about corporations making commitments in terms of 
basic rights, it seems appropriate to mention that even on the thinnest reading of 
Rawls (i.e. that global corporations are not part of the basic structure), 
corporations are still often in violation of the requirements of justice. As such, 
the most fundamental requirement of corporations in the ideal circumstances of 
justice is that they do not violate basic rights. The specification of a basic 
normative minimum is taken up again in the next section on concessive theory.  
 
Second, in relation to the stipulation of widespread ownership of productive 
assets, the sheer size of some global corporations, would be subject to question 
within a property-owning democracy. As mentioned in chapter two, global 
corporations utilise, and develop many commercial and operational techniques 
that establish them as large powerful entities. In this regard, mergers and 
acquisitions, high levels of FDI, as well as techniques such as transfer pricing 
and outsourcing seem relevant to this discussion. It is difficult to see how 
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corporations that own assets across a number of different territories could be 
justified against the requirement of widespread ownership of productive assets. 
Of course, the ideas discussed by Rawls are to do with national societies, but the 
existence of global corporations across territorial boundaries would seem to 
emphasise rather than negate this point. In circumstances where there is a global 
monopoly on certain products or services, the ideas of a property-owning 
democracy would suggest that overall this mitigates against the realization of 
background justice over time, in the sense that the ownership of the means of 
production is concentrated in the hands of the few, rather than spread across 
different groups or different societies. The ultimate conclusion of this point, then, 
is that justice requires that business be conducted on a smaller, less global scale 
that offers opportunities for the widespread ownership of the means of 
production.  
 
Third, from the quote above it would seem that background institutions within a 
property owning democracy must work to enable citizens to participate fully in 
society, as equal members with equal chances. This is to do with guaranteeing 
background justice over time, and also would presumably place restrictions not 
just on ownership of resources and assets, but also on the generation of profit. 
Rawlsian justice, while allowing for some accumulation of wealth (as discussed 
in chapter four, in relation to incentive-generating inequalities), would require 
that such accumulation does not mitigate against background justice, for example 
in relation to ―the fair value of the political liberties and to fair equality of 
opportunity‖ (Ibid: 161). Rawls proposes that a property-owning democracy 
employs a principle of progressive taxation to prevent this (Ibid). Thus, it could 
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be assumed here in relation to corporations that they would be taxed accordingly, 
such that as their profits went up, so would their rate of taxation.  
 
The difficulty of this again is in the globalised element of it – different countries 
fiercely defend their right to set different taxation rates. Some countries have a 
progressive element to their corporate tax rate (for instance, the UK), while 
others operate a flat rate, regardless of profit (for instance, Ireland). However, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that taxation is an area in which corporations are 
able to pick and choose which rules best suit them, as evidenced by phenomena 
such as transfer-pricing and double-tax agreements. In relation to this, at the very 
minimum a Rawlsian picture of justice would require that corporations are at 
least compliant with tax law (and it is often argued that corporations are not), but 
also ideally that corporate taxation rates are set to ensure background justice, and 
to prevent great accumulations of wealth within a society. Given the point made 
above, that within a property-owning democracy global corporations of the scale 
that we are familiar with would possibly not exist, in relation to taxation, the 
Rawlsian scheme would call for national societies to set a progressive rate of 
taxation for business. However, if global corporations were to exist within a 
property-owning democracy, perhaps they would be subject to a global rate of 
progressive taxation, for if only one country practises this, then corporations can 
move to other jurisdictions.  
 
A case could also be made that a property-owning democracy would require the 
reduction of the gap between CEO pay and pay of the lowest workers. As 
mentioned in the introduction, this gap has grown vastly in recent years. 
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Rawlsian justice requires that any inequalities within society are there to be of 
benefit to the least advantaged – this is the only justification there can be for 
inequalities in, say, income levels, or taxation. Thus in relation to high levels of 
pay for CEOs, the case would have to be made that such levels are indeed of the 
greatest benefit to the least advantaged. As it currently stands, it is not clear that 
this is what happens at the moment.  
 
The quote above also mentions the value of human capital in relation to 
background justice. A national society within a property owning democracy 
would work to provide members of a society with the education training and 
skills required to participate on an equal footing in that society. Justice requires 
that people have a life that has equivalent possibility for being a fully 
cooperating member of that society. As such, it requires that people are not 
disenfranchised or disempowered by the circumstances into which they are born. 
A property-owning democracy would have to ensure that people are sufficiently 
educated and resourced to ensure their basic rights are respected in relation to 
their dealings with corporations. The ideas within the Rawlsian conception 
articulate a clear role for the state to play in enabling the full membership of 
society by all citizens. Again, what this would mean in the global sense is less 
clear.  
 
This is a very general point that could have widespread implications in relation to 
global corporations– from the ability to join and participate in a trade union, to 
the ability to protect and utilize natural resources for a society‘s advantage. As 
well as this, there is a parallel here between what is said below about pre-
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consultative learning and this requirement of a property-owning democracy. The 
corporate role in this is that groups of people who are affected by a corporation 
are viewed by that corporation to have the right to contest, challenge and 
participate in corporate decision-making in questions that affect them. This 
means that many of the aspects of capitalism that have a profound effect on 
people‘s life chances must be negotiated with affected groups, rather than 
assumed as given.  
 
6.2.2 Corporations and Just Choices: Cohen’s Ethos 
Moving beyond the Rawlsian construal of justice as compliance with rules, 
Cohen‘s argument is that justice requires more than compliance. It also requires 
making just choices within the rules. On this interpretation, it would seem that 
present practices of voluntary self-regulation of corporations would be required 
in addition to compliance with just rules. Thus the Cohen-inspired perspective on 
this would elaborate a much more stringent set of criteria for the realisation of 
the just corporation, most likely including questions of profit making and 
resdistribution, as well as commitments on human rights, labour rights, 
environmental standards 
 
On this basis then, the thesis argues that a Cohen-inspired conception of justice 
as applied to global corporations would involve rules that work against the 
maximization of profit and the concentration of the ownership of the means of 
production in the hands of the few, as well as justice being of consideration in 
circumstances where the corporation has the choice to behave justly or unjustly. 
In this respect, it is important to note that, inspired by the argument set out in 
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relation to a property-owning democracy, this would require at the very 
minimum just choices in relation to basic rights, but also just choices in relation 
to profit redistribution, executive remuneration, etc.  
 
In summary, this section of the chapter has argued that there are two elements to 
ideal-aspirational theory with respect to corporations and justice. The first 
element draws from the Rawlsian idea of a property-owning democracy, which is 
to do with rules and corporate compliance with them. This stipulation would at a 
very minimum require that corporations do not violate basic rights; more 
stringently, it would put limitations on the size of corporations, in order to ensure 
the widespread ownership of the means of production. It would also require 
corporations to contribute to ensuring background justice within societies over 
time, which it was argued would imply the necessity of a (possibly global) 
progressive rate of taxation. On top of this argument, the case was then made for 
a Cohen-inspired perspective on justice in relation to corporations, which would 
require that in addition to compliance with rules, corporations also make just 
choices within those rules.  
 
6.3 Conceding to the Facts: The Do No Harm and The All Affected Interests 
Principles 
 
Concessive theory will be important, since the time comes when some 
desirable goal turns out to be too difficult or too unlikely to be worth 
taking on as a practical goal. In that case we should concede to the 
unfortunate facts, some of them about human failings, some of them 
about other things, and chart a more feasible, if less inspiring course. 
(Estlund, 2008: 271).   
 
  
 
237 
 
 
This section concedes to the facts of global capitalism and corporations and asks 
by what principles should corporations be regulated once the realities of these 
facts are acknowledged. Before outlining the details and implications of this 
principle, it is first useful to explicate the value of concessive theory, and how it 
relates to the above-mentioned aspirational theory. 
 
6.3.1 Why Concede? 
In order to be clear about what is being conceded to, in what follows, the fact of 
the existence of corporations within a system of global capitalism shapes the 
recommendations here. This means that it is taken as given that corporations 
exist and will continue to exist. More specifically than this, the thesis has 
proceeded from the argument that global capitalism has involved an ongoing 
blurring of the lines of public and private authority, and that this is significant in 
relation to global corporations. As well as this, the thesis concedes to the facts 
that were highlighted in the historical story presented in chapter two – previous 
attempts at multilateral regulation have largely failed, and the question of the 
societal responsiblities of corporations has emerged as a question of self-
regulation in co-operation with other actors.  
 
By conceding to these facts, the thesis attempts to develop a proposal about 
justice and corporations that strikes a balance between desirability and 
feasibility. In doing so, the proposal addresses the process of CSR. CSR is not 
necessarily conceded to – it may be the case, on the basis of these facts, that 
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there are good reasons to propose CSR as a way of dealing with justice and 
corporations, even if it were not a fact of life. Indeed, Cohen‘s argument above 
seems to imply that some form of voluntary regulation of choices on the part of 
corporations is necessary.  
 
It is in this section of the thesis that the ideas put forward in chapter three 
become important. Recall that chapter three used insights from Polanyi and 
Gramsci to help explain the emergence of CSR. It was argued therein that 
Polanyian thought is useful in understanding why the question of CSR emerged 
when it did, while Gramscian ideas related to the hegemonic bloc of capitalism 
offer an explanation as to why CSR takes the form it does. Thus this explanation 
views global capitalism as central to the emergence, form and shape of CSR. The 
above section, which discussed ideal-aspirational theory, are quite divorced from 
this interpretation of corporations and justice, in the sense that the 
recommendations made have little to do with the reality of global capitalism. 
However, concessive theory is about conceding to certain facts, in this case 
global capitalism, global corporations, and the historical emergence of CSR as a 
question of self-regulation. The Polanyian explanation of chapter three infers an 
inevitablity about the existence of the question of what constitutes a socially 
responsible, or just, corporation – thus it is incumbent upon a concessive theory 
to also address such a question. Furthermore, the Gramscian explanation infers 
that such a question and the dominant responses to it are shaped by capitalism, 
and what has emerged as a result of this is the process of CSR – thus a 
concessive theory must address the process of CSR and how it is shaped in this 
way.  
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This is where balance is important. The insights developed in chapter three‘s 
explanation necessitates that attention is paid to the inescapable shaping of the 
question of the socially responsible corporation. However, the thesis is also about 
articulating what global distributive justice ought to demand of global 
corporations, and thus it is also important not to concede too much. As Estlund 
says: 
 
There is more to goal setting than likelihood or ease of success. In 
political theorizing, concessions to the realistic but unfortunate facts are 
sometimes appropriate responses to a wider-ranging normative inquiry, 
where more desirable goals have been shown to be impossible or too 
difficult or too uncertain. Other times such concessions are merely 
symptoms of utopophobia. It would be irresponsible to set small and 
narrow goals without good reason to think that bigger and better things 
really cannot or will not be achieved (Ibid).  
 
So, while something must be conceded in order to develop ideas that are not 
hopelessly unrealistic, it is also important to recognise that conceding too much 
is just as detrimental as not conceding anything.  Drawing from what was 
articulated in the previous section about the ideal-aspirational demands that 
could be made of global corporations, it could be said here that CSR is, in 
Estlund‘s terms, an ―unfortunate fact‖ -  in ideal circumstances, we would not 
only have CSR, but we would also have fully just rules with which corporations 
would comply. However, critically interrogating CSR from the perspective of 
distributive justice balances out this attention to facts by making high normative 
demands of the process of CSR as it exists. As such, the ideas here attempt to 
chart a ―more feasible, if less inspiring course‖ (Ibid).  
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Thus balance between normative desirability and empirical feasability is key; in 
this regard, the discussion below does two things. In the first instance, a basic 
normative minimum in relation to corporate activity is discussed, the proposition 
that corporations should adhere to a do no harm principle. In the second instance, 
the all-affected interests principle and its related conditions put forward a high 
normative aspirational standard for corporations within the process of CSR. So, 
on the one hand, the thesis offers a substantive principle that aims to set a limit 
on any corporate activity that causes people harm. This is a deliberately 
generalised proposal that seeks to appeal to a broad array of political and moral 
convictions that exist about justice and corporations. On the other hand, the 
thesis discusses ideas that directly relate to the process of CSR, which advocate 
aspiration towards justice through its legitimisation as a result of the AAIP.  
 
6.3.2 Setting a Basic Limit: The Do No Harm Principle  
As is discussed in greater detail in the remainder of this chapter, the application 
of the AAIP focuses primarily on the procedure of CSR and what amendments 
could be made to it in order that it move towards justice in a concessive sense. 
The AAIP is predominantly concerned with bringing legitimacy to the procedure 
of CSR; in the sense that legitimacy is much less demanding than justice, the 
AAIP works towards striking a balance between feasibility and desirability. 
However, this raises the question of whether it is sufficient to follow a particular 
procedure in relation to corporations and CSR, and thus to contend that whatever 
outcome such a procedure constitutes legitimacy? Or does justice necessitate that 
we are also concerned with the outcomes that the specified just procedure 
produces? 
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The former scenario is a basic tenet of Rawlsian theory – in a fully just liberal 
democratic society, just institutions take care of background justice, and 
outcomes are not part of the consideration. In relation to corporations and CSR, 
this is problematic. While the ideas being proposed accept CSR as the way in 
which corporations address questions of their social responsibilities, and offer 
proposals for the amendment of the process, this should not be taken as an 
endorsement of the process per se. In this regard, it would seem important to 
specify a normative principle that aims to set a substantive limit on corporate 
activity, regardless of their participation in the process of CSR. This is because 
the thesis acknowledges the inherent limitations of CSR, and in some senses its 
precariousness and ambiguity. So again within concessive theory, balance is 
crucial. While conceding to facts, it also seems necessary to specify a basic 
normative principle by which corporate activity can be judged, if only to protect 
against the precariousness of the CSR process, even when practised under the 
terms specified below. 
 
In this regard, the thesis makes the modest proposal that corporations should 
adhere to a ―do no harm‖ principle. This principle by no means specifies the 
limits of justice in relation to corporations; this is a basic normative minimum, 
specified because that is what is missing from most accounts of CSR. Pogge uses 
the negative duty not to cause harm as a trigger for global justice obligations as 
an appeal to libertarian thought that would dispute the legitimacy of positive 
duties across territorial boundaries (2008: 136-143). Even under a negative duty 
not to cause harm, Pogge argues, a requirement for justice to apply to the global 
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sphere is still triggered. In this line of thought, the requirement that corporations 
do no harm would presumably be acceptable even to those who dispute that there 
are justice requirements between corporations and those affected by their 
activities. However, the orientation of the thesis is cosmopolitan, and the 
requirement not to cause harm is also a fundamental tenet of cosmopolitanism.  
 
In many ways, it might seem spurious to contend that a principle to do no harm 
ought to be part of concessive theory in relation to corporations; it might be 
objected that it is a concession too far. It is of course such a basic requirement, 
that surely a discussion of distributive justice should require commitments over 
and above a specification not to do any harm. In this regard it is interesting to 
note Linklater‘s comments about Marxist thought in relation to the causation of 
harm and global capitalism. He states: 
Increasingly, with the continuing global expansion of capitalism, the 
greater portion of human harm has been transmitted across frontiers by 
world market forces rather than exported from one society to another 
through conquest and war. To put this differently, in the past the major 
forms of transnational harm were concrete since they were part of a 
deliberate design to injure others; but in the future, Marx believed, harm 
would have a more abstract quality by virtue of being spread haphazardly 
across frontiers by the forces of global capitalism (Linklater, 2001: 271).  
 
Thus on this basis it is within the process of global capitalism that much harm is 
caused, and the causation of harm is an obvious and minimal concern for justice. 
However, what is needed is a specification of baseline rights violations that 
constitute harm. One view of harm is that A is harmed by X if X makes A worse 
off than he was before X was performed. In relation to corporations, this would 
seem too strong, because virtually all corporate activity will make some less well 
off individuals worse off than they were prior to that activity.  
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Empirical evidence is useful here. The introduction detailed some recent 
instances of corporate irresponsibility that can easily be said to constitute the 
causation of harm of the most fundamental sort. Pogge‘s account (2002 and 
2008) of global justice specifies a notion of harm as that which causes severe 
worldwide poverty; as a baseline for this notion he employs the idea of basic 
human rights. Pogge employs an institutional understanding of human rights, 
which does not specify what human rights there are, but instead specifies how we 
should conceive of human rights – or ―what does the assertion of a human right 
assert?‖. Pogge‘s reply to this is that a human right asserts that  
 
[…] human agents are not to collaborate in upholding a coercive 
institutional order that avoidably restricts the freedom of some so as to 
render their access to basic necessities insecure without compensating for 
their collaboration by protecting its vicitms or by working for its reform 
(2008: 76).  
 
Thus harm on this understanding is conceived of as violation of a basic human 
right, defined as above. Most discourse about human rights and corporations 
proceeds from the UNDHR‘s specifications of human rights, which, as Pogge 
points out, introduces a large set of difficulties in relation to positive and 
negative duties. While a complete account of corporate harm and rights 
violations in this regard is outside of the scope of the thesis, this notion of harm 
seems feasible, given that it specifies harm as the product of ongoing, 
systemic/institutional coercion that impedes people‘s access to basic necessities. 
As a basic normative requirement, this principle aims to set basic limit on 
corporate behaviour, in order to produce minimally just outcomes. It also alludes 
to the broad conception of justice that the thesis works from, as discused in the 
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introduction, which specified that justice is about the mitigation of suffering.  
 
6.3.3 Legitimising CSR: The All Affected Interests Principle 
The All-Affected Interests Principle (AAIP) focuses on the process of CSR and 
its application here seeks to legitimise the do no harm principle through allowing 
those who are affected by corporate activity to have a say in decisions that affect 
them. The link between two principles can be seen as the transition from a 
negative duty to do no harm, to positive duties to effectively legitimise the 
process of CSR.  
 
The provenance of the AAIP is within democratic theory, with theorists such as 
Dahl (1970, 1989), Whelan (1983) and Goodin (2007) discussing it as a 
resolution of what they have deemed to be, respectively, the ―problem of the 
unit‖, the ―boundary problem‖, or most recently, the problem of ―constituting the 
demos‖. In a simple iteration, the AAIP states,  ―Everyone who is affected by the 
decisions of a government should have the right to participate in that 
government‖ (Whelan, 1983 cited in Goodin, 2007: 51). As such, in the case of 
the institutions of a domestic basic structure that display a profound effect on life 
chances, what justifies their operation is the right that people have to a say in 
how they are run. The thesis adopts a modified version of the principle, given 
that the subject matter here is not states, which states, ―anyone who is affected by 
the decisions and activities of a global corporation that have a profound effect on 
their life chances should have the right to participate in those decisions and 
activities‖. The five conditions outlined below extend and develop this principle 
by outlining a scheme that enables the democratic participation of those affected 
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by corporate activity in decisions that affect them. 
 
This principle is thus to do with legitimacy, which on this understanding is 
defined as ―the right to rule, understood to mean both that institutional agents are 
morally justiﬁed in making rules and attempting to secure compliance with them 
and that people subject to those rules have moral, content-independent reasons to 
follow them and/or to not interfere with others‘ compliance with them‖ (Keohane 
& Buchanan, 2006: 411).  The difference between justice and legitimacy is 
important. It could be argued that justice is about giving people what they are 
owed; legitimacy on the other hand asks which conditions must be satisifed in 
order that we can say individuals would have a valid, weighty reason to accept an 
institution and its effects. Of course, as Rawls points out, an institution can be 
legitimate without necessarily being just (2005: 428). The AAIP confers 
legitimacy on the activities of global corporations by allowing those who are 
affected by such activities to have a say in the definition of the rules. Keohane & 
Buchanan make that point that legitimacy must not be collapsed into justice, 
because justice articulates too high a standard for many global governance 
institutions; thus the argument that only just institutions have a right to rule is 
self-defeating (Ibid: 412). In the sense that the AAIP is viewed to be part of 
concessive theory, the thesis agrees with this idea. Rawls is clear that legitimacy 
cannot stand on its own without substantive justice (2005: 425). While this is 
certainly the case, in the sense of attempting a concessive idea of justice, the 
specification of conditions which could legitimise the process of CSR seems the 
best possible, or at least the least-worst, response once facts have been conceded 
to.  
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The appeal of the AAIP in this sense can be outlined in three main reasons, 
which are discussed briefly here. The first reason is to do with avoiding the 
arbitrary restriction of principles of justice to the state, or to global public 
institutions of governance and in so doing, missing out a variety of circumstances 
of injustice related to corporations – these circumstances are to do with the 
profound effects corporations have on people‘s lives. As Goodin discusses it, the 
AAIP is about who counts in determining the constitution of the demos, a 
question that he refers to as the silence at the heart of democratic theory (2007: 
43); it is also a key question for Fraser in her conception of global justice (2008: 
22-29). Goodin argues that the AAIP is the only justifiable way to constitute the 
demos because it is the only way that people‘s interests can be protected; the 
problem of overinclusiveness in this regard is secondary (Ibid: 49-50).  
 
Arguments about constituting the demos are effectively arguments about 
protecting people‘s interests. As such, appeals to common territory, history or 
nationality are more to do with the intertwining of people‘s interests because of 
that shared territory, history or nationality, rather than the intrinsic normative 
significance of these commonalities; what is important here are people‘s 
―common reciprocal interests‖: (Ibid: 48). Fraser makes a similar point about the 
co-imbrication of people‘s interests (2008: 24). In this way of thinking, a better, 
or fairer, rationale for constituting the demos in particular ways is the protection 
of people‘s interests. In the same way that the existence of profound effects on 
people‘s life chances is a morally sound and politically necessary reason to 
rethink where principles of distributive justice apply, it is the intertwining of 
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people‘s interests that justifies the all-affected principle. In circumstances where 
people have a common interest in a particular institution‘s effect on their life 
chances, it seems intuitive that all those people affected ought to have a say in 
the operation of that institution.  
 
Following on from this, a second reason for using the all-affected interests 
principle is the scope within it for contestation of the received wisdom of CSR 
practices. As discussed in chapter three, the power dynamics of CSR processes, 
unavoidably shaped by global capitalism affect the outcomes of such processes. 
If CSR processes are developed by corporations, without parity of participation 
being given to all those affected by their activities, it is difficult to see how either 
the procedures or the outcomes could be deemed to be just. It is not enough for 
corporations to say that their procedures are developed with the interests of their 
stakeholders in mind. A substantively legitimate procedure would give equal say 
to all those affected and equal say would mean space for contestation, in the 
same way that is required for a democratic state to be called legitimate.  
 
The third reason for the adoption of the all-affected interests principle is 
empirically focussed. Although the thesis is critical of stakeholder theory per se, 
it is valuable to point out that there is at least some affinity between the AAIP, 
and some of the thought behind stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory 
influences many CSR processes and proposes to draw those who are affected by 
a corporation into a process of engagement. The thought behind doing this is a 
prudential one – that this sort of engagement will improve business. This is 
normatively problematic and it is this difficulty that the AAIP seeks to address. 
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While stakeholder engagement is premised on the business case for doing so, the 
AAIP requires that all those who are affected are included because of that effect, 
not because it is prudent to do so. This stipulation secures the engagement 
process so that  participation is a right, and not something that can be taken away 
or not given in the first place because of commercial reasons.  
 
In summary then, the thesis proposes two principles under concessive theory. 
The first principle, that corporations should do no harm, is a basic minimum 
normative standard that this argues is an intuitive requirement of corporate 
behaviour. The generality of this principle is deliberate so that it is difficult to 
refute its applicability to global corporations. Thus this principle sets a minimum 
standard for just outcomes in relation to corporate activity. The second principle, 
the AAIP, focuses on the procedural element of justice and corporations, the 
contention being that allowing those who are affected by corporate activity to 
have a say in decisions about such activity would bring some legitimacy to the 
CSR process in a concessive sense.  The next section of the chapter outlines five 
conditions of the AAIP that it is argued would need to be implemented across the 
CSR process.  
 
6.4 Concessive Theory in Practice: Five Conditions of the Just Corporation 
 
This section details the implementation of both principles across the process of 
CSR. Given the focus on procedure, the AAIP demands most attention here. 
However the do no harm principle also serves a purpose as the normative 
standard that can be referred throughout the implementation of the AAIP. Some 
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details are necessary in this regard.  
 
An obvious objection to the do no harm principle is that it does not specify to 
whom no harm must be done. Similarly with the AAIP, it could be argued that 
including all those affected by corporate activity does not necessarily render the 
process a more just one. Given that those affected by a corporation could be 
directors, managers, employees, as well as local communities, consumers etc, it 
is not then clear who is of concern in the process. The thesis replies to this 
objection that the process ought to be conducted in a non-hegemonic fashion, in 
which those who do not already have a voice built into the structures of corporate 
activity are privileged within the process of CSR. As such, in relation to the do 
no harm principle, and in answer to the question of to whom no harm must be 
done, the ideal substantive answer is that CSR processes should ensure that no 
harm is done to those who do not already have a degree of protection from within 
the structures of global capitalism. As such, of course, directors who have share 
options within a company are affected by its share price falling dramatically. 
However, it is the contention of the thesis that if we are concerned about justice 
in the concessive sense, what is of more concern is the protection of people 
whose rights are not already well protected. This stipulation is more complex 
than can be discussed thoroughly here, and in practice this would cause complex 
dilemmas. At best, however, we can see this priniciple as a broad guidance for 
the implementation of the AAIP across the CSR process.  
 
The purpose of these conditions is to detail the political-institutional set-up 
through which the principles can be implemented and realised. This requires the 
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implementation of five conditions that would oversee the incorporation of these 
principles into all aspects of a corporation‘s activities, thus acknowledging the 
multiple actors and complex political circumstances within which CSR operates. 
Working on the basis that to reform just one aspect of corporate behaviour would 
be missing the point that global corporations are involved in multiple networks 
of activity, the argument is that each of the following conditions are interlinked, 
and the ideal scenario is that fulfilment of the criteria of one condition 
necessarily affects the fulfilment of another one. Thus the conditions are offered 
here in sequential order. A more modest suggestion is that an appropriate 
consultation requires fulfillment of the first, second and third conditions. 
Condition four, that of evaluation, should hold even if the first three conditions 
are not met; condition five, the opportunity for redress, is applicable to the AAIP, 
but also to the do no harm principle, i.e. people ought to have an opportunity to 
seek redress when basic harm has been committed against them by a corporation. 
The examples, where given, are to illustrate that some contemporary practices 
are similar to what is being proposed here; however, the existence of illustrative 
examples is not meant to be the limitation of what is being proposed.  
 
6.4.1 Condition 1: Pre-Consultative Learning 
The central idea here is that the existence of a system that aims to enable and 
ensure just corporate behaviour necessitates that those who are affected by that 
system understand it. This is about the democratization of knowledge so that 
those who are affected by corporate activity know and understand this effect, but 
also know how to empower themselves to take action, in a similar way that a 
functioning democracy needs citizens‘ willingness and capacity to contest 
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authority and power. The scheme proposed here aims to facilitate this 
participation and contestation requirement, but it seems necessary that in order 
for contestation and participation to be possible, people need to know and 
understand what they are participating in and indeed what they are contesting.  
 
The Rawlsian stipulation of publicity is apt here. Recall that, ―the publicity of the 
rules of an institution insures that those engaged in it know what limitations on 
conduct to expect of one another and what kinds of actions are permissible‖ 
(Rawls, 1999: 38-39). While CSR policies have traditionally been developed in 
order to avoid ―rules‖, in the regulatory sense, the argument here is that justice 
requires the existence of rules that are understandable and acceptable to all. 
However, in order to fulfill this requirement it would seem necessary that all 
those affected by corporate activities need to know and understand the ways in 
which they are affected and how they can respond.  
 
Some corporations engage specifically in education programmes (for example, 
Monsanto‘s Educational Outreach programme or Nike‘s School Innovation 
Fund). However, programmes such as these are to do with corporate provision of 
education services as a charitable act, rather than the facilitation of mechanisms 
whereby knowledge of how corporations work, and how those affected by them 
can participate in their operation, is made available to relevant parties.  
 
Pre-consultative learning would also need to be a process that is open to all types 
of debate and contestation. As is discussed in more detail below, current CSR 
practices do not allow much room for questioning the logic of the practice. 
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Fundamental questions to do with corporate practice, such as the right to capital 
mobility and the right to use natural resources, are not generally up for 
discussion. A fair pre-consultative learning process would allow, and indeed 
encourage these questions to be discussed and understood.  
 
The question of how pre-consultative learning would happen is a difficult one. A 
primary difficulty is to do with who provides the learning. In the cases cited 
above, it is a private corporation that funds many public education schemes. In 
the interests of transparency and objectivity, this is not ideal. Pre-consultative 
learning ought ideally to be facilitated by an institution other than the 
corporation. One idea would be that knowledge of how the system works is 
provided by the state – in schools, to community groups etc. Another way of 
doing it is through multi-stakeholder fora - akin to groups such as the Forestry 
Stewardship Council, or Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria – 
that involve governments, private sector actors, civil society groups and affected 
communities, whereby part of the mandate of the organisation is to engage 
specifically in pre-consultative learning. A current similar example to how this 
might be done is the Building Global Democracy project, which has a strand 
entitled ―Citizen Learning for Global Democracy‖. This initiative draws on 
academic and practitioner knowledge to discuss how citizens can become more 
knowledgeable and thus empowered in relation to the globalizing conditions that 
affect their lives  (BGD, no date).  
 
6.4.2 Condition 2: Transparency and Disclosure of Information 
The second condition is somewhat similar to condition one, in that it is also to do 
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with the availability of knowledge and the importance of knowledge in 
mitigating the negative effects of corporate activity. However, the second 
condition is a requirement that corporations disclose all information they have 
regarding their activities that is important for the people who are affected by their 
activities.  
 
In order for affected parties to participate equally, and in a way that will actually 
have an effect on the corporate decision-making process, they need to have 
access to all the information that is relevant. It is important to note here that 
many corporations discuss transparency in terms of reporting, most particularly 
social and environmental reporting. Whilst acknowledging this, the thesis views 
the transparency requirement to have two key components. The first one is to do 
with direct provision of information prior to decisions about corporate activity 
taking place, rather than just providing reports on activities once they have 
occurred. The second one is to do with information being made freely available 
to those who request it.  Transparency understood as reporting comes under the 
fourth condition discussed below, that of evaluation.  
 
Transparency of information is recognized as a key component of wider 
accountability processes (see for example, One World Trust, 2008: 30) yet in 
relation to corporations, it is a sensitive subject. Indeed, One World Trust note 
that none of the corporations assessed in its 2008 report on accountability have a 
formal policy on information disclosure (Ibid: 32). Transparency is often alluded 
to; for instance, Gap and Coca Cola mention transparency a lot, but it remains 
unclear from their reports what their notion of transparency means (see Coca 
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Cola, 2008 and Gap Inc 2008: 28). One World Trust note that transparency 
commitments suffer from a lack of clearly defined policies by which information 
disclosure is guided; their suggestion is that at the very minimum corporations 
provide a list of information that will be proactively disclosed (2008: 33) as well 
as emphasising that global civil society groups have a key role to play in the 
process of transparency and disclosure. Two examples are cited in this regard - 
the Global Transparency Initiative and the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (Ibid). However, transparency of information does not feature 
frequently in many examples of CSR, and from the examples drawn on here it 
would seem that it is name-checked regularly, but it is unclear what is implied by 
this. 
 
The transparency condition ought to serve to ensure the implementation of the 
AAIP across corporate activities. First, it would demand that corporations 
proactively disclose information that is important in enabling affected groups to 
participate in a decision-making process about corporate activity. The obligation 
to do this is underpinned by the assumed power disparity that exists between a 
corporation and its affected groups. Very often groups affected by corporate 
activities are under-resourced, with reduced capacity to gather and analyse 
information. In these instances, it ought to be incumbent upon the corporation to 
provide those affected with any information they have that might affect people.  
 
There is a wide variety of possible information a corporation could have that 
would be relevant for affected parties. Environmental impact of corporate 
activity is a particularly suitable case. It would also be important that the 
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disclosure of information would not be constrained by the demands of 
capitalism; the withholding of information on the basis of ―market-sensitivity‖ 
could not be justified in this regard. As such, the disclosure of information to 
affected parties in order that they can participate in the process of corporate 
decision-making is seen as being normatively prior to commercial sensitivity.  
 
Second, the demand for transparency would also require that procedures are in 
place so that those affected by corporate activities can easily and successfully 
request information from a corporation. Most current demands for transparency 
focus on this aspect of it, as opposed to the above mentioned proactive 
disclosure. One World Trust provides good practice recommendations in this 
regard which state that corporations respond to requests for information within a 
reasonable timeframe, as well as providing a reasonable justification for refusing 
to give information (2008: 33).  
 
Clearly the requirement for transparency of information is a demanding one. As a 
standalone aspect, ensuring transparency of information is recognised is difficult. 
However, the key point in regard to the five conditions is that they are 
interdependent. As such, in cases where there has been a failure either to 
proactively disclose information, or to respond to information requests (or to 
respond falsely) then those who are affected by that have a legitimate claim to 
redress, as discussed below.  
 
6.4.3 Condition 3: Consultative Forum 
The third condition is an institutional requirement of the AAIP. It proposes the 
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implementation of a global oversight body that facilitates a consultative forum 
through which those who are affected by corporate activity can have their say in 
corporate decision-making. There are three central characteristics of such a 
forum that are crucial to its operation as a fair, just and functional body.  
 
Before elaborating these features it is necessary to address briefly what sorts of 
matters corporations ought to be required to consult about. Evidently, there will 
be many corporate decisions taken, the specifics of which are not relevant to 
those affected. As well as this, it is in some ways counter-productive to specify 
exactly what corporations should consult about, given that a key criticism of 
CSR is that in many instances its agenda is decided in advance of any 
consultation and that the power dynamics of the process place a tight control on 
what is and isn‘t discussed. However it is possible to assume that there are 
number of general areas about which global corporations should consult. One is 
the use of natural resources – it is surely of concern to local communities and 
governments whether and how local resources such as oil, gas, forestry and water 
are used. Relatedly, the environmental impact of corporate activity is also 
obviously of concern to local communities, to employees, to governments. Profit 
redistribution is another example. If a corporation is to manage its tax affairs so 
as little or no corporate profit is redistributed within the area in which it operates, 
this again is of concern to local communities, governments etc. Employment 
terms might also warrant consultation. One of the main incentives for granting 
global corporations the permission to set up in a particular country is the prospect 
of employment. However, the terms on which employment is offered is of 
concern for justice, in terms of pay, job security and working conditions. Issues 
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surrounding a corporation‘s commitment to long-term investment might also 
warrant discussion. This list is by no means exhaustive. Indeed the consultative 
forum should be seen as an ongoing and dynamic process of legitimisation of 
corporate activity.  
 
On this basis, the first feature of the forum is that to facilitate a process of 
meaningful engagement, rather than functioning as ―window-dressing‖ for an 
altogether different type of corporation. As such, it is imperative that deliberation 
and consultation take place before decisions are made, and decisions are taken on 
the basis of that deliberation, rather than those who are affected by such 
decisions being asked for their views as a means of adding legitimacy to a 
decision that has already been taken. This entails the existence of a global 
obligation for corporations to participate in, and work with, such a consultative 
forum.  
  
The question of motivation in this regard is important. There is evidence that one 
of the primary motivations the corporations have in seeking out consultation with 
stakeholders is that there is a good business case for doing so ( see for example 
Pleon, 2005:  18); a majority of respondents in this study cited the business case 
for CSR as their primary motivation. This is problematic in the sense that if 
engagement with stakeholders were to actually affect the decisions taken, then 
clearly there would be occasions when there would not be a business case for 
certain decisions – there would be situations when consulting those who are 
affected might result in a decision that necessitates that the needs of stakeholders 
are put before those of the corporation. Current practices of CSR are overly 
  
 
258 
dependent on the willingness of corporations to be ―good citizens‖ or to make 
morally motivated decisions. By having a forum within which mandatory 
consultation takes place, whether or not an individual corporation is motivated or 
interested in participating in it is not important, given the obligation this scheme 
places on corporations to participate.  
 
It is safe to assume that substantial input from those affected being reflected in 
corporate decision-making would lead to different decisions being taken. While 
many current CSR practices include stakeholder engagement processes, there is 
no reason why the engagement with stakeholders has to actually affect the 
decisions; there is no authority by which corporations must abide that requires 
them to demonstrate that they have used the views of those affected in 
determining their course of action. There is also no core normative standard of 
justice by which corporations must make their decisions. To change this would 
seem like a demanding ideal – and such a process would fundamentally change 
corporations – but there is some evidence that this type of idea is less utopian 
than expected. For instance, it was noted in BP‘s 2008 sustainability report that 
BP‘s reporting would benefit from demonstrating how stakeholder views have 
been taken into consideration (BP, 2008: 10)  
 
At the very minimum, perhaps if it were transparent exactly how stakeholder 
views were taken into account, then different outcomes would be possible. 
However, a global oversight body which facilitated the engagement, and that had 
clear rules for all corporations in this regard, would take this requirement out of 
the hands of corporations themselves, and make the outcome of decision making 
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processes subject to fair input from those affected.  
 
The second characteristic that warrants discussion is to do with the necessity for 
regional/local interpretation of global principles. Part of the difficulty in thinking 
through a global conception of distributive justice is the balance that must be 
struck between global normative requirements, and sensitivity to the plurality of 
cultures that such a conception affects. Thus the AAIP must pay due regard to 
this diversity. By articulating a principle that applies globally, but can be locally 
interpreted, the global intertwinement of peoples‘ interests can be reflected, but 
in a way that does not assume that people think in the same way about those 
interests. On this basis, a consultative forum that necessitated that all groups 
affected must accept the same terms globally would not be a just one. In the 
same way that an ideal Rawlsian liberal democratic society must negotiate many 
competing reasonable comprehensive doctrines, the global community of those 
affected by corporations cannot be seen as a collection of people, all of whom 
have the same interests. Thus the forum must be premised on the assumption that 
different groups will have different ideas, and there must be flexibility for this in 
its operation.  
 
Recognition of the plurality of cultures involved in the CSR process could result 
in a radically different idea of what corporate responsibility is. The differences 
could range from whether child labour is perceived as acceptable or not, what 
sort of working hours are acceptable, whether or not unions are seen as 
legitimate, levels of corporate taxation and how profits are redistributed and 
used, right through to, at the most fundamental level, questioning how some of 
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the basic tenets of capitalism are viewed 
 
The non-negotiability of the CSR process, as discussed by Blowfield is 
indicative in this regard. He argues that CSR takes as non-negotiable some of the 
basic values of capitalism without paying due regard to the idea that such values 
are by no means universal. An example of this is how a community‘s right to 
land affected by, say, a mining company can be subject to extensive negotiation, 
while a company‘s right to own and use such land is not questioned (2005: 520). 
Allowing the space for local interpretation of the AAIP could resolve this. While 
it may very well be the case that the outcome of a consultative forum would 
result in a corporation being authorized, for example, to use local resources, from 
the point of view of justice, it ought not be taken as given that corporations have 
the right to do this, without first local communities ascenting to this. As such, 
cultural specificity of the AAIP would allow all these questions to be up for 
discussion and interpretation in a substantively different way to current 
stakeholder engagement processes.  
 
There is a third issue that draws both these sets of considerations together, that of 
power. There are inherent power inequalities between corporations and the 
stakeholders they engage with. Power inequalities are manifested in the way that 
it is a lot more difficult for some stakeholders to make their voices heard within a 
stakeholder engagement process than it is for the corporation to do so. Power 
inequalities are also manifested in the unquestioning incorporation of capitalist 
values within the process of stakeholder engagement, regardless of their cultural 
suitability or application.  
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Part of this power is do with sheer size – corporations tend to have more 
resources, knowledge and capacity than smaller scale NGOs, local communities 
and possibly employees (although in the case of employees, trade unions can 
often provide the organizational wherewithal to alleviate this). But it also has to 
do with how the question of the responsible corporation has emerged, through 
CSR processes, as a question of technical adjustment and the use of certain 
methods to define what a good corporation is – such as the development of codes 
of conduct, monitoring, reporting etc (Ibid, 2005:  519). In terms of the 
stakeholder engagement process, power is also manifested in exactly who is 
defined as a stakeholder – as such, there may very well be groups affected by 
corporate activity who are not well-organised or well resourced enough, thus not 
recognized as legitimate and not invited into the stakeholder process (Newell, 
2005: 542). As such, corporate power lies in the ability to define and dictate what 
corporate responsibility is.  
 
The application of the AAIP ought to alleviate that inherent differential in power. 
This means that there needs to be an assumed base level of equality between 
those who participate in the forum. All ideas, perspectives and views ought to be 
equal to that of the corporation, with the do no harm principle protecting in 
particular the interests of those whose rights are not already well protected by 
capitalism. On this basis, it would seem that the forum for consultation would 
need an independent arbitrator to negotiate the consulting process. If the forum 
started off from the basis that there are profound effects on those affected by 
corporate activity that need to be mitigated from the point of view of justice 
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(rather than starting from the premise of the business case for CSR), this would 
work towards rectifying these power inequities.  
 
Independent arbitration would only work in this instance if the question of justice 
that was central to proceedings, and this would require a huge change in the legal 
status of corporations. As discussed above, certain basic rights that corporations 
claim – the right to make a profit, the right to private property, free trade, and the 
freedom of capital – would be subject to contestation rather than assumed as 
being prior to the right of those affected to have their say. In terms of feasibility, 
it is clear that this is indeed some distance from what current practice dictates. 
However, it is also interesting to note that there are some legal mechanisms in 
place already (although they are much under utilized and indeed not very widely 
known) that can serve as a reminder that the powerful position that corporations 
are in is not a given fact, and that their existence is subject to legal permission. It 
was mentioned in chapter two that corporations originally were granted their 
licence to operate to fulfill some public purpose. This feature of corporations has 
been alluded to more recently, charter revocation laws being an example in this 
regard (Bakan 2005: 157). Such laws suggest that the right to dissolve a 
corporation for failure to fulfil its purpose (remembering that part of the original 
purpose of corporations was to fulfil some kind of public purpose) is possible 
within American state law, and there exist citizen activist campaigns to 
encourage groups to exploit this law (see for example CELDF, 1996).  
 
6.4.4 Condition 4: Evaluation 
The above three conditions aim to facilitate the best possible circumstances 
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within which corporate decisions can be taken, in a way that provides those 
affected by corporate activities a way to have a say in such decisions. The fifth 
and final condition described below is to do with what happens when this process 
fails. However, in between these circumstances, it is clear that those who are 
affected need to be able to make an assessment about the extent to which the 
process has worked. As well as this, even in circumstances where conditions one, 
two and three have not been met, there is still a need for assessment of corporate 
behaviour. Hence, the fourth condition is to do with evaluation.  
 
The purpose of the condition of evaluation is for those who are affected by, and 
those who participate in, the process of corporate decision-making to be able to 
see whether or not it works. This condition determines who has an opportunity 
for redress. Evaluation processes, then, have the key objective that what is being 
evaluated is the extent to which corporate activity could be said to be just. This 
means that all three prior conditions, with the overarching AAIP cutting across 
them, as well as the do no harm principle underpinning them, would need to be 
the criteria on which the evaluation is performed.  
 
Current CSR practices do contain some evaluative mechanisms. There are some 
specific institutions that have been set up to facilitate corporate reporting on 
environmental and social aspects of activity – for instance, the Global Reporting 
Initiative, AccountAbility, ISO 9000, and SA 8000 (see chapter 2) – all provide 
frameworks by which corporations can evaluate their own performance in 
relation to certain expected standards of social and environmental impact. These 
are predominantly multi-stakeholder fora, and have a variety of participants 
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involved in determining the framework. The reports that are produced are 
generally made publically available and as such the information contained within 
these reports should be known to all those who are affected by those reports.  
 
There are, however, two central difficulties with this type of reporting. The first 
is to do with the fact that there is no obligation on corporations to engage in such 
evaluation, and the consequences of not reporting are generally not very serious.  
For example, reporting according to the GRI framework is a requirement of 
membership of the Global Compact, yet the most serious consquence of not 
providing a report is de-listing from the Compact.  Beyond de-listing, there is no 
sanction for companies who do not report, other than the negative PR that results. 
This would seem to be far too weak to meet any requirement of justice. As well 
as this, even when corporations provide reports, it is not usually clear exactly 
how the information in these reports is used to reform corporate activities.  
 
Another problem with current evaluation mechanisms is the lack of 
independence or objectivity therein. While many corporations aim to meet the 
standards set out in various frameworks that are developed in conjunction with a 
variety of stakeholders in many other instances the corporation itself is the entity 
that produces and writes the report. For instance, Gap‘s 2008 CSR report 
indicates quite clearly that the company‘s performance in relation to CSR is 
evaluated by themselves alone (Gap, 2008: 7).  So while corporations can sign up 
to objectively developed standards of reporting, the way in which this 
information is presented and constructed is left to the corporation. Given the 
resources and tools corporations have at their disposal to present this 
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information, corporations are in a powerful position with regard to how they 
evaluate themselves.  
 
These problems point to the need for an independent evaluation of corporate 
activity. This could be done in the same way that there is independent arbitration 
in the consultative forum. Evaluation would have to be on the basis of the extent 
to which the corporations met all five conditions of the AAIP, with reference to 
the do no harm principles, and the conclusion of the evaluation would have to 
present clearly whether or not there is a case for interested parties to seek redress 
from the corporation.  
  
6.4.5 Condition 5: Opportunity for Redress  
It is necessary to assume that there would be many instances in which corporate 
decision-making would not be acceptable to all those who are affected, and thus 
there is a need for the opportunity for redress. The most basic of such instances is 
of course in circumstances where the do no harm principle has been violated. 
This is seen as a violation regardless of fulfillment of the other conditions. The 
following four instances outlined here attempt to sketch out the more complex 
circumstances that would prompt a group to seek redress, as a violation of the 
AAIP. In real circumstances the cases won‘t be as clear as described here – 
however, it is useful to think through what might be on the agenda for redress, 
and also to think through the level of moral seriousness that might be ascribed to 
different instances. The first two instances as such are viewed as ―first-order‖ 
problems, and call for the corporation to be held seriously to account; the second 
two are viewed as less serious, but still necessitating an opportunity for redress. 
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The difference between the two, however, is that the first two would (possibly) 
trigger compensation; the latter two (depending on investigation in the case of 
the fourth instance) would necessitate a learning exercise on the part of the 
corporation, but not necessarily compensation. 
 
The first instance is when it can be demonstrated that a fair and just procedure 
within the consultative forum has not been followed. This could be as simple as a 
corporation obstructing, or not participating in or facilitating, a consultative 
forum. The problems relating to the inherently unequal power dynamics would 
also most likely be at play here. This could manifest itself in certain interested 
groups not being afforded the opportunity for participation in the forum, or their 
participation being hampered in some way, such as through a lack of capacity to 
organize, or lack of resources to fund research and garner the necessary 
knowledge to participate meaningfully in the forum. Given the obligation that the 
AAIP puts on corporations to give those affected an equal voice, as well as the 
obligation to protect those groups that are not already well protected by reference 
to the do no harm principle, the group affected would have a right to hold the 
corporation to account for that failure to comply with the process, as well as for 
whatever negative effects this failure has resulted in.  
 
A second instance is in circumstances where a fair and just procedure has been 
followed but the decisions taken, or the commitments made, have not been 
followed through on. The existence of a consultative forum, and the obligation 
on corporations to participate is aimed at avoiding situations where there are 
grievances about corporate activities. However it must be assumed that despite 
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this, there will be instances where this process will fail.  In this regard, affected 
groups would have a right to hold the corporation to account for the 
commitments it had made (viewed as binding in terms of the obligation to apply 
the AAIP) and had failed to follow through on. Again, it would also have a right 
to hold the corporation to account for the consequences of that failure.  
 
A third possible instance in which the opportunity for redress might need to be 
exercised is in circumstances where corporate activity has had unforeseen 
consequences that have negatively affected certain groups of people, and that 
these negative effects are indisputable by the corporation. This third instance 
must be seen as morally less serious than the first two, because it would seem to 
be unjust to punish the corporation for outcomes that were unforeseen and 
impossible to avoid. However, in terms of the AAIP, it is important that 
corporate decision-making and the consultative forum within which this takes 
place is seen as an ongoing learning process, and in this third instance the right 
for an opportunity for redress would be exercised so that where possible the same 
errors are not made again. In this regard, the fourth condition of evaluation is 
important. If decisions are to be made about the consequences of decisions taken, 
the ability to access fair and impartial evaluative information about that is key.  
 
A fourth possible and more problematic instance is in circumstances where all 
just procedures have been followed – all relevant groups have participated in the 
process on an equal footing and all commitments made by the corporation have 
been followed through on - yet some groups argue that they have been negatively 
affected. This could mean that some groups argue that a corporation is 
  
 
268 
responsible for a particular negative outcome, while the corporation denies it is 
responsible. The Rawlsian argument in this regard would presumably be that as 
long as the just procedure has been followed, the outcome does not matter. Yet 
with reference to the do no harm principle, it would seem important that 
perceived harm on the part of less well-protected groups is pursued and if 
necessary rectified. Similarly to the third instance above, until responsibility can 
be established for the negative effect, this would have to be seen as morally less 
serious and the opportunity for redress would have to result in a learning exercise 
rather than be used as a method of punishing the corporation. If a link can indeed 
be established, and it can be demonstrated that the corporation knew otherwise, 
by the evaluation carried out under the fourth condition, it would be necessary 
that the negative effect be treated in the same way as the first two instances of 
willful neglect.  
 
It is also necessary to think through what the goal of the opportunity for redress 
condition is. The most obvious is that affected groups would want corporations 
to rectify their wrongdoings. In the case of the first two instances, where willful 
neglect of corporate obligations to observe the do no harm principle and the 
AAIP has occurred, there is a good argument that victims may be compensated. 
In terms of the practice of CSR, what is perhaps more relevant is thinking about 
how the opportunity for redress could be used as part of the development of the 
idea of the just corporation. CSR as learning network is an idea that is very 
prevalent within the literature. For instance, within the Global Compact, the 
specification that it is a learning network, rather than an institution with 
enforceable rules is a core part of its mandate. The justification for this is that 
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anything more stringent than that would act as a deterrent to corporate 
involvement. It is easy to criticise this as a derogation of responsibility on the 
part of CSR practitioners. However, within the realm of concessive theory, it is 
necessary to recognize that the question of CSR is an evolving one, and the idea 
that corporations can be held to account in a similar way to governments also 
requires time to evolve. The opportunity for redress should be seen then not only 
as a way of compensating victims, but also as a way of contributing to the 
development of the broader idea of the responsible corporation.  
 
6.4.6 Criticisms and Objections to the Five Conditions 
It is necessary here to briefly discuss some obvious criticisms that could be made 
about the ideas outlined here. With respect to concessive theory, there are two 
clear objections. The first is that the ideas are too concessive. The second is that 
they are not concessive enough.  
 
With regard to the first claim, it could be argued that by engaging this far with 
CSR as it stands, normative demands are relegated as secondary to feasibility 
demands. As such, if the problem with global corporations is the practice of CSR 
as a response to allegations of systemic harm, why propose a solution that is 
located within that system? For instance, why not contend that the capacity of 
states, as well as that of multilateral organisations, to regulate should be beefed 
up so that corporations are subject to real, meaningful and stringent rules? The 
first and most obvious response to this is empirical. As was detailed in chapter 
two, attempts at multilateral regulation historically have failed, and the historical 
story of CSR tells against stringent regulation of corporations ever succeeding. 
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However, it could still be said this attitude is letting the corporations off the hook 
to an extent. In response to that, the thesis argues that it is not in fact clear that 
state-based and multilateral regulation is actually necessarily more desirable than 
what is being proposed here. In an ideal, Rawlsian state, of course it would be 
possible to regulate corporations according to principles of justice. The reality is 
somewhat different  - there is little evidence to suggest that states or multilateral 
organisations alone are better placed to demand just behaviour from 
corporations. Thus the ideas outlined here emphasise that the inclusion of a 
multiplicity of actors who are affected by corporate activity is an appropriate 
concessive response to corporate responsibility in an empirical sense.  
 
The second response is normative. Following on from the above, we can also 
refer back to Cohen‘s position about justice and rules; his argument is that justice 
requires more than rules, it also required just choices within rules. On this basis, 
it can be argued that CSR is a necessary part of a wider picture of justice in 
which a just ethos is as important as just rules. The conditions suggested here 
thus attempt to reform the process of CSR with this in mind. With specific 
reference to the AAIP and in response to the objection that the ideas are too 
concessive, as Goodin argues, the reason why territory or nationality or common 
history comes into a discussion about constituting the demos (or, deciding who 
has a right to a say), is to do with the intertwinement of people‘s interests. In the 
context of contemporary processes of globalisation, it can be argued that 
people‘s interests are intertwined in many ways, not just in relation to territory, 
nationality or history and that global corporations are one instance of this. If this 
is indeed the case, on the same basis that people have a say in domestic 
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governments because of the intertwinement of their interests, people ought also 
be able to have a say in how corporations affect their lives.   
 
On the other hand, it could also be posed that the ideas suggested here are not 
concessive enough. This argument would run that the conditions of the do no 
harm and the all affected interest principles place unrealistic demands on 
corporations that are unlikely ever to be realised. The first response to this is 
again empirical. The ideas developed here appeal directly to the process of CSR 
as it is currently construed and many of the issues raised in the above discussion 
are well-known and acknowledged by participants in CSR processes, as indicated 
by many of the references given above. As such, the above ideas represent a 
critical engagement with CSR, that admittedly have demanding ideals of justice 
at their core, but that also concede to the way in which CSR has evolved and is 
practiced.  
 
The normative reponse to the criticism that the ideas proposed are not concessive 
enough is the contention that it is not clear that a proposal regarding justice ought 
to be any more concessive. Justice is a demanding ideal, and the work of political 
philosophy is to specify ideals. The ideas proposed here raise the question of 
what the purpose of global business is; the existence and popularity of CSR 
indicates at the very least that there is acknowledgement that the purpose of 
business extends beyond the generation of profit. In the sense that the effects of 
corporate activity cannot be mitigated merely by reference to the principles of 
justice of a state, it is important to set out principles that span corporate activity 
and CSR processes, even if they are demanding far beyond what is currently 
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expected. The historical story of the corporation is indicative here; the original 
purpose of the corporation was to perform a public role. Thus constraining the 
demands of justice strictly to what currently seems possible is a constraint too 
far.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
In summary then, this chapter has articulated two ways of thinking about global 
distributive justice in relation to global corporations. The important division in 
this regard is that between aspirational/ideal theory, on the one hand, and 
concessive theory on the other. Ideal theory is to do with a situation of full 
compliance with the requirements of justice. In relation to the organisation of 
capitalism, the consequences of full compliance with a Rawlsian theory of justice 
is a property-owning democracy in which the right to private property is only 
justified in the context of background institutions within a society that are fair 
and just. Within this scheme of property owning democracies, there are two 
possibilities in regard to corporations; either they would not exist, or they would 
be substantially different to what we know them to be now. The difference would 
be to do with the right to private property and the generation of profit, which 
could only be justified were it to be necessary for the purposes of securing a 
material basis for independence and self-respect.  
 
The thesis also views these ideas as aspirational theory, in that they highlight that 
it is the fundamentals of capitalism that is at the core of the question of what a 
responsible corporation is. While CSR processes aim to generate discussion 
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about the responsible corporation, it is often the case that certain topics or areas 
for reform are off limit within that discussion. This is the value of aspirational 
theory – it highlights that the unlikelihood of something happening is not a 
morally good enough reason not to discuss it. As such, the ideas related to a 
property owning democracy as discussed here in order to set up the discussion of 
concessive theory.  
 
The second section developed the concessive theory idea. Concessive theory 
recognizes that it is important to concede to certain facts if a slide into hopeless 
utopianism is to be avoided. This is important because theory that focuses only 
on the ideal, without reference or concession to certain facts, is easily 
disregarded. Given the focus of the thesis on a practical process like CSR, 
feasibility is a constant concern. However, as was mentioned above, it is 
important not to concede too much. While there is a practical focus of the thesis, 
the purpose of this practical focus is to ascribe duties of justice to corporations; 
as such, the normative dimension to this should not be completely superseded by 
questions of feasibility.  
 
In this regard, the section on concessive theory concedes to the facts of global 
capitalism, and the existence of corporations, as well as to the manner in which 
CSR processes have been developed. Thus the thesis does not advocate straight 
forward state or international legal regulation; this is recognition of the fact that 
CSR has historically involved a wide variety of actors in the process, including 
states, international organizations, civil society actors, and corporations 
themselves. In this sense the thesis does not see the question of justice in relation 
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to corporations as a straightforward question of either state-based conceptions, or 
cosmopolitan conceptions of justice; the just corporation is a matter of discussion 
and contestation for these various actors.  It is also important to note that it is an 
evolving question, and the ideas discussed here attempt to reflect that.  
 
The core principles of this concessive theory are the do no harm and the all 
affected interests principles. These principles cover both substance and 
procedure with respect to the justice. The former principle specifies a basic 
normative minimum – that corporations should not actively harm anyone, but 
particularly those who are not already well protected within the structures of 
global capitalism. The second principle relates to procedure and specifies that 
anyone who is affected by the activities of a corporation have a right to say in the 
operation of that corporation. The do no harm principle interacts with the AAIP 
by specifying who, or what sorts of groups, are of primary concern within the 
five conditions of the AAIP. However, it is the AAIP that is of primary concern 
for this thesis.  
 
Paying due regard to the demand for feasibility with regard to the normative 
standard being proposed here, the principles are implemented through the 
operation of five key conditions, that attempt to encapsulate the multiplicity of 
actors involved in the process of corporate responsibility, as well as the wide 
variety of institutional settings that are co-imbricated in the system within which 
global corporations operate. The five conditions discussed above have articulated 
the roles that other actors, such as governments and civil society organizations 
have to play in the question of corporate responsibility. These conditions were 
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pre-consultative learning, transparency and disclosure of information, a 
consultative forum, evaluation, and the opportunity for redress. Two of these, the 
consultative forum and the opportunity for redress, require the implementation of 
specific global political institutions tasked with the oversight of these processes. 
The others, pre-consultative learning, transparency of information, and 
evaluation, require the participation of actors other than the corporation, in the 
interests of objectivity and independence of the process. Justice in this regard 
requires the existence of these five conditions that are interdependent and 
symbiotic.  
 
These five conditions outline the criteria on which CSR practices can be 
assessed. The thesis next addresses one specific CSR example, the UN Global 
Compact, and ascertains the extent to which the Compact meets these criteria, as 
well as making recommendations for change within the Compact on the basis of 
these criteria. This exercise can be seen as a further extension of concessive 
theory – another concession to certain facts. The question of feasibility is central 
to this, and as such the next chapter will endeavour to maintain a demanding 
normative ideal, while working within the institutional confines and remit of the 
Compact.  
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7: Aspiration vs Concession: a Proposal for the Reform of the UN 
Global Compact 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the extent to which a prominent 
example of CSR, the UN Global Compact (hereinafter the Compact), meets the 
requirements of global distributive justice, as articulated in the previous chapter. 
This will address both the aspirational/ideal theory, as well as the do no harm and 
all affected interests principles, articulated through the five conditions of 
concessive theory. This chapter represents the final consolidation of the 
argument of the thesis. The thesis has established the gap that exists within 
political theory in relation to justice and global corporations, and has attempted 
to fill that gap by developing and extending the ideas about profound effects and 
the basic structure. Subsequently the thesis outlined a proposal for justice and 
corporations that addresses the ideal, as well as addressing what a concessive 
theory of justice in relation to the corporation denotes. This chapter is where a 
core aim of the thesis, to engage theory with practice, is realised.  
 
The Compact is useful as an example of CSR because it represents the 
institutionalisation of the concept of CSR at the level of a global political 
institution. The principles of the Compact are not specific to any one company or 
country, and its foundation is the most recent indication of the belief on the part 
of the UN, as well as other global political actors, that global corporations have a 
large role to play in questions of development, human rights and justice. Given 
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the argument of the thesis that state-based theories of justice are not adequate to 
cope with processes of globalization, and that existing cosmopolitan theories of 
global justice neglect the important role played by private actors, such as global 
corporations, the Compact is illustrative of both the non-state, (global), non -
public aspects of this argument.  
 
It is important to be clear at this point about the purpose and constraints of this 
chapter. The Compact is assessed here in terms of the argument already made for 
global justice and corporations. As such, the chapter and thesis do not purport to 
provide an assessment of the Compact on its own terms (and importantly, the 
thesis is not ―about‖ the Compact), but rather to evaluate it from the point of 
view of the high normative standards it has been argued ought to apply to global 
corporations, as argued for within the thesis. The purpose of this is twofold. 
First, it is useful to extend as far as possible the theoretical ideals of the thesis to 
assess their application to ―real-world‖ instances of CSR. This is an indication of 
one of the main objectives of the thesis to draw together normative thinking 
about global justice with instances of global power that have profound effects on 
peoples life chances. The basis of this thought is, as stated in the thesis 
introduction, that the primary value of theoretical ideals is in how they apply to 
actual instances of injustice. Second, the ideas argued for within the thesis should 
be seen as part of a reform agenda for CSR practices, and within this chapter, for 
the Compact. Although high ideals are espoused within the thesis, as argued in 
the previous chapter, this is a valuable exercise, and the position of the thesis is 
that arguments about justice ought not be entirely constrained by current 
practices and beliefs about what is possible in relation to global corporations. 
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Thus this chapter on the Compact should be seen as representative of the balance 
the thesis aims to achieve between what is desirable and what is feasible. 
 
There are three main sections in this chapter. The first section provides a brief 
description of the Compact, and sets out some of the main criticisms and 
appraisals of the Compact that exist within the literature. The purpose of this is to 
provide some context for the argument being made in the thesis in relation to 
existing views on the Compact. The second section draws on the ideas articulated 
in chapter six in relation to ideal and aspirational theory, and assesses the extent 
to which the Compact meets these standards. The distinction between Rawls‘s 
position on ideal theory and rule-compliance, on the one hand, and Cohen‘s 
position on ideal theory and private choices on the other is utilised here to 
ground the argument being made about the Compact – that justice requires that 
corporations must comply with rules, as well as make just choices. It is argued 
below that the Compact is predominantly to do with the latter part – just choices 
– but does not purport to change rules or demand compliance.  
 
The third section moves to concessive theory and discusses the Compact in 
relation to the two principles and their five conditions that corporations would 
need to meet in order to be called just. The broad concern in this regard appeals 
to some of the issues raised towards the end of chapter six, relating to the extent 
to which reality should be conceded to and normative demands tempered as a 
result. The Compact is good example of this age-old political dilemma being 
played out. For its advocates, it is a pragmatic stepping-stone towards the 
realisation of justice at a later stage. On this view, it is important to engage 
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business in debates about responsibility and justice because such engagement is 
more fruitful than making unrealisable demands and therefore alienating 
corporations from the debate. For its critics, the Compact is a concession too far 
to corporations, which has allowed them to avoid regulation and gain the popular 
credibility that comes from association with the UN logo. While this dilemma is 
discussed and debated by policy makers and academic work concerned 
specifically with the Compact, it is also a central concern for philosophical 
questions of justice. The thesis does not purport to resolve this dilemma entirely, 
but the chapter sets out to highlight and discuss aspects of this debate, as it has 
played out in literature about the Compact, as well as how it impacts upon the 
recommendations of the thesis in regard to justice and global corporations.  
 
7.2 The UN Global Compact: An Experimental Learning Network 
 
The Compact was launched in July 2000, by UN secretary-general at that time, 
Kofi Annan, with the specific aim of giving global markets a human face (UN, 
1999). The Compact draws from Ruggie‘s ideas regarding the globalisation of 
embedded liberalism (see chapter three for further discussion of this idea), and is 
about creating a partnership between business and the UN. This partnership will 
afford the activities and operations of global corporations a degree of social 
legitimacy, in the way that national economies provided the institutional 
mechanisms whereby social values were embedded in the wider economy. On a 
global level, it is argued that the challenge to do this is importantly different to 
that at the national level (see Ruggie 2003 and 2004), and the Compact has been 
devised specifically to address the unique set of circumstances that globalising 
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processes have brought about, by including global corporations and civil society 
actors as key partners in the process (Kell and Ruggie, 1999: 103).  
 
The central idea of the Compact is that corporations voluntarily sign up to a 
series of 10 principles, related to human rights, labour rights, environmental 
standards, and corruption, which are drawn from the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, the ILO‘s Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development and the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (See Appendix 2). Thus the Compact gains 
legitimacy from the utilisation of existing UN documents and declaration.  
 
However, the defining feature of the Compact that its supporters argue makes it 
an innovative and creative venture (cited in Ruggie, 2001), is its existence as a 
non-regulatory, voluntary network, that promotes learning, dialogue and the 
exchange of knowledge between relevant actors. By drawing on a variety of 
models of governance from international organisations - the ―norm-setting‖ 
function of the UN, the collaborative partnerships of the ILO, the focus of the 
OECD on the importance of non-coercive principles of corporate responsibility, 
as well as the focus of the WTO on consensus (Therien &Pouliot, 2006: pp. 60-
62) – it has been argued that the Compact is an instance of ―complex 
multilateralism‖ (Ibid), as well as an ―interesting piece of constitutional design‖ 
(Hurd, 2003: 17-18), or ―an interorganizational network embedded within a 
shared framework of values‖ (Kell & Levin, 2003: 154-155). Perhaps ultimately 
the Compact has been described as the ―network of networks‖ (UN Global 
Compact, no date). Thus, the perceived value of the Compact is in its unique 
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governance structure, and its approach to CSR as a non-coercive encouragement 
of best practice, as well as the dissemination of the ideas developed within the 
Compact about CSR. As such, it could be said that the Compact is about creating 
an ethos of corporate responsibility at the level of a global public institution of 
governance. This idea, and its relationship to theoretical ideals of distributive 
justice has a similarity to Cohen‘s ideas about the importance of a just ethos, as 
well as just rules, within a society; this is discussed further below in the next 
section.  
 
7.2.1 Governance and Operation 
The Compact‘s governance structure was reviewed in 2005, and to date 
comprises of a variety of different aspects, that exist locally, nationally and 
globally, and that include multi-sector actors.
7
 Again the focus in the Compact‘s 
self-description is that the governance structure ―is light, non-bureaucratic and 
designed to foster greater involvement in, and ownership of, the initiative by 
participants and other stakeholders themselves‖ (―Global Compact Governance‖, 
UNGC website). In summary there are 7 entities that make up the governance 
structure of the Compact. These are: the Global Compact Leaders Summit, Local 
Networks, Annual Local Networks Forum, Global Compact Board, Global 
Compact Office, Inter-Agency Team, and Global Compact Donor Group.  
 
In terms of how companies that sign up participate in the Compact, the primary 
way of doing so is through the Communications on Progress  (COP) mechanism 
(for the most recent updates on the COP, see UNGC, 2009). This is a 
                                                        
7
 Unless otherwise stated, the following information about the Compact comes from its website: 
www.unglobalcompact.org 
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requirement of membership and involves the company submitting a report to the 
Compact and sharing it with other stakeholders, detailing how the company has 
incorporated the Compact‘s values into its business. There are 3 key features 
within this: there must be a statement of support from the CEO; a description of 
practical actions; and a measurement of outcomes. Companies must submit a 
COP within one year of joining the Compact, and subsequently on an annual 
basis thereafter. Companies that fail to meet the COP deadline will be marked as 
―non-communicating‖ on the Compact website. Those who fail to submit a COP 
after being ―non-communicating‖ for a year will be delisted from the Compact. 
Such companies will also not be allowed to use the Compact‘s logo, or to 
publically associate themselves with the Compact. All companies are expected to 
address policies and practices that relate to at least two of the Compact‘s issue 
areas in the first five years; subsequently, in the next five years, companies are 
expected to address all issue areas. The Compact provides members with tools 
and guidance as to how the COPs are to be produced, in the form of books and 
information on the website. There are also COP workshops, most of the papers of 
which are published on the website. In terms of highlighting best practice, the 
website also lists what are called ―notable‖ COPs, in which outstanding COPs 
are recognized and shared. Companies are also asked to make a financial 
contribution to the Compact, ranging from $500, up to $10,000, depending on 
company revenue (UNGC, 2008b). As well as this, companies are encouraged to 
participate in the Compact‘s local networks, which are organized within different 
geographical areas, thus facilitating dialogue and exchange of knowledge on a 
local basis.  
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As of October 2009, the Compact had 5133 business members; this figure 
includes large companies as well as small to medium enterprises (SMEs). Of 
these, 168 were FT 500 listed companies. 4199 of these companies were listed as 
―active‖, and 934 were listed as ―non-communicating‖. In addition to business 
participants, business associations (global and local), academics, civil society 
actors, cities, foundations, labour organizations (global and local), and public 
sector organizations can all participate. As of October 2009, these ―other‖ 
participants totalled 1834. The purpose of the inclusion of multi-sector actors 
within the Compact is to do with its focus on dialogue, learning and exchange of 
knowledge, the idea being that multi-sectoral inclusion ensures that all those 
deemed relevant to the debate about corporations are included.  
 
7.2.2 The Compact’s Advocates 
As would be expected, the Compact has generated a vast amount of attention, 
including both widespread praise and as well as criticism. A brief summary of 
these assessments will be provided here, but the main focus for assessment and 
critique is, as mentioned above, the standards outlined in the previous chapter.  
 
The central argument of those in favour of the Compact, as pointed out by 
Therien and Pouliot (2006) is the direct link that is made between the 
participation of business and the alleviation of poverty and the achievement of 
development goals (Ibid: 63). In Annan‘s speech that launched the Compact, this 
link was made explicit:  
We have to choose between a global market driven only by calculations of 
short-term profit, and one which has a human face. Between a world which 
condemns a quarter of the human race to starvation and squalor, and one 
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which offers everyone at least a chance of prosperity, in a healthy 
environment. Between a selfish free-for-all in which we ignore the fate of 
the losers, and a future in which the strong and successful accept their 
responsibilities, showing global vision and leadership. (UN, 1999).  
  
  
Kell and Ruggie provide an intellectual underpinning for this appeal to business 
as key actors in the development process. As mentioned above, this is to do with 
the re-embedding of global markets with social norms, in which it is argued that 
some form of protective mechanism needs to be built into market structures (see 
for example, Kell & Ruggie 1999; Ruggie, 2003 and 2004). By engaging global 
business in these sorts of questions, it is argued that the Compact brings key 
actors into the discussion, and develops partnerships and relationships, rather 
than top-down regulation. Although Kell and Ruggie are cautious in their 
assessment of the Compact, saying it can only make a modest contribution 
(1999: 116), they are clear that another part of its value, they feel, is in the 
advantages it gives to business (Ibid).  
 
The Compact itself also makes this point, its brochure listing 6 different benefits 
to business to participate (2008a). Interestingly, none of these benefits are to do 
with the ―business-case‖ for Compact membership, and are more to do with the 
Compact being able to provide clarity, ease and advice to CSR practices, the 
assumption seemingly being that corporations are engaging with CSR anyway. 
Thus the Compact is pitched as responding to a need of the business community. 
The ―business-case‖ is, however, alluded to by certain business figures that 
advocate membership of the Compact for companies (see for example Leisinger, 
2007).  Thus an important ―selling-point‖ for advocates of the Compact is that 
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membership is advantageous to business participants, in terms of profit 
generation, but also in terms of enabling the process of CSR as it is already 
practiced by many corporations. This idea of the Compact being about providing 
legitimacy for already established practices, instead of working to change such 
practices, is taken up in the second section.  
  
Another focus for praise of the Compact is in the governance structure and 
institutional form it takes. As mentioned above, it is avowedly non-regulatory, 
and adopts the form of a learning network, rather than attempting to impose rules 
on corporations from the top down – indeed the dichotomy between voluntarism 
and regulation is one that is rejected as irrelevant by Kell (who is Executive 
Head of the Compact) (see Kell, 2005: 72). He explains that the purpose of the 
Compact was never to be about regulation, but instead its purpose was to 
experiment with cooperation based on the use of market mechanisms, in a way 
that should be seen as complementary to regulatory approaches (Ibid; my 
emphasis).  
 
Ruggie‘s argument for this form of institutional structure is based on pragmatic 
assessments of the likelihood of any alternative arrangements being accepted, 
either by the UN General Assembly, or by business leaders. In the case of the 
latter the fear is that attempts to codify and regulate would push progressive 
business leaders into an ―anti-code coalition‖ (Ruggie, 2002: 32). He also argues 
that a stronger intellectual case can be made for the learning forum structure on 
the basis that no consensus exists as to what the responsibilities of global 
business to society are. As such, the Compact is an experiment in generating 
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discussion about this (Ibid). The learning forum innovation of the Compact 
provides the idea of corporate responsibility with the degree of flexibility that is 
required, it is argued, to avoid the ―command and control‖ of regulatory 
approaches (cited in Therien & Pouliot, 2006: note 43).  
 
7.2.3 The Compact’s Critics 
Many criticisms have emerged about the Compact that argue the opposite of the 
above positions. One argument is that a close link with the private sector is not 
necessarily a solution to questions of development and third world poverty. This 
link relies on the assumption that neoliberal economic policies work to benefit 
the poor, and is a position that is much contested within the field of development 
studies. Following on from this is the argument that the Compact is an 
endorsement of a cosy relationship between the UN and business, in which the 
values of capitalism will eventually drown out the values of the UN (see for 
example Corporate Europe Observatory, 2000). Some groups argue that this 
alliance between the UN and business should not exist in any guise (see for 
example CorpWatch, 2000 and 2004) 
 
These arguments are often articulated by highlighting and targeting the 
membership of particular companies of the Compact, rather than attacking 
explicitly the more general argument that private sector participation is key to 
development and poverty alleviation. The fear, on the part of many civil society 
organizations, is that of corporate ―blue-wash‖, or of corporations using the 
advantages that are to be gained by being associated with the UN logo, with 
relatively little substantial commitment in regard to corporate responsibility. In 
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this respect, the involvement of some corporations that have established negative 
reputations has been highlighted in various letters and press releases directed at 
the Compact. Some of the corporations (among many others) that are mentioned 
by Corpwatch are Bayer, Nestle, Rio Tinto, Aventis, Norsk Hydro – all as 
―Global Compact violators‖.  
 
While Ruggie and Kell have argued that in general it has been ―single-issue‖ or 
smaller non-transnational civil society organizations that have criticized the 
Compact (1999: 116), later on in the life of the Compact it was argued by 
Bendell that other larger NGOs, who had by that time endorsed the Compact and 
become stakeholders (Amnesty International, Oxfam, and Human Rights Watch 
for example) have all raised concerns about the membership of particular 
corporations (2004: 5). In a public letter to Louise Frechette, the Deputy 
Secretary-General of the UN, NGO concerns regarding the accountability 
features of the Compact were highlighted (see Amnesty International, 2003a). In 
a manner indicative of the wider institutional character of the Compact, the letter 
was published on the Compact website, as was Frechette‘s response (UNGC, 
2003). Utting has also highlighted that these high-profile NGO‘s protests are 
particularly concerning, given their prominence and the general respect that their 
work receives (Utting, 2002b: 645). 
 
A recurrent issue for critics of the Compact is the extent to which its principles 
and commitments are binding and enforceable. Even supporters, such as the 
NGO-coalition mentioned above, have raised concerns that over time the 
Compact‘s principles have been less enforceable and accountable (Ibid). This 
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relates to a more general, wider debate that has emerged in the context of moves 
towards less formal regulation and more self-regulation of corporations, as 
discussed in chapter three. While advocates of the Compact and its unique 
structure claim that any discussion of regulation vs non-regulation in relation to 
the Compact is irrelevant (for instance see quote from Kell above) as the 
Compact is intended to be complementary to regulation, widespread concern 
exists that the endorsement of self-regulation at the level of the UN is a 
derogation of responsibility in this regard, and that the debate has turned away 
from regulation to assuage the concerns of business.  
 
The wider point in this regard is noted by Utting: 
 
[…] the Compact has come to symbolize the virtues of "voluntarism", 
both in the sociological sense that individual actions and values trump 
structural change and empowerment as the key to development and social 
justice, and, in the more literal sense, that voluntary initiatives and 
corporate self-regulation trump stronger forms of regulation involving 
governmental or multilateral organizations (Utting, 2003: no page 
number). 
 
 
Thus the Compact becomes the definition of what constitutes UN-endorsed CSR 
practice, and leaves less room for discussion of other ways of doing things, such 
as the possibilities for new forms of regulation, or the opening up of the CSR 
agenda. The upshot of this, as has been argued by Blowfield (2005), is that CSR, 
the Compact included, emphasises and includes certain values - those that 
Blowfield calls negotiable - and exclude others, the non-negotiable ones (Ibid: 
520). The latter values are to do with capitalism: property rights, profit-making, 
freedom of capital, commodification and the superiority of market mechanisms. 
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This point will be taken up later in the chapter in a discussion of ideal and 
aspirational theory in relation to the Compact.  
 
It should be noted here that the Compact and its advocates are not in denial about 
this; as mentioned above, it was never meant to be a regulatory device. Annan, 
Ruggie and Kell have all emphasized the complementary nature of the Compact. 
Annan states: ―where effective laws and regulatory systems are lacking, and 
where public institutions are weak or corrupt, the Compact can be only a 
pragmatic interim solution‖ (UN, 2004: no page number). However, despite 
these recognitions, it is hard to see where such regulatory initiatives would have 
enough support to get off the ground. In this sense, the Compact is both a 
symbolic as well as an institutional endorsement of this sort of approach. The 
general point is that the endorsement of self-regulation at the level of the UN 
gives it a certain strength and power – in effect it means that self-regulation 
becomes the norm, which in turn contributes to a further consolidation of 
corporate power.  
 
Thus there are two strands of consensus regarding the Compact. One says that 
the Compact is an innovative partial and complementary solution to the difficult 
and challenging problem of corporate responsibility in the context of 
globalization, while the other says that the existence of the Compact is overall a 
weak answer to the same problem, and in many ways is detrimental to the long-
term resolution of the question of corporate responsibility. The next two sections 
of the thesis will draw on some of these arguments in the assessment of the 
Compact in terms of the principles and conditions of global distributive justice as 
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articulated in the chapter six. The broad overarching argument that brings the 
strands of the assessment together is that the Compact endorses and fails to 
challenge received wisdom about corporate responsibility in particular, but more 
generally takes as given many fundamental ideas about global capitalism that are 
intrinsic to questions of global distributive justice. It is in this failure to change 
basic ideas about corporate responsibility that the Compact is primarily lacking. 
However, as the discussion on concessive theory indicates there is scope for 
some relatively easy change in certain aspects of the Compact. Ultimately, the 
thesis accepts that the role of the Compact is one of a stepping-stone, but argues 
that this role is undermined by the lack of discussion or conception as to what 
exactly the Compact (and more broadly, CSR) is a stepping-stone towards.   
 
7.3 Ideal-Aspirational Theory: The Global Compact, Just Rules and Just 
Choices 
 
The ideal and aspirational circumstances outlined in the thesis are to do with the 
restriction on the size of corporations and the generation of profit – thus, they are 
to do with redressing some of the inequalities brought about by current structures 
of global capitalism.  The Compact in no way sets out to do this, and as such 
criticism of it on this basis might seem unfair. However, given that the thesis set 
out to articulate both aspirational and concessional conceptions of justice, and to 
apply these ideas to the Compact, this section of the chapter will develop a 
critique of the Compact on the basis of the ideas of aspirational theory, discussed 
in chapter six, as well as make some recommendations with regard to the 
Compact, corporations and justice.  
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7.3.1 The Compact and Just Rules 
The Compact, as a mechanism of CSR at the level of a global governance 
institution like the UN, is in many ways the ultimate endorsement of CSR as the 
received way that the responsibilities of global corporations are defined. As 
mentioned above, this constitutes recognition of the belief on the part of the UN 
that corporations are intrinsic to questions of development and poverty. 
However, it is also an endorsement of the corporate way of responding to these 
questions, i.e. voluntary, unbinding, self-regulation. Chapter two detailed other 
historical attempts at developing global regulation of corporations, but the 
political-economic circumstances of recent years have determined that these sorts 
of questions have been restricted to the voluntary adoption of codes of conduct 
and responsibility.  
 
On the basis that the Compact does not challenge received wisdom about CSR 
(i.e. that voluntary initiatives are the best way to go about corporate 
responsibility), it does not fit with the ideas of the aspirational theory. The 
Compact is not about the scaling down of the size of corporations, nor about the 
redistribution of profit and progressive taxation, the reduction of executive 
remuneration, or about ensuring widespread ownership of the means of 
production within societies. The Compact as such is an instance of global 
capitalism as currently known being endorsed by the UN as the defining way in 
which corporate responsibility is ensured. More generally than this, the Rawlsian 
ideas to do with compliance with rules are most definitely off the Compact‘s 
agenda. As discussed above, the question of voluntariness versus regulatory 
approaches have been dismissed as missing the point involved in the Compact. In 
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the Rawlsian sense that justice is about creating rules within a basic structure, the 
Compact is not about creating and abiding by just rules, in the regulatory sense – 
it is instead about encouraging just choices.  
 
A valid response to criticism of this nature is of course that the Compact does not 
meet these requirements because it does not set out to fulfil such an agenda. As 
such, the Compact is not about securing ideal justice – as per Ruggie‘s and 
Annan‘s arguments, the Compact is a pragmatic response to circumstances that 
prevail currently. It is not, however, perfect, nor is it the only response. Ruggie 
mentions that there may be instances in which corporations sign up to the 
Compact for strategic reasons, and that the learning model of the Compact 
cannot deal with ―determined laggards‖, who he argues may require different 
approaches, such as legislation or social action (Ruggie, 2002: 33). He also 
points out that the Compact is not a replacement for effective action by 
governments (Ibid: 34).  
 
Ruggie also makes the point that a regulatory-based response to corporations and 
globalisation is impossible, from the point of view that a definitive code of 
conduct for corporations would never get through the General Assembly, but 
practically speaking would also be impossible for the UN to monitor (Ibid). So 
on this basis the Compact is presented as a partial solution that is feasible and as 
well as desirable. The trade-off is of course the inevitability that there will be 
―determined laggards‖ and those who sign up for strategic reasons. In this sense, 
its advocates construe the Compact as a concessive solution to the dilemma of 
the wider responsibilities of global corporations to society.  
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In terms of aspirational theory, then, it is valid to contend that a direct 
comparison with the Compact is unfair, because it is not a comparison of like 
with like. The thesis concurs with this, and in a similar manner to the previous 
chapter, the larger focus of the chapter is on concessive theory.  However, it 
seems there is another point that could be made in this regard. What is missing 
from advocates of the Compact is an articulation of something akin to 
aspirational theory. For instance, given that the Compact is widely accepted as a 
partial, non-ideal response, then what is the ideal response? No such attempt has 
been made by the Compact‘s advocates to do this, but perhaps an indication is 
given in Ruggie‘s report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, in which he 
was unexpectedly critical of the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (see 
Mantilla, 2008 for an analysis of Ruggie‘s contribution).  
 
Broadly, Ruggie criticised the attempts to codify the legal responsibilities of 
global corporations vis-à-vis human rights, because they placed demands on 
corporations that were not placed on states. He also argued that it is the state that 
ultimately has responsibility for overseeing compliance with human rights. Thus 
it could possibly be assumed that ―bringing the state back in‖ is the aspirational-
ideal advocated by some supporters of the Compact. Ruggie terms this approach 
as ―principled pragmatism‖ (cited in Mantilla, 2008). However the second point 
in response to this is that ―bringing the state back in‖ may not be practical or 
desirable. As has been argued in this thesis, the extent to which states are able to 
guarantee human rights (or a wider conception of distributive justice) in the 
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context of globalisation is problematised by the mobility of corporations vs. the 
immobility of governments. Furthermore, states are often not the neutral arbiter 
of rights that they might be thought to be, especially in relation to corporations. 
While Ruggie‘s argument is of course legitimate, without further articulation of 
the aspirational-ideal in relation to corporations from the Compact‘s advocates, it 
is difficult to conjecture further. 
 
7.3.2 The Compact and Just Choices 
There is, however, one other respect in which the Compact warrants discussion 
in relation to aspirational-ideal theory. This is in the manner in which the 
Compact comes some way towards Cohen‘s ideas about just choices within the 
rules. The Compact sets out to encourage members to make corporate decisions 
on the basis of its ten principles, and to share knowledge in regard to the 
processes involved. As such, the Compact is part of the CSR ethos that exists 
amongst many large global corporations. In its role as part of the UN system, it is 
intrinsic in the endorsement of that ethos at the level of global governance.  
 
However, it is difficult to see how an initiative such as the Compact would 
constitute justice as per Cohen‘s position. Recall that in chapter six it was argued 
that on Cohen‘s ideas, justice is about compliance with just rules, as well as 
making just choices. As well as this, Cohen‘s position is that justice requires that 
choices that are made are not market maximising. The Compact is not about the 
encouragement of such choices; it is however, about encouraging the recognition 
on the part of corporations that their behaviour has a wider impact beyond the 
immediate commercial sphere. In its mode of operation, the Compact partially 
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fulfils the publicity requirement discussed in previous chapters. While questions 
have been raised about the efficiency of the way in which the Compact diffuses 
its ethos (see for example Kuper, 2004: 12), in the manner in which the Compact 
institutionalises the idea that corporations have responsibilities beyond their 
commercial ones in a public way, it could be said that it is in some way 
responsible for the generation of an ethos that aspires towards justice.  
 
7.4 Concessive Theory: The Compact and the Five Conditions of Justice  
 
In chapter six it was argued that it is necessary in discussions of global 
distributive justice to differentiate between what is desirable and what is feasible. 
In relation to what is feasible, it was argued that once certain facts are conceded 
to (in this instance, capitalism and the existence of global corporations), two 
suitable principles of justice to apply to global corporations are the do no harm 
and the all-affected interests principles. These principles address the matter of 
substance and procedure in relation to justice, the former specifying a basic 
minimum normative standard that aims to set a limit on corporate activity; the 
latter espouses the idea that justice necessitates the right of anyone who is 
affected by a decision to have a say in that decision. Specifically to this thesis, 
and to corporations, the AAIP was restated thus: ―anyone who is affected by the 
decisions and activities of a global corporation that has a profound effect on their 
life chances should have the right to participate in those decisions and activities‖.  
 
It is important to be clear that the AAIP is utilized, in this instance, to protect and 
support those who are affected by a corporation‘s activities, while the do no 
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harm principle aims to ensure such protection and support for those not already 
protected by the structure and operation of global corporations and global 
capitalism. Given the concessions this argument makes to the realities of 
capitalism and corporations, this would seem a necessary bias or adjustment. It is 
important to be clear that the principles put forward here are meant to operate to 
the advantage of those who do not already have a say built into structures of 
capitalism. As was mentioned above, CSR in general does not address what have 
been called non-negotiable values; in this regard, shareholders, directors, 
executives, as well as in some instances, employees, are generally well protected, 
and have secure rights in relation to a corporation. As well as this the latter 
groups of people also usually opt in to their relationship with the corporation; the 
argument of the thesis is directed at those who experience the profound effects of 
the corporation but who do not or did not necessarily have a choice in that 
regard.  
 
This section of the chapter assesses the Compact in relation to the 5 conditions of 
the do no harm principle and the AAIP that were outlined in the previous 
chapter. It draws on secondary sources that have been published about the 
Compact, as well as evidence from the Compact itself, and seeks to set out 
instances where there are examples of the substance of the condition being met, 
possibilities where the conditions could be met, and instances where the 
Compact works to render the conditions impossible to meet. It also highlights 
ways in which the Compact could be reformed to meet the conditions.  
 
7.4.1 Condition 1: Pre-Consultative Learning 
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Recall that the pre-consultative learning condition is to do with the 
democratization of knowledge, and the importance within that process of 
equipping people with the skills, capacity and tools to use knowledge. The 
purpose of this condition is that in order for those who are affected by the 
activities of a corporation to make use of the full stipulation of the five 
conditions (i.e. to participate in the consultative forum, to access evaluation of 
corporate behaviour, and to seek redress where necessary), they need to be able 
to know how to do so. Without knowing and understanding the system within 
which their lives are being affected, people are easily disenfranchised and 
disempowered. Pre-consultative learning is an attempt to rectify this by opening 
up the manner in which corporations operate (in particular but not exclusively 
CSR processes) to those who are affected so that they are easily understood.  
 
In relation to the Compact, its governance structure and institutional form offer 
some possibilities in relation to pre-consultative learning. In the first instance, the 
public provision of information on the Compact‘s website can be seen as part of 
a process of learning, or at least making information available to those who wish 
to access it. It is possible to access a corporation‘s COP quite easily on the site, 
and to access a lot of literature, both critical and otherwise, that has been written 
about the Compact. There is an important difference in this regard between 
corporations whose CSR programmes are not part of the Compact and those that 
are. Although for the most part the reports that can be accessed on a company‘s 
website are the same as they would post on the Compact‘s website, within the 
Compact it is possible to access criticism of the Compact, and of specific 
companies. This is a small but vital feature. In the sense that pre-consultative 
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learning ought to be about enabling people to understand, but also to contest and 
challenge CSR, the ability to access both negative and positive points of view 
about the process is integral. In this instance it could be said that this is the value 
of having a global public institution such as the UN as the overarching 
framework of a CSR initiative.  
 
In the second instance, there are parts of the Compact that address the matter of 
education specifically. As mentioned above, academic institutions can be 
members of the Compact. In October 2009, there are 326 academic members, 
and the purpose of their membership is said by the Compact to be twofold – to 
enhance and develop knowledge of corporate citizenship, as well as to play a part 
in educating future business leaders with a focus on responsible citizenship. In 
the latter regard, in 2007 the Compact published the ―Principles for Responsible 
Management Education‖ (UNGC, 2007). The premise of this document is that  
 
Academic institutions help shape the attitudes and behavior of business 
leaders through business education, research, management development 
programs, training, and other pervasive, but less tangible, activities, such as 
the spread and advocacy of new values and ideas. Through these means, 
academic institutions have the potential to generate a wave of positive 
change, thereby helping to ensure a world where both enterprises and 
societies can flourish (Ibid: 3).  
 
The document goes on to list six principles that amount to a commitment on the 
part of academic institutions, and those therein who are involved in the education 
of business leaders, to educate and train future leaders with principles of 
responsibility and sustainability in mind. Thus, this is a clear recognition on the 
part of the Compact that change in regard to corporate behaviour necessarily 
involves processes of education, the idea being that in order for it to work, the 
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values of the Compact (and more generally, the values of CSR) need to be 
incorporated into all aspects of a corporation‘s operations and behaviour.    
 
These aspects of the Compact are important and innovative in terms of changing 
the ethos that surrounds independent information about corporations, as well as 
the ethos generated through business leader education. An argument could be 
made that such initiatives could be more far reaching. Bearing in mind that the 
purpose of the AAIP is to give voice to those whose rights in relation to 
corporations are not clearly defined and are often not at the forefront of corporate 
decision-making, the condition of pre-consultative learning is best directed at 
those who are not already in privileged positions with regard to corporate life. Of 
course, CSR education is important, but educating future ―leaders‖ in the practice 
and value of CSR is a substantially different thing from equipping those who are 
already disenfranchised in relation to corporations to be able to contest, 
challenge and understand how they can have their say in relation to corporations. 
 
The key idea in this is that CSR education through prestigious academic 
institutions might easily be responsible for the replication of the hegemonic 
nature of CSR practices as they currently stand. The value of pre-consultative 
learning is that it would heighten understanding of what are considered to be 
―non-negotiable values‖ (see above) amongst those affected by corporations, as 
well as raising awareness that perhaps such values ought not be taken as given. 
In broadening out the sort of education that takes place with regard to CSR, the 
hope is that the condition of pre-consultative learning would have a similar 
expansive effect on other conditions, in particular the consultative forum. Pre-
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consultative learning should enable people to question the fundamentals of CSR 
and corporate behaviour in an equivalent way to the manner in which powerful 
corporations advocate current CSR practices. Pre-consultative learning is thus 
about facilitating resistance, dialogue or participation where necessary.  
 
In terms of how this might take place within the Compact, this is where the 
learning network structure of the Compact would be valuable. Given that the 
Compact incorporates multi-sector actors, it ought to be possible to include an 
educational aspect to the Compact‘s activities, most likely within its local 
networks, and through local schools. NGOs, academics and the ―other‖ 
stakeholders in the Compact are the most crucial here. It is important that pre-
consultative learning does not become akin to educational outreach programmes 
that are part of many CSR processes. The aim of a process such as this would 
have to be clear. The value of it is in the manner in which it enables people to 
contest challenge and understand the process of global capitalism, and not in the 
extent to which it endorses CSR or the Compact per se. This process also ought 
to actively encourage people to participate in the four other conditions, and 
where necessary facilitate this.  
 
As detailed above, the Compact is widely criticised for endorsing a cosy UN-
business relationship. In implementing a pre-consultative learning process, the 
Compact could work to assuage this criticism by provoking and stimulating ideas 
and thoughts that might be considered to be somewhat beyond the pale in current 
CSR processes. If the point of CSR is to make corporations more responsible to 
the societies in which they operate, then surely it is clear that the people who live 
  
 
301 
in those societies need to be well equipped to engage in this process. The 
extension of the learning and educational aspect of the Compact would seem a 
feasible and much desirable addition to the Compact.  
 
7.4.2 Condition 2: Transparency and Disclosure of Information  
As discussed in chapter six, transparency and disclosure of information involves 
two different components – proactive disclosure of information prior to decision-
making taking place, and reacting to requests for information disclosure. Again, 
like condition one, this is to do with the democratisation of knowledge and 
information in relation to corporations, and is seen to be vital in terms of 
enabling people to participate in the whole process of the five conditions. As 
mentioned as well in chapter six, and drawing on what has been said about CSR 
and non-negotiable values, this condition should not be seen to be constrained by 
the market-driven requirement that privacy of information is required in order for 
corporations to function efficiently within the market. If all corporations are 
required to do this, then they will all be performing on an equal basis in any case.  
 
In relation to the Compact, its success in regard to the transparency requirement 
is mixed. In the sense that the Compact functions on the basis of the disclosure of 
reports regarding CSR performance and results, it can be said that transparency is 
part of the wider initiative. Indeed transparency is name-checked regularly by the 
Compact‘s advocates, and it is argued that transparency is one of the core goals 
of the Compact overall (Ruggie, 2002: 6; Kell, 2005: 77). Kell makes the point 
that transparency was improved with the introduction of the COP requirement in 
2004; this was part of a process of decentralisation, freeing the Compact‘s office 
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from the ―impossible mission of providing assurance in a centralised fashion‖ 
(Ibid: 72). Transparency, he argues, is something that will grow and improve 
over time as the Compact does so (Ibid). However, as was mentioned in chapter 
6, transparency when it means just reporting (i.e. transparency after decisions 
have been taken), is classed instead as evaluation by the thesis, and as such is not 
seen as part of this second condition.  
 
The Compact also deals specifically with the matter of transparency through the 
tenth principle, which was introduced in 2004, that states "Businesses should 
work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery." (see 
Appendix 2). In this guise, transparency is seen as part of an attempt to eradicate 
corruption. The Compact argues that there is a clear ethical case for not engaging 
in corrupt practices, but focuses more extensively on the business case for not 
doing so. As such, this transparency/anti-corruption principle is to do with 
encouraging businesses to comply with the rules in relation to fair business 
practice.  
 
The condition of transparency draws directly from the AAIP, and tries to enforce 
the idea that people have a right to information about decisions that are to be 
made that will have a profound effect on their life chances. A requirement as 
stringent as this is not currently part of the Compact. What this would mean in 
relation to the Compact is that participating members would have to, presumably 
as part of the COPs, disclose all information that is relevant to those who will be 
affected by their activities. The type of information this would require is wide-
ranging: from the environmental impact of activities, to the relationship between 
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corporate profits and wage payments to workers, as well as a corporation‘s tax 
arrangements. The idea is that those affected by corporations need clear and 
honest information in order to participate in the consultative forum of condition 
three. Given that COPs currently are set up as ―after-the fact‖ reporting, in the 
sense that they provide reports on activities that have already taken place, the 
second condition would require that COPs also have a pre-decision making 
component, rather than just being about reporting. As well as this, corporations 
would have to, through the Compact, respond to requests for information from 
those affected by their activities in a non-obstructive manner. Constraining the 
release of information on the basis that it is market sensitive is not justified and 
should be actively discouraged, or indeed banned, by the Compact.  
 
In terms of how this condition would operate through the Compact, the most 
feasible way of doing this is channeling requests for information through the 
Compact‘s local networks, so that these requests can be dealt with locally by 
corporations where possible, and where necessary they can be passed on to the 
global operations of the corporation. In terms of the proactive disclosure 
requirement, local networks are again important here. Corporations could, 
through the local networks of the Compact, arrange meetings and information 
dissemination points where those who have an interest and who are affected can 
access open, honest information freely. Information such as this would also have 
to be posted on the Compact‘s website, but it is important that information 
disclosure is not restricted to the website so that access to information is not 
dependent on access to technology. The key idea in this instance is that it is 
incumbent on the corporation, and by extension the Compact, to get the 
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information to those who need it.  
 
Oversight and policing of this condition is difficult. It is hard to see how it can be 
guaranteed that all information is proactively disclosed. This is why it is 
important that this is seen as a condition with two components: it is easier to 
know when specific requests for information have been turned down than when 
information has been held back. In terms of proactive disclosure, again this is 
where the institutional structure of the Compact is important. The participation of 
multi-sector actors can contribute to ensuring that transparency requirements are 
met, and the publicity element of the Compact will enable them to do so. In 
being able to publish information on the website, participants in the Compact can 
make public any evidence they might have to suggest that the transparency 
requirement has not been met.  
 
However, this method of oversight would seem to be somewhat partial or 
conditional and given the importance of this condition, it is perhaps the case that 
a more stringent way of doing it is required. As was mentioned above, the 
Compact is avowedly non-regulatory, and so discussion of how to regulate the 
sort of information that corporations disclose is not on the cards at present. 
However, given the emphasis that the Compact‘s supporters place on its status as 
both a complementary and innovative initiative, there are two foreseeable options 
in relation to condition two. Either the Compact, with all its multi-stakeholder 
participants, becomes an advocate for change in terms of the laws related to 
information-disclosure, so that proactive disclosure of information relating to 
CSR performance becomes a (global) regulatory requirement in the same way 
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that financial information is at a domestic level. Or, the Compact adopts a 
policing role itself with regard to information disclosure and corporations. The 
latter option in this instance would seem unlikely to come about, given the 
emphasis Kell places (as mentioned above) on the impossible task of the 
Compact‘s office overseeing the transparency requirements of corporations. The 
former offers more prospects for change, given the Compact‘s commitment to 
knowledge dissemination. 
7.4.3 Condition 3: Consultative Forum  
Condition three involves an institutional component – the implementation of a 
consultative forum that would facilitate the participation of anyone who is 
affected by the activities of a corporation in corporate decision-making in matters 
that involve them. Recall that in chapter six, three important factors of this forum 
were highlighted. First, it was highlighted that it is imperative that the 
consultative forum is a meaningful exercise in consultation – rather than a post-
hoc legitimisation of decisions already taken. Second, it was discussed that the 
forum must be able to incorporate regional interpretations of global principles. 
Third, it is also important that the forum explicitly addresses the question of 
power differentials between participants. The issues on which consultation ought 
to take place was not specified, given that this would seem a necessarily fluid 
question. However, some obvious possibilities were mentioned, such as 
environmental impact, use of natural resources, employment terms and taxation 
arrangements.  
 
The extent to which the Compact provides a consultative mechanism for those 
who are affected by its participants‘ activities is limited. In terms of how the 
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Compact operates, the participation of various different stakeholders through the 
learning networks of the Compact could be seen to be a form of consultation. 
The ability of all stakeholders to contribute to knowledge about corporate 
responsibility and the Compact is part of this in the sense that reviews and 
reports on the Compact‘s work, as well as the work and views of all participants, 
are accessible to those participating in the network. Thus the Compact functions 
partly on the basis of consultation of stakeholders, and over time various 
consultation processes have resulted in new principles being adopted and new 
initiatives being started. Some examples in this regard are the introduction of the 
tenth principle (anti-corruption) in 2004, after a long series of consultations, as 
well as a consultation process initiated by the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights in cooperation with the Compact office, on the relationship 
between business and human rights (see OHCHR, 2004). At any one time, on the 
Compact‘s website there are a number of initiatives that call for stakeholders 
participation in and endorsement – as of October 2009, the time of writing, there 
was a call for business participation in an initiative called Caring for Climate, as 
well as a CEO Water Mandate, which provides a strategic management 
framework to help businesses to address the global water crisis. As such, the 
manner in which the Compact operates is akin to a consultative process, in that it 
is not a top-down, regulated institution. The learning network form allows for 
ongoing consultation of all stakeholders, and thus the evolution of the Compact 
is dependent on a consultative process.  
 
However, the type of consultation that is advocated in the thesis is different to 
this. In terms of the three criteria laid out above, the Compact does not meet any 
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of them. Consultation of the type advocated here would mean that corporations 
consult with those who are going to be affected by their activities prior to 
decisions taking place, so that consultation affects the decisions that are made in 
a substantive way. As well as this, the consultation that the Compact currently 
practices is voluntary and sporadic. The thesis has argued that the AAIP 
constitutes an obligation on the part of corporations to consult with those who 
are affected, and also demonstrate not only the extent to which that consultation 
has been taken into account, but also actively seek to make decisions that help 
those who do not already have a voice within the structures of the corporation. 
As has been discussed, the AAIP must not work to privilege those groups who 
are already in a powerful position in relation to corporations. As such, 
consultation within the Compact, in order to meet the requirements of the AAIP, 
would need to work to the advantage of lesser powerful groups, rather than being 
a ―talking shop‖ in which the assumptions of current CSR practices are reified 
and replicated.  
 
In terms of changes the Compact would need to make in order to do this, it seems 
that at a very minimum a substantive consultative process would have to be a 
requirement of participation in the Compact, in the way that the COP currently 
is. Although the COP is in some ways a consultative mechanism, it is about 
reporting on progress already made, not about discussion of decisions before 
they are taken. The Compact could facilitate a consultative process throughout its 
local networks, whereby regional and local interpretations of corporate practices 
could be discussed and deliberated upon. In its oversight of this process, it would 
seem necessary that the Compact take on some form of mediator role, in order to 
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avoid the process being a hegemonic one in which the opinions and views of 
already powerful groups trump those who are less powerful. Again, this is where 
the question of negotiable and non-negotiable values comes in. The Compact 
would have to facilitate open and free discussion of the terms on which a 
corporation would gain support (or, indeed, permission or a license to operate) 
for its activities and decisions.  
 
Consultation, thus, would need to take place in a way that the power inequities of 
the relationship between the corporation and those affected by its activities are 
mitigated by the oversight role played by the Compact. This is where the 
Compact, as part of the UN, could assert a form of public authority over the 
proceedings, in a way that would demonstrate the Compact to be independent 
from its powerful corporate members and the conception of CSR that has come 
to prevail. In the sense that the Compact has been set up as a specifically non-
regulatory instrument, it is difficult to see how the Compact would take on this 
sort of role. While the emphasis of the Compact is on partnership and dialogue, 
presumably the argument against the Compact taking on a form of arbitrator of 
public values role would be that this would act as a deterrent for corporations to 
become part of the Compact. 
 
However, within the form of a learning network, surely there ought to be scope 
for, at a minimum, widening out the discussion beyond the parameters that are 
already set within the Compact. Although the ten principles that form the core of 
the Compact are well defined and have an international legal grounding, it ought 
to be recognized that justice in relation to corporations and in relation to the 
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Compact, would often require more than compliance with these standards. It 
needs to be explicitly recognised by the Compact that legitimate (and indeed 
just) behaviour on the part of corporations is not always guaranteed by the 
recognition of the ten principles of the Compact. Although compliance with 
these principles would go a long way towards improving corporate behaviour, 
the argument of the thesis has been that justice applies to corporations because of 
the profound effects corporations have on people‘s life chances. While these 
effects are often to do with human rights, or labour rights (which are covered by 
the Compact), they are also often to do with, say, the land rights of indigenous 
peoples, or the rate of pay to employees relative to the rate of profit generated by 
a large corporation, which are not covered by the Compact. Thus an arrangement 
that would go some way towards the recognition of justice by the Compact 
would involve the Compact arbitrating with these, currently non-negotiable, 
values in mind.  
 
7.4.4 Condition 4: Evaluation  
As discussed in chapter six and above, there is an evaluative element to the 
Compact. Corporations are expected to provide a COP annually, and the report is 
expected to follow the framework for evaluation set out by the GRI. Three 
problems were highlighted in chapter six with many evaluative mechanisms of 
CSR practices, which related to both principles. First, it was argued that in 
general evaluative mechanisms are weakened by the fact that there is no 
obligation for corporations to undertake any evaluation of their performance in 
relation to CSR standards. Second, many evaluative mechanisms are undertaken 
by corporations themselves, rather that by an independent body; this undermines 
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the objectivity of the process. Third, evaluating corporate performance in relation 
to CSR commitments does not in any way guarantee that the findings of the 
evaluation must have any impact upon corporate activity.  
 
The main evaluation mechanisms of the Compact are articulated through the 
―Integrity Measures‖, which include the COP, as discussed above (see UNGC, 
2008b). Another part of this evaluation mechanism that is undertaken by the 
Compact itself is in instances of alleged ―systematic and egregious abuse‖ of the 
aims and values of the Compact. In such instances, the Compact commits to 
contacting the corporation involved, to determine whether there has been abuse. 
In instances where there has, the Compact commits to take actions such as 
referring the corporation to another UN entity‘s dispute mechanism, dealing with 
the matter through its own offices or through the Compact board, or requesting 
that a local Compact network deal with the matter. All these possibilities are at 
the discretion of the Compact, and to be decided on an ad hoc basis.  In instances 
of allegations of abuse, failure to enter into dialogue with the Compact can result 
in a corporation being listed as being non-communicating, and subsequently 
possibly delisted. As well as this, if the continued membership of a corporation is 
seen to be detrimental to the reputation and integrity of the Compact, the 
Compact can also delist the corporation. As such, this is an ongoing evaluative 
process, in which the Compact provides guidance and assistance to rectify 
situations and allegations that run contra to the values of the Compact. In the 
sense that the Compact can delist members that it deems to be in breach of the 
values, it can be said that the evaluation that the Compact performs is primarily 
an oversight function, to maintain its overall integrity and accountability.   
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It should be noted that these mechanisms have been strengthened in recent years 
– the integrity measures were only introduced in 2004. As of June 2008, 630 
companies had been delisted; this indicates that the process of being delisted is a 
serious one that does actually take place. However, in terms of the three main 
difficulties with evaluation mechanisms in general, the first and third are most 
relevant to the Compact. While providing a COP is a requirement of membership 
of the Compact, the consequences of not doing so are, at worst, being delisted 
from the Compact. It does not impact upon a corporation‘s permission to conduct 
business. The consequences of being delisted from the Compact are unclear, yet 
it is difficult to see how anything worse than negative PR could happen. But the 
Compact in this regard is adamant that it is not a ―compliance‖ initiative and as 
such the evaluative process that it oversees and facilitates seems more to do with 
maintaining the institution of the Compact per se, rather than ensuring 
corporations behave in a responsible manner.  
 
This points to the third type of difficulty with evaluation mechanisms. There is 
no reason why evaluation has to actually impact upon corporate activity. 
Evaluation under the Compact is primarily to do with maintaining the integrity of 
the process of CSR, rather that evaluating the extent to which membership of the 
Compact facilitates and ensures just or responsible behaviour on the part of 
corporations. In many ways this is a similar point to that made above in relation 
to the consultative forum. Just as it is necessary that corporations take part in 
consultation prior to important decisions being taken, it is also necessary that 
evaluation leads to changes taking place within corporate activity, rather than 
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evaluation culminating in the production and dissemination of a report, and little 
else. There seems little point in evaluating activities if that evaluation does not 
also produce an impetus, or indeed a requirement or obligation, to change.  
 
Many of these critiques have been made by NGO members of the Compact, who 
have called for clarity of the role of the Compact once corporations have signed 
up to the principles (see Amnesty International, 2003a). The premise of such 
critiques is the step-by-step reform of the Compact that needs to take place to 
tighten up areas in which it is alleged it is lacking. However, in order for these 
changes to take place, it is perhaps the case that the Compact would need to 
become the sort of body that it is adamant that it is not – a public, regulatory 
institution that monitors compliance with stringent requirements.  
 
7.4.5 Condition 5: Opportunity for Redress  
Chapter six set out four possible circumstances where justice would require that 
there is an opportunity for redress for those affected by corporate activity. The 
first two sets of circumstances were described as ―first-order‖ problems, and 
these described situations in which either fair and just procedure has not been 
followed (i.e. one or more of the previous four conditions have not been met), or 
situations in which fair and just procedure has in the main been followed, but 
commitments and decisions made have not been followed through on. The 
second two sets of circumstances the chapter discussed were described as 
―second-order‖ problems; these are situations in which all fair and just 
procedures have been followed and commitments have been followed through 
on, but certain groups have been negatively affected in a way that can be 
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demonstrated to have been unforeseen, but importantly, are undisputed; or, in 
situations where all just procedures have been followed, but certain groups 
maintain that they have been wronged, and this is disputed by the corporation. 
The first two situations outlined here warrant redress by the corporation; in the 
case of the second two, it is less clear. There would be a need for independent 
verification of these allegations, and certainly a need for the alleged abuses to 
prompt a ―learning experience‖ on the part of the corporation. It was also pointed 
out that this fifth condition has a role to play in oversight of the do no harm 
principle, regardless of compliance with the other conditions.  
 
In relation to the Compact, the evaluative mechanism described above is also in a 
way a method of seeking redress. In situations where abuse has been alleged, 
members of the Compact, like NGOs or academic institutions, can highlight to 
the Compact instances of alleged abuse and the Compact undertakes the 
commitment to investigate; the Compact also, it should be noted, makes very 
clear that the Compact will make every effort to weed out ―prima facie frivolous 
allegations‖ (UNGC website). In cases where the Compact refers allegations of 
abuse to be dealt with through the dispute mechanisms of other UN entities, this 
could be deemed to be a form or redress. Utting has argued that the Compact 
could make more of the connection between international legal human rights 
norms and global corporations, i.e. that breaches of Compact values can indeed 
be pursued through international law and that the Compact should work to 
correct the misconception that such law is only applicable to states, but to 
corporations as well (Utting, 2002: 645). In a more recent statement in this 
regard, the Compact distances itself explicitly from any involvement in 
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international law. In relation to the Integrity Measures, the Compact states: 
 
The purpose of these measures in the first instance always will be to 
promote continuous quality improvement and assist the participant in 
aligning its actions with the commitments it has undertaken with regard to 
the Global Compact principles. It should be noted that the Global Compact 
Office will not involve itself in any way in any claims of a legal nature that 
a party may have against a participating company. Similarly, the measures 
set out below are not intended to affect, pre-empt or substitute for other 
regulatory or legal procedures or proceedings in any jurisdiction  (UNGC, 
2008b).  
 
 However, even if the Compact does not want to get involved in legal disputes, it 
is reasonable to suggest that the Compact could place more emphasis, within its 
Integrity Measures, on how it can enable groups to seek redress through existing 
UN entities.  
 
Again, what is noticeable in this regard is that in relation to both redress and 
evaluation, as discussed above, the Compact is very focused on self-validation of 
the institution and process of the Compact itself, rather than focused on justice 
and corporations. Of course, this is about maintaining the accountability and 
legitimacy of the exercise, and that is important to the extent that if the Compact 
must exist, it ought to be legitimate and accountable. But without an explicit way 
that abuses and wrongs can be pursued and redressed, it is difficult to see how 
the full process of justice in relation to corporations can be guaranteed.  
  
In terms of how the Compact would allow for redress in a more explicit way, it 
would seem necessary that either the Compact develops an institutional 
component to which claims for redress can be brought, or the Compact receives 
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the claims, and facilitates them by referring them on to a court of law – either 
state courts, or an international court.   
 
7.5 Stepping Stone or Concession Too Far? 
 
The above section has provided a detailed analysis and critique of the Compact 
in terms of the five conditions of concessive theory offered in the previous 
chapter. The purpose of the chapter has been to apply the discussion of global 
distributive justice to the Compact as an institutionalised example of CSR, and 
the chapter has done this by addressing each of the five conditions individually. 
Generally the chapter has been quite critical of the Compact, but the critical 
comments have been tempered by suggestions on how the Compact could be 
reformed.  
 
Aside from the specifics of the conditions, the above discussion raises a broader 
question about global justice, that is most likely impossible to resolve here, but is 
worthy of discussion. This question is to do with whether it is better from the 
point of view of justice to engage something like the Compact in the short-term, 
on the basis that in the long-term it will come to be a stepping-stone to a more 
just or ideal arrangement. Or whether collusion in this way is in fact detrimental 
to long-term prospects for realising justice. These sorts of questions were 
addressed very briefly towards the end of chapter six, and it is important to 
address them again here in relation to the Compact.  
 
7.5.1 The Long-Haul Argument 
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As highlighted towards the beginning of the chapter, this dichotomy of the 
Compact as either a pragmatic stepping-stone, or as an example of corporate 
―bluewash‖, dominate the general debate in the literature. Theoretically 
speaking, Caney employs an interesting argument that touches on similar larger 
questions. Using what he terms the ―long-haul argument‖ in relation to the 
distribution of carbon emission rights, Caney discusses how, on the basis of this 
argument, an unjust arrangement could be accepted on the basis that it is better in 
the long-term. Such an argument concedes that the arrangement in question may 
indeed be unjust, but is also a necessary step towards a later, just, arrangement 
(2009: 128-129). In relation to the Compact, a similar position would state that it 
is necessary to engage corporations within the debate, rather than alienate them, 
so that in the long-term corporations are a willing part of the solution. Thus this 
concessive approach to justice views the process of CSR as one of long-term 
reform towards an ideal end.  
 
There are two possible counter-arguments to this view. The first is that, as Caney 
points out, it would be unjust for corporations to insist on particular 
arrangements that suit them on the basis of this long haul argument, because of 
course, if they were willing to, say, reduce their size, redistribute their profits 
more equitably, or indeed assent to more stringent regulation, they could – such 
change is not impossible. This is what aspirational theory is getting at: that such 
radical change is not beyond the realm of human possibility. Even within the 
realm of concessive theory, it is clear that from the point of view of justice, it is 
not just for corporations to constrain the process of CSR merely on the basis of 
this long-haul argument. As the history of CSR, as well as the review of the 
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literature on the Compact both show, however, this is in fact what happens. 
Corporations to a great extent have developed and defined the idea of what 
corporate responsibility is on the basis that anything more stringent than self-
regulation will not work because they will not agree to it. Thus what is deemed 
to be possible is very often dictated instead by what is in fact merely desirable 
from the point of view of corporations. As Caney highlights with a quote from 
Rawls, ―to each according to his threat advantage is not a conception of justice‖ 
(1999: 116; my emphasis).  
 
This view states, then, that corporations withholding their support for fairer or 
more just arrangements on the basis of long-term aspirations is itself an act of 
injustice, and certainly is not a valid reason to prevent progress. Furthermore, 
justifiable use of this long-haul argument would surely require a clear 
articulation of what the long-term goal in relation to CSR actually is. The 
Compact as an institution does not do this, and it is not explicitly clear that those 
who sign up to the Compact do so with the belief that it is an interim measure 
towards an eventual arrangement that would constitute justice.  
 
7.5.2 Redrawing the Parameters of the Debate 
In many ways this argument gets to the real core of the question of a concessive 
theory of justice and corporations. There is no one conception of justice and 
corporations that is widely accepted to which participants in the Compact can 
work towards. Of course, in relation to distributive justice and the state, there is 
no one conception either, and it is not desirable that there would be. However, at 
least in relation to distributive justice and the state, the parameters of the 
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question, as well as who is involved in the question (or, as mentioned earlier in 
the thesis, the site of justice) is clear. Such dimensions of the question of global 
justice are vastly less clear, and the discussion of what these dimensions are only 
at very early stages.  
 
This thesis contends that global corporations are a vital element in the debate 
about global justice, and that initiatives such as the Compact and wider processes 
of CSR are worthy of analysis on this basis. Ruggie‘s basis for the importance of 
CSR and global corporations, as well as initiatives like the Compact, is similarly 
motivated – that corporate power is indicative of a wider reconstrual of what he 
calls the global public domain (2004) and corporations themselves are 
indispensable in questions of global justice. As Kuper puts it, harnessing 
corporate power is vital (2004). As such, the Compact is valuable for its 
―stepping stone‖ status because it firstly raises the question of corporate 
responsibility at the level of a global public authority like the UN and second 
because it draws into the debate key actors such as corporations themselves, as 
well as civil society, academics, governments. By setting out the framework in 
this way, the Compact is a preliminary step towards redrawing the parameters of 
analysis in relation to justice and corporations.  
 
Having said that, many of the criticisms made above in relation to concessive 
theory still hold  - the Compact could fairly easily do more in relation to pre-
consultative learning and education, as well as pushing for more and better 
transparency and information disclosure. It is difficult to see, on the other hand, 
how the more stringent demands of the consultative forum could be met, as well 
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as the opportunities for redress. The key point here is that overall, the operation, 
aims and objectives of the Compact should not be constrained by the process that 
has come to be known as CSR. If the Compact is to be a progressive idea that 
strives towards a more ideal arrangement it is essential that this is not limited to 
corporations‘ conception of what corporate responsibility is. The suggestions 
made in this chapter are put forward as small ideas that argue for the enhanced 
legitimacy and opening up of the CSR process, on the basis that such changes 
would constitute progress towards justice.   
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has assessed the extent to which the Global Compact meets the 
requirements of justice that were articulated in chapter six. In terms of the ideal-
aspirational ideas, it was argued that the Compact does not in any real way 
address the matters that are part of the ideal conception of justice in relation to 
corporations put forward in this thesis. In the sense that the ideas of a property-
owning democracy would place limitations on the size of corporations, the way 
in which profit is redistributed, and executive remuneration, as well as requiring 
changes in the ownership of corporations, the Compact is an entirely different 
initiative than that suggested by these ideal requirements of justice. It was 
acknowledged that this is perhaps an unfair criticism, given that these sorts of 
ideals are not the ones that the Compact sets out to achieve.  
 
On this basis it was contended that the question of justice and corporations would 
be developed usefully if advocates of the Compact were to articulate what an 
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ideal solution would be, given that most advocates acknowledge that the 
Compact is partial, non-ideal solution. The difficulty of doing this is clear, and in 
many ways this difficulty points to the relative newness of these sorts of 
questions. However, as discussed above, opting for less just solutions on the 
basis that an ideal solution is in the offing is not on its own justifiable. To this 
end, it was suggested that perhaps a role the Compact might play is in generating 
a discussion about what an ideal solution might look like, and about what the 
Compact is aspiring towards.  
 
The bulk of the chapter focussed on concessive theory and assessed the extent to 
which the Compact meets each of the conditions articulated in chapter six.  In 
relation to pre-consultative learning, it was argued that there is some scope for 
the realisation of this condition within the Compact in the sense that education 
and learning is a partial component of the Compact‘s activities. The situation in 
relation to the second condition (that of transparency and disclosure) is mixed. 
Transparency as interpreted by the Compact is to do with the disclosure of results 
and performance, as well as to do with the tenth principle related to anti-
corruption. The thesis views transparency differently to this, arguing that 
transparency in relation to justice would require the proactive disclosure of 
information about decisions that have an effect on people‘s lives, as well as 
responding to requests for information in a timely and non-obstructive fashion. 
In order to meet such requirements, the Compact would need to either become an 
advocate for change in regard to the legal requirements regarding transparency, 
or provide the facilities for the realisation of this condition.  
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In terms of condition three, the consultative forum, again the extent to which the 
Compact meets such a requirement is limited. While part of the operation of the 
Compact is based on a network of stakeholders who technically can be consulted 
and offer opinions, etc, this is post-hoc consultation, whereas the thesis 
advocates the consultation takes place before decisions are made. It was argued 
that the Compact needs to make a substantive consultative process a requirement 
of Compact membership, while also broadening out its activities to include real 
intances of injustice rather than just adherence to the 10 principles. Condition 
four is to do with evaluation. It was argued that in relation to the Compact, the 
fact that there is no substantial requirement to provide evaluation of performance 
– while the Compact provides an oversight function with regard to evaluation, 
failure to conduct evaluations does not constitute a revoking of a licence to 
conduct business. It was also argued that under the terms of the Compact, there is 
no reason why the evaluation produced has to impact upon corporate activity, 
and as such evaluation in this sense legitimises the process of CSR.Finally in 
relation to the fifth condition, that of the opportunity for redress, similarly to the 
points made about evaluation, any opportunities for redress that the Compact 
offers seem primarily to do with maintaining the integrity of the Compact itself 
as an exercise of CSR, rather than a quest to render corporations more just.  
 
Finally the chapter raised and discussed some of the broader questions in relation 
to justice and corporations that the foregoing discussion generates. These 
questions relate to long-standing dilemmas that emerge within politics, about 
whether change requires step by step reform, and thus possible collusion in non-
ideal circumstances, in order to achieve a long-term goal of ideal circumstances 
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of justice. Or, on the other hand, whether change requires disengagement from 
non-ideal solutions and holding out for an ideal one. The thesis cannot purport to 
resolve this, but the discussion of the Compact has illuminated several things. 
First, there are aspects of the current operation of the Compact that could be 
relatively easily enhanced or developed with ideal circumstances of justice in 
mind. Second, in opening up the question of CSR at the level of a global public 
authority like the UN and in actively inviting other actors into the debate about 
CSR, the Compact to an extent opens up the process in a democratic fashion. In 
terms of the ideas proposed here, this is a positive development. Following on 
from this, and finally, in order for the Compact to be anything to do with 
questions of justice, its advocates need to articulate more clearly exactly what the 
Compact is aiming towards. Without this, the Compact could quite easily be 
dismissed as an exercise in endorsing CSR per se. There are reasons to think that 
the Compact is flexible and progressive in this regard, given the various changes 
that have been made since its inception. However it seems to be widely accepted 
that the Compact is only a partial solution. The wider but vital question is 
whether there is an ideal solution, and if so, what that is.     
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8: Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The thesis has addressed the central research question of what demands can and 
should be made of global corporations by a conception of global distributive 
justice through a critical interrogation of the phenomenon of CSR. The thesis 
examined existing conceptions of global distributive justice, which it was argued 
struggle to cope with the activities of global corporations. The thesis then 
proposed two sets of principles that ought to apply to global corporations, first an 
ideal-aspirational set and second, a concessive set: the do no harm and the all 
affected interests principles, to be realised through the implementation of five 
conditions through the process of CSR. The thesis concluded by applying these 
ideas to a working example of CSR, the UN Global Compact. In the discussion 
of the principles, greater weight was given to concessive theory in an effort to 
consolidate the aim of the thesis to join theory with practice.  
 
The conclusion of the thesis summarises the main arguments, chapter by chapter. 
The conclusion then reiterates the wider implications of the argument, and the 
central contributions the thesis has made. Subsequently, a short section offers 
some reflection on the research process, highlighting elements of it that were of 
signatory importance to the overall thesis and the challenges faced in the process. 
The latter elements feed in to the next section, which details ideas for a future 
research agenda.  
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8.2 Thesis Summary  
 
In order to answer the central research question, the thesis explored five sub-
questions. In the first instance, the thesis detailed the historical emergence of 
CSR policies, and developed a theoretical explanation for this emergence, 
drawing insights from Polanyi and Gramsci. The thesis then provided a 
justification for the application of principles of global distributive justice to 
global corporations by critiquing both state-based and cosmopolitan conceptions 
of distributive justice. Following on from that, the thesis outlined the demands 
that might be made on corporations in ideal-aspirational circumstances. 
Subsequently, the thesis outlined the demands of global distributive justice once 
certain facts are conceded. This led to the proposal that corporations ought to be 
subject to both a do no harm principle, as well as an all affected interests 
principle, which could be applied through five conditions of the CSR process. 
The final chapter applied these ideas to a working example of CSR, the UN 
Global Compact.  
 
8.2.1 Chapter Summary 
Prior to outlining the normative element of the argument, the thesis first 
concentrated on the history of CSR, as well as the development of a theoretical 
explanation for its emergence. Chapter two provided some details as to what 
constitutes a global corporation, highlighting two important features that are 
important from the perspective of justice. One of these was the adoption of legal 
personality by the corporation, which enabled the separation of ownership and 
management within the organisation; the other was the various techniques that 
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corporations use to globalise their activities. The chapter then detailed three 
historical periods in which the emergence of CSR can be characterised, loosely 
defined as a period of corporate philanthropy pre 1945, a period of (failed) 
attempts at multilateral regulation from 1945-late 1980s, and finally the 
contemporary period in which CSR has largely become a self-regulatory process.  
The chapter then detailed the agents, content and procedures involved in CSR 
processes in general. The value of this chapter was to provide some historical 
context for CSR which highlights the manner in which it blurs some of the 
boundaries on which theories of distributive justice rely – national/international, 
public/private. Furthermore, this historical context also informed the concessive 
proposals on distributive justice developed in chapter six. In the attempt to strike 
a balance between desirability and feasibility, the failed attempts at multilateral 
regulation were important to bear in mind when making recommendations.  
 
Chapter three provided further context for understanding CSR, this time in an 
effort to explain its emergence, in terms of why CSR emerged when it did, as 
well as why it takes the form it does. In relation to why CSR emerged when it 
did, the chapter drew on some insights from Polanyian thought to interpret CSR 
as a reaction to a Polanyian type resistance to the pursuit and practice of free-
market global capitalism. The chapter also argued that Gramscian ideas about the 
hegemonic bloc of capitalism offer insight into the shape and form CSR takes, in 
terms of the constraints capitalism puts on the agenda and scope of CSR, as well 
as in terms of the tools and procedures it uses. These explanations fit in to the 
wider argument of the thesis by highlighting firstly a certain inevitability about 
the emergence of the question of the socially responsible corporation and 
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secondly the way in which capitalism shapes the process and outcomes of the 
CSR process.  
 
Chapter four moved on to the political theoretical element of the argument. The 
central purpose of this chapter was to critique three prominent state-based 
conceptions of distributive justice, as well as to develop a critique of them on the 
basis of normative and empirical reasons. The chapter categorised these state-
based conceptions as being based on notions of citizenship, national self-
determination and sovereignty, drawing mainly from the work of Rawls, Miller 
and Nagel, respectively.  The chapter critiqued the various justifications offered 
by such conceptions for why distributive justice is a question for the state alone. 
In terms of normative reasons, the justifications of liberal tolerance, collective 
and cultural identities, and sovereignty, were rejected as insufficient reasons for 
the restriction of justice to the state, arguing that there are many instances of 
injustice that could not be resolved by reference to such values. In terms of 
empirical reasons, the chapter argued that contemporary globalising processes 
are constituted in part by structures of global governance that are responsible for 
the articulation and development of norms, rules and standards that affect 
people‘s life chances in a way that is important for a conception of justice. 
Global corporations are one instance of this, and statist conceptions of justice are 
not designed to deal with such realities.  
 
Chapter five turned to cosmopolitan conceptions of global distributive justice. 
The chapter first set out some of the main characteristics of a cosmopolitan 
paradigm of thought, loosely divided into methodological, moral, political and 
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legal cosmopolitanism. The chapter then discussed some of the main 
justifications adopted by cosmopolitan writers for thinking about distributive 
justice in a global sense, and discussed some of the principles they adopt in doing 
this. In respect of such arguments, the central contention of the thesis is that 
existing accounts of cosmopolitan justice are incomplete in their implicit 
omission of the activities of global corporations. The chapter then moved on to 
develop the central argument of the thesis, which is that the application of 
principles of justice to global corporations can be justified on the basis that such 
corporations are responsible for profound effects on people‘s life chances. The 
chapter drew on the basic structure debate between Rawls and Cohen that 
discussed whether the basic structure is made up of only legally coercive 
institutions, or whether it also includes legally noncoercive institutions, as per 
Cohen‘s argument. The thesis agreed with Cohen in this regard, but with a 
modification that drew on Williams‘s idea about publicity and justice – i.e. that 
justice should only apply to institutions that have an element of publicity in their 
rules. It was argued global corporations are an instance of such an institution – in 
the way that their activity unavoidably shapes people‘s life chances, but also in 
the element of publicity that the pursuit of CSR policies involves.  
 
Having set up the argument that global corporations ought to be subject to 
principles of global distributive justice, chapter six attempted to develop what 
such principles should look like. The chapter was divided into ideal-aspirational 
theory, and concessive theory. In terms of the former, two possibilities were 
developed. The first drew on the Rawlsian idea of property-owning democracy, 
and argued that a fully just corporation would have limits placed on its size, 
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profit generation, taxation and executive pay. The second element to this drew on 
Cohen‘s ideas about a just ethos, and contended that Cohen‘s view, which 
emphasises the importance of just choices within just rules as a conception of 
justice, would perhaps contend that some formof CSR (in the sense that it is a 
voluntary self-regulatory process), as well as just rules, would be necessary for 
the fully just corporation. In terms of concessive theory, the chapter proposed 
two principles that react to certain facts that are deemed necessary to concede. 
These were the facts of global capitalism, global corporations, and the manner in 
which the question of CSR has historically come to be addressed. The first 
principle the chapter discussed was a do no harm principle, which would set a 
basic minimum normative standard that could limit corporate activity. The 
second principle attempts to bring a degree of legitimacy to the CSR process. 
The AAIP proceeds on the basis that those affected by corporate activity have a 
right to a say in such activity. The chapter proposed five conditions the CSR 
process would have to fulfil in order to meet this requirement.  
 
Chapter seven sought to apply the proposals of chapter six to a working example 
of CSR, the UN Global Compact. The chapter began with a description of what 
the Compact is and how it works, as well as the central arguments that have been 
made for and against its activities. The chapter then provided a brief discussion 
of how the Compact measures up to the ideal-aspirational ideas of chapter six. 
On these terms it was argued that the Compact does not in any real way meet the 
aspirational ideas of a property-owning democracy; however it was also 
acknowledged that this not what the Compact sets out to do. On this basis it was 
proposed that the project of the Compact might be improved by some articulation 
  
 
329 
of what the ideal is, given that most of its advocates acknowledge it as a partial 
solution, or a stepping-stone. In terms of concessive theory, the chapter assessed 
the activities of the Compact on the basis of each of the five conditions of the 
concessive theory developed in chapter six. While there is scope for enhancing 
the Compact relatively easily in some regards – for instance, in terms of 
conditions one and two – in others, meeting the conditions would seem quite a 
deviation from what the Compact currently does. The chapter concluded with a 
discussion of whether the Compact ought to be seen as a valuable stepping-stone 
towards a more ideal solution, or as a concession too far. It was argued in this 
regard that if the Compact is to be seen as a stepping stone, then an articulation 
of what the long term goal is in relation to CSR would be very valuable. It was 
also suggested that there are some relatively straightforward changes that could 
be made that would improve the Compact‘s activities.  
 
8.3 Wider Implications and Central Contributions 
 
The thesis set out to bring together two areas of literature, that of global political 
theory and that of IPE and global governance-based interpretations of global 
corporations, in order to explore the demands that could be made of global 
corporations in terms of global distributive justice. In doing so, the thesis 
attempted to apply political theoretical ideals of justice to the practice of global 
corporations and their CSR policies. The motivation for doing this was two-fold: 
in the first instance, the thesis proceeded from a conviction that discussions of 
global justice to a great extent neglected empirical realities of the global 
economy, particularly in terms of the activities of global corporations. In the 
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second instance, the thesis was motivated by the idea that global corporations 
have wider societal responsibilities than a narrowly defined commercial remit, 
and that while CSR was a useful demonstration of this idea, a normative critique 
of it would be useful in terms of thinking through what it means for global 
distributive justice.  
 
 The remainder of this section details the wider implications and central 
contributions of this piece of work.  
 
8.3.1Reflection on the Theoretical Framework 
As detailed in the introduction, the thesis adopted a cosmopolitan-liberal 
framework within which to answer the central research question. Key to this 
framework was the cosmopolitan concern with the mitigation of suffering, and 
the liberal contention that possibilities exist for the mitigation of suffering within 
a (global) institutional basic structure that shapes people‘s lives to an inescapable 
degree. The thesis argued that global corporations are part of that institutional 
structure and the application of principles of global distributive justice, such as 
those articulated in chapter six, could contribute to the mitigation of that 
suffering.  
 
However, this theoretical framing throws up two dilemmas for the conclusions of 
the thesis. In the first instance, a liberal framing of the research questions and the 
responses suggested by the thesis is problematised to a great extent by the central 
point within liberalism that the division between public and private spheres is an 
important one that needs to be maintained for reasons such as liberty and 
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autonomy, among others. Thus global corporations are private actors are beyond 
the realm of coercive relations and should not be subject to obligations of justice. 
However, there are two (related) ways in which the thesis can respond to this. 
Firstly, while it can be argued that the maintenance of a separation between 
public and private spheres is a key component of liberalism, it can also be argued 
that a concern for justice is also a key component. Thus instances of ‗profound 
effects‘, it can reasonably argued, are of more serious concern for liberals. 
Secondly, as chapter five discussed, the liberal separation of public and private 
has long been contested, in particular by (liberal) feminist theory, and the thesis 
contends that the activities of global corporations are another manifestation of 
this disputed separation.  
 
A further dilemma raised for the theoretical framing of the thesis is the use of a 
neo-Gramscian critique of CSR, which argues that the constraints of the CSR 
process are an aspect of the hegemonic control of global capitalism, while the 
conclusions and recommendations for the reform of CSR are situated within the 
process of global capitalism itself. This is a tension within the thesis, that comes 
about as a result of the drive within the work to produce an account of global 
distributive justice that relates as far as is possible to the empirical realities of the 
world as we find it, but also draws on a philosophically–grounded argument. As 
such, the response to this dilemma is to do with the importance the thesis places 
on feasibility. Firstly, the recommendations of the thesis where possible 
articulated how the constraints of global capitalism could be avoided such that 
the process of CSR might be made more just – for instance, the five conditions 
are to do with enhancing the position of those who are not already well protected 
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within the structures of global capitalism. Secondly, it is not entirely clear what 
sorts of recommendations for reform that Gramscian-inspired perspectives could 
offer to the emergent debate about global distributive justice. While a critique of 
global capitalism is vital to this debate, it is also important to develop normative 
solutions that concede to facts. On this basis, it is unlikely that CSR or global 
capitalism are going to disappear and hence the thesis put forward some 
suggestions that, while they are vulnerable to this critique, also fulfil the thesis 
aim of developing an empirically grounded account of global distributive justice.  
 
8.3.2 Global Political Theory 
The thesis does not contend that state-based theories of justice are irrelevant. 
There are some questions of distributive justice that are answerable in the context 
of the nation-state. What the thesis instead argues is that there are also many 
questions of justice that are not answerable within the nation-state. Thus one of 
the central contributions of the thesis is to the growing set of literature that does 
not rely on the state as the locus of activity that is relevant to questions of justice. 
As detailed in chapter five, many cosmopolitan writers have addressed questions 
of global justice, but as was argued, the focus for most has been on the role that 
global public institutions of governance have to play in global justice, rather than 
―private‖ actors such as global corporations. The wider implication of having 
made this argument is that if conceptions of global justice are going to truly take 
account of globalising circumstances, the parameters of concern must stretch 
beyond the limitations of the nation-state. If political theory neglects the 
importance of such actors, its wider relevance will be inherently restricted. On 
this basis, the thesis should be seen as an attempt to extend the disciplinary 
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boundaries of political theory beyond the state, as well as the public realm, and 
to focus the concern on questions of justice on circumstances where people‘s 
lives are profoundly affected.  
 
8.3.3 IPE and Global Governance 
The role played by global corporations is widely dealt with by the fields of IPE 
and global governance. However, what the central argument of the thesis has set 
out to highlight is that the activities of global corporations are a matter for 
political philosophy, as well as IPE and global governance. As such, the thesis 
uses the Rawlsian idea of the basic structure to highlight that there is a broad 
structure of institutions that profoundly affect people‘s life chances, and that this 
structure is, as Rawls says, the subject of distributive justice. It is the emphasis 
that political theory places on the centrality of a series of political institutions 
with regard to the normative question of justice that is useful to the analysis of 
the role played by corporations. What the thesis has sought to emphasise is that 
the newness or unfamiliarity of the globalising circumstances highlighted in the 
thesis should not deter political theory from thinking through the normative 
ideals that could be expected to apply in such circumstances. However, the thesis 
also emphasises that corporations are not immune from normative critique, and 
that a phenomenon like CSR ought to be scrutinised from the perspective of the 
impact it has on people‘s lives. This argument contributes to IPE and global 
governance-based literature by demonstrating that normative critique of global 
corporations is possible through a systematic engagement with philosophical 
ideas. By developing a foundation within political philosophy for the critique and 
reform of global corporations that has engaged with the process of CSR, the 
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thesis offers IPE and global governance-based literature a conception of global 
distributive justice that is currently for the most part missing.  
 
8.3.4 Synergy of the Literature 
A development of this point is applicable to both sets of literature. In exploring 
the relationship between CSR, global corporations and a theory of global 
distributive justice, the thesis has tried to identify the intersections of the 
(disciplinary) boundaries that are often perceived to exist between, say, public 
and private, as well as national and international. What the identification of these 
intersections points to is the idea that a theory of global distributive justice is of 
necessity an amalgamation of these considerations. As such, global distributive 
justice needs to take regard of globalising circumstances such as the activities of 
global corporations, both in their role as actors within structures of global 
governance, but also in the way they have profound effects on people‘s life 
chances. Concomitantly, the question of justice in relation to CSR and 
corporations cannot just be about endorsing the centrality of market mechanisms 
to address the societal responsibilities of corporations – it also prompts the use of 
normative ideals to propose ways in which corporate activity can be reformed. 
This points to the wider importance of the re-construal of the ―public‖ sphere (in 
which questions of distributive justice are traditionally thought to be located) to 
encompass both the global, as well as the market. This complexity of the site of 
justice where such intersections are located is a necessary component of the 
question of global justice. The implication of this complexity is that many 
assumptions about our parameters of concern must be dropped, rendering the 
issues addressed all the more urgent.  
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The manner in which the thesis has set out its recommendations is also a 
contribution to both fields of work. By dividing the recommendations into ideal-
aspirational theory on the one hand, and concessive theory on the other, the 
thesis applies theory to practice. The abstracted nature of much work about 
distributive justice is of clear value, and certainly one of the primary roles that 
political theory has is to set out ideal-type demands about what justice requires. 
However, this thesis set out to address the question of justice in an importantly 
different way – that is, to think through what justice means in the world as we 
find it, with particular reference to corporations. In its division between ideal-
aspirational theory and concessive theory, the thesis demonstrates that more 
specific application of theoretical ideas is possible, and indeed desirable. It also 
demonstrates, however, that concrete realities are most certainly not immune 
from, and indeed require attention from, the normative perspective of justice.  
 
8.3.5 CSR 
A final implication of the thesis is the role it has to play in literature that is 
specifically about CSR, in terms of management and organisational behaviour. It 
was not a specific aim of the thesis to make a direct contribution to this literature, 
primarily because the thesis views the question of global corporations and CSR 
as inherently political, rather than a technical question of how to make CSR 
―better‖. However, there are some broad points that the thesis has made that are 
useful to that sort of literature. Primarily this is to do with the idea that CSR is 
about accepting that corporations have responsibilities that extend beyond that of 
profit generation, and that corporations impact upon people‘s lives in a serious 
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way. This is essentially what prompts approaching CSR from a political 
philosophical perspective – but it also implies that managerial or technical 
approaches to CSR research could benefit from engagement with the normative 
ideals of global justice. Importantly this would imply the broadening out of the 
CSR agenda to address the fundamental assumptions of the process. As the thesis 
has emphasised, current CSR processes take as non-negotiable many 
fundamental assumptions of global capitalism. It is these assumptions that need 
to be addressed if the circumstances of injustice in relation to corporations, or the 
suffering inherent in their activities, are to be mitigated. It is often emphasised 
within the corporate community that a key problem with CSR is that there is a 
prevailing lack of clarity about what it means and what it is trying to achieve. 
The thesis suggests that one way of acquiring clarity about it is by looking to 
some ideals of political philosophy, however abstracted they might be from 
corporate realities.  
 
8.4 Research Process 
 
The purpose of this short section is to reflect on the research process in general 
and to discuss what worked, and also how the key challenges of the process were 
dealt with. Such limitations raise important questions for a future research 
agenda, which is discussed in the next section.  
 
A central motivation of this work was to apply theoretical ideals to real 
circumstances of perceived injustice. In doing this, it was necessary to draw 
global governance/IPE literature together with political theory literature. The 
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subject areas within each field are vast, and making the connection between them 
was of core importance to the thesis. What worked in this regard was the key 
idea of the thesis – that there exists an argument within political theory which 
states that justice applies in circumstances where an institution has a profound 
effect on people‘s life chances, as discussed in chapter five. This theoretical 
insight opened up the possibility of scrutinising global corporations from a 
normative perspective that has a solid foundation within the field of political 
theory.  
 
A second signatory part of the research process was the division of political 
theory recommendations into ideal-aspirational and concessive theory. Much 
work regarding distributive justice attracts obvious questions about its feasibility 
and its applicability, and in many ways this fences off many of the arguments 
that are made, simply from the point of view it is not possible to see how the 
ideas would apply or work in the ―real-world‖. The use of concessive theory in 
this regard was particularly important – hence the priority given to it within the 
text – in the way that it allowed certain important facts to be conceded, while 
retaining the idea that it is desirable and feasible to articulate normatively 
demanding requirements that could apply to the CSR process.  
 
However, as is perhaps inevitable, the aspects of the research process that 
worked are also linked to its limitations. The thesis has made the case that both 
sets of literature gain significantly from speaking to one another. However, the 
limitation of this approach is that neither area has been developed as fully as the 
topic might warrant. For instance, in relation to global corporations and CSR, 
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some generalities have had to be made about the practice of CSR in order to 
garner a coherent picture of what CSR looks like. CSR is more nuanced and 
varied than it has been possible to describe. Additionally, the activities of global 
corporations are also a lot more nuanced – certain corporations take social 
responsibility seriously, while others don‘t. CSR is also often differentiated in 
terms of the home country of a corporation, or the history of a corporation. In 
relation to the arguments about global distributive justice, again generalities have 
had to be made to articulate the central arguments of various different thinkers. 
While it has been pointed out that most political theorists have not addressed the 
activities of corporations in their work, the question of whether what they have 
said could be applied to corporations has not been explored fully.  
 
While the ideal-aspirational and concessive theory division has been a key 
contribution of the thesis, it raises problematic questions as well. For instance, 
has too much been conceded and ought a discussion of global justice aspire to 
higher ideals? Conversely, although facts are conceded, whether or not the ideas 
proposed are actually feasible in practice is under explored. The scope of what 
has been covered within the thesis has certainly brought together two areas of 
literature in a useful way, but such a project meant that any testing of feasibility 
outside of the internal logic of the thesis has not been possible. While such 
testing is not necessarily the goal of a thesis such as this one, it is important to 
acknowledge awareness of this, especially given the constant effort within the 
thesis to apply theory to practice.  
 
8.5 Agenda for Future Research 
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As mentioned above, the limitations of the research process elicit a future 
research agenda.  
 
8.5.1 CSR 
A conception of global distributive justice has been developed here to apply to a 
broadly conceived idea of what the global corporation is and what constitutes 
CSR. The thesis presents this conception as a response to the neo-Polanyian and 
Gramscian analysis of CSR that was developed in chapter three. However, in 
order to do this some generalisations have to be made about CSR. A deeper 
analysis would have to acknowledge that CSR does not mean the same thing to 
all people or corporations. As well as this, some corporations have better records 
than others at dealing with their societal responsibilities, while many 
corporations have different ideas about what such responsibilities are. To this 
end, a productive area of research would be to develop a more nuanced 
normative critique of global corporations, delineated perhaps in terms of 
industry, CSR issue area, or indeed country of origin. For instance – the ways in 
which, say, the oil industry has particular effects on people‘s lives and what this 
means for distributive justice: how would the do no harm and all affected 
interests principle work in that regard? A further area in which the ideas of the 
thesis could be explored is in relation to the UN Global Compact, with a more 
detailed and focussed study on its activities.  
 
Future research would also seek to address the applicability of what has been 
proposed within organisations themselves. The thesis has not been able to 
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address the way in which CSR is approached and developed within corporations, 
in the sense that it has primarily been concerned with making a political-
philosophical argument for the reform of CSR. This critique has largely been 
externally driven, i.e. from the outside looking in to the corporation, which was 
necessary in many ways. However it would be of use to address the vast 
literature that exists within organisational behaviour about the status of CSR 
within the firm, in order to further discuss institutional limitations and the 
feasibility of CSR schemes.  
 
8.5.2 Global Political Theory 
In terms of the political philosophical component of the thesis, there is much 
scope for future research. The key purpose of the pursuit of further research in 
this area would remain the same – to contribute to the growing literature that 
addresses distributive justice in the context of globalisation. The thesis has 
argued that the idea of profound effects is one way in which justice in this 
context can be addressed. Others writing on the subject propose other ways and it 
would be of value to assess these arguments in relation to global corporations. As 
well as this it would also be of value to assess the extent to which the argument 
made here works in relation to other aspects of globalisation that have a similar 
effect. The political theory that has been addressed within this thesis has covered 
predominantly analytical thought that is largely Anglo-American in origin and 
orientation. This limitation was a necessary one, given the breadth of the task at 
hand. However, it would be of use to address the ethical and normative questions 
raised by global corporations and CSR from the perspective of continental 
strands of political philosophy, with particular attention to Habermasian ideals of 
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discursive democracy, or Foucouldian notions of disciplinarity in relation to 
corporations.  
 
Finally, chapter six, in proposing the do no harm principle, suggested that further 
development of this idea necessitated a clearer articulation of basic rights 
violations in relation to global corporations. It was not possible to do this in this 
thesis, given the focus that was placed on the procedural aspects of legitimacy 
raised by the application of the AAIP. Given that the thesis set out to address the 
process of CSR in particular, this focus is justified, on the basis that the AAIP 
requires the implementation of certain conditions across CSR procedures, thus 
addressing the large scope of corporate activity. However, it would be productive 
to focus some future research on the basic normative standard articulated by the 
do no harm principle, in the sense of how rights violations can be specified in the 
context of contemporary intensified processes of globalisation within which 
corporations operate. It would be important in this regard to discuss the 
relationship between this idea, and that of humanitarianism, and what the 
implications would be for the global institutional order.  
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
The central concern of the thesis - that of the demands that a conception of global 
distributive justice could make of global corporations in the context of 
contemporary globalising processes - has been addressed through the critique of 
existing conceptions of distributive justice, as well as through the development 
of proposals that apply to corporations and their CSR processes. What has been 
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articulated is a demanding set of ideals that are not impossible, but are unlikely 
to be attainable, as well as a set of concessive principles that pay due regard to 
the need for feasibility in regard to justice and corporations.  
 
The thesis should be seen as a partial response to a problem of the ―real-world‖ 
that the disciplinary boundaries of political theory make it sometimes difficult to 
contend with. The question of the just corporation, while perhaps not completely 
resolved by this thesis, has, through the exploration of the questions posed, been 
raised as an urgent and compelling matter that it is incumbent upon political 
philosophy to respond to.  
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Appendix One 
 
Rawls’s Law of Peoples 
Eight Principles 
 
The principles of the Law of Peoples are as follows: 
 
 
1. Peoples are to be free and independent, and their freedom and 
independence are to be respected by other peoples. 
 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.  
 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defence but no right to instigate war for 
reasons other than self-defence. 
 
6. Peoples are to honour human rights. 
 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 
 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable 
conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social 
regime  
 
(source: Rawls, John (2001) The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press): 37) 
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Appendix Two 
 
The UN Global Compact 
Ten Principles 
The Global Compact asks companies to embrace, support and enact, within their 
sphere of influence, a set of core values in the areas of human rights, labour 
standards, the environment, and anti-corruption: 
 
Human Rights 
1. Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of 
internationally proclaimed human rights; and 
2. Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.    
 
Labour Standards 
· Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
· Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; 
· Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and 
· Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation.      
 
Environment 
· Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to 
environmental challenges; 
· Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental 
responsibility; and 
· Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally 
friendly technologies.     
 
Anti-Corruption 
· Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, 
including extortion and bribery.   
 
 
 (source: The UN Global Compact Website: www.unglobalcompact.org)  
 
  
 
